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Midwest Timber Products Co. v. Self
Citations: 230 Ark. 872; 327 S.W.2d 730; 1959 Ark. LEXIS 707Docket: 5-1898
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; September 21, 1959; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Midwest Timber Products Company, Inc. appeals a default judgment of $3,000.00 entered by Circuit Judge Paul Wolfe on November 5, 1958, in favor of A. A. Self for the alleged misappropriation of timber. The appellant was not present during the proceedings. The appeal claims the trial court erred by not setting aside the judgment on the basis that the appellant had no notice of the trial date and asserts a valid defense, stating that unavoidable circumstances prevented its appearance. The case traces back to an October 9, 1957, complaint filed by A. A. Self's attorney, Mr. Poe, and an answer filed by Bob Bailey, Sr. for the appellant on October 28, 1957. A letter from the circuit clerk on October 22, 1957, notified Bailey of the court's schedule but did not specify the trial date for the Midwest case. Bailey notified the court on October 26, 1957, of a scheduling conflict that would prevent him from representing the appellant during a subsequent trial week. Following Bailey’s death on December 23, 1957, Bob Bailey, Jr. took over representation. On August 16, 1958, Mr. Poe expressed a desire to expedite the trial, and subsequent correspondence between Poe and Judge Wolfe indicated attempts to set a trial date. Judge Wolfe confirmed November 5, 1958, as the trial date in a letter to Poe, which was also sent to Bailey, Jr. On October 22, 1958, Richard Mobley, a new attorney for the appellant, informed the parties he would not attend the trial. The appeal is based on claims of lack of notice and the assertion of a legitimate defense. Richard Mobley's successor attorneys, Parker and Mobley, assert they were not retained by the appellant until November 3, 1958, just prior to the default judgment on November 5, 1958. The default judgment was rendered during the November term of the Scott County Circuit Court, and the appellant's motion to vacate this judgment was filed on November 14, 1958, within the same term. The court's refusal to set aside the judgment was deemed to fall within its discretion, consistent with established legal principles indicating that motions to vacate filed within the term of the judgment do not need to comply with post-term statutory requirements. The court noted that the appellant's attorneys had a duty to inform the appellant of litigation developments, and any failures in this regard were imputed to the appellant, which was seen as having knowledge of its attorneys’ actions. Prior case law established that an attorney's negligence is attributed to the client, and there was no evidence of fraud or intent to deceive regarding the judgment. The judgment was entered early in the term, allowing the appellees sufficient time to prepare a defense. The appellant's claims of unavoidable casualty or misfortune were rejected, as it had a responsibility to stay informed about its case. The appellant's attorneys were engaged shortly before the judgment and should have been aware of the impending trial date. Consequently, the appellant could not seek relief based on its own negligence or that of its attorneys. Other errors raised by the appellant were also considered and found to be without merit. The court's decision was affirmed.