Lincoln Income Life Insurance v. Alexander

Citations: 1959 Ark. LEXIS 466; 231 Ark. 63; 328 S.W.2d 266Docket: 5-1911

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; October 26, 1959; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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An appeal concerns a lawsuit to recover benefits under a double indemnity clause in a life insurance policy issued by Lincoln Income Life Insurance Company for the life of Evard O’Leary Alexander, whose beneficiaries are Elzo and Eosie Alexander. The policy stipulates a $1,000 payment upon death and an additional $1,000 if death results from violent, external, and accidental means. Evard was fatally stabbed by Lovely Lee on September 5, 1957, and died on September 12, 1957. The insurance company paid the initial $1,000 but denied the double indemnity claim, asserting that Evard's death was not accidental but rather a result of an assault.

The appellees sought the additional $1,000, along with statutory penalties and attorneys' fees. The insurance company contended that Evard’s death arose from intentional actions rather than an accident, thus exempting it from double indemnity payouts. To support its position, the company presented testimony from four witnesses. Rosa Lea Harding confirmed she was present at the tavern and saw neither man with a weapon. Carl Di G-erlamo, an insurance agent, provided no significant evidence. Gurinder Abner, the tavern's bouncer, stated he escorted both men out without witnessing a fight and saw Evard shortly after the stabbing without a weapon. Lovely Lee, the attacker, admitted to the stabbing but provided conflicting statements regarding the events, including denying ejection from the tavern, which contradicted testimonies from Harding and Abner. Lee's credibility was further undermined by his evasiveness during questioning.

Lee claimed that Alexander approached him with a knife; however, during his murder trial, he testified that Alexander merely had his hand in his pocket. Key undisputed facts include that Alexander did not strike or verbally confront Lee after leaving the Tavern, and there was no agreement to fight between them. Lee also noted that a bystander yelled "Look out," and that there were approximately 25 to 30 people in the Tavern at the time. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellees, awarding them $1,000, plus statutory damages and attorney’s fees, leading to this appeal.

Appellant challenges the trial court's decision to give Instruction No. 11 to the jury, which stated that if an unarmed person (Alexander) was moving aggressively towards another (Lee) without knowledge of the latter’s intent to harm, the death could be deemed accidental. This instruction is based on established Arkansas law. The court found no error in giving this instruction.

The appellant's first point of contention is that the evidence does not support a finding that the insured (Alexander) died from accidental injury. It is established that Alexander’s death resulted from a stab wound, which is considered a violent and external cause, thus creating a legal presumption of accidental death. The jury was instructed accordingly, and it was their role to determine the credibility of the evidence presented.

The second point raised by the appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Alexander’s death did not result from his involvement in an assault. The insurance policy included an exclusion for deaths resulting from participation in an assault or felony. Arkansas law clarifies that the assault referenced in such exclusions must be severe enough to warrant self-defense. Courts emphasize the necessity for the insured to be able to foresee the consequences of their actions in determining liability.

Recovery for injury claims hinges on whether a reasonable person would foresee serious danger from the insured's actions. If the insured could not foresee fatal consequences, recovery is allowed. The case presented conflicting testimonies, making it a jury question. The appellant argued that evidence was insufficient to prove the insured's death was not caused by intentional injury from another party. The general rule states that for an exclusion of death from intentionally inflicted injuries to apply, there must be intent not only to inflict injury but also to cause death. Legal precedents indicate that if the assailant intended only to injure and not to kill, recovery may still be permitted. In this case, the key witness, Lee, testified he did not intend to harm or kill the decedent, and the jury accepted this testimony. The jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence, leading to the affirmation of the judgment. Additionally, the appellees' attorneys were awarded an extra $100 in fees, distinct from the trial court's initial fee arrangement.