Midwest Crane and Rigging, Inc. seeks judicial review of a determination by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) classifying it as a "commercial motor carrier" under the agency's jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denies this petition. The excerpt outlines the historical context of federal regulation of motor carriers, beginning with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1935, followed by the transfer of authority to the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1966. Notably, the Motor Carrier Safety Act (MCSA) was enacted in 1984 to enhance highway safety, granting the Secretary of Transportation the ability to set safety standards for motor private carriers and requiring annual vehicle inspections.
Furthermore, the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act, enacted in 1991, emphasizes the need to eliminate illegal drug use among individuals in safety-sensitive positions, such as truck operators. This Act led to regulations mandating pre-employment drug and alcohol testing, reinforcing that increased testing serves as a deterrent against illegal drug use. It also stipulates mandatory suspensions for operators found under the influence of drugs while operating commercial vehicles, with specific penalties for repeat offenses.
In 1995, Congress dissolved the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and assigned its functions to the Secretary of Transportation, leading to the establishment of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) in 1999, which handles motor carrier safety. The FMCSA is tasked with setting federal safety inspection standards for commercial motor vehicles and assessing the safety fitness of vehicle operators.
A compliance review conducted by the FMCSA on April 19, 2007, following a complaint, resulted in Midwest, a Kansas corporation leasing construction cranes, being charged with four violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), including issues related to vehicle safety inspections and drug and alcohol testing. The FMCSA proposed a civil penalty of $7,470. Midwest contended that it was not a 'private motor carrier' as defined under 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b) and claimed its self-propelled cranes, which are mounted on truck chassis, are not subject to FMCSA jurisdiction.
Midwest argued that its cranes do not transport passengers or property as they function as integrated units. However, the FMCSA rejected this argument, stating that the primary purpose of transporting these cranes is for commercial service, which subjects them to FMCSA regulations due to their weight exceeding the thresholds for commercial motor vehicles. The FMCSA emphasized that classifying these cranes as outside its jurisdiction would pose significant safety risks to the public. Thus, it determined that the self-propelled cranes qualify as commercial motor vehicles and that Midwest is a private motor carrier under FMCSA's jurisdiction.
The FMCSA concluded that self-propelled cranes were not definitively categorized under FMCSR at the time of Midwest's alleged violations, resulting in no civil penalties against Midwest. The case hinges on the interpretation of "property" as defined in 49 U.S.C. § 31132(1)(A) and the FMCSR. If Midwest's crane apparatus is deemed not to be "property," it may fall outside FMCSA jurisdiction. Conversely, if the apparatus qualifies as "property," the vehicles in question would be classified as "commercial motor vehicles," placing Midwest under FMCSA authority. Although Congress frequently uses the term "property" in motor carrier regulations, it has not provided a definition, granting the FMCSA discretion in its interpretation. Courts typically defer to agency interpretations unless they are deemed unreasonable or inconsistent with the regulation's clear meaning. Midwest bears the burden of proving that the FMCSA's actions were arbitrary or not legally justified. The FMCSA's interpretation aligns with prior case law, specifically Harshman v. Well Serv. Inc., which dealt with the classification of permanently mounted equipment on vehicles as property in interstate commerce. The court in Harshman dismissed similar arguments about the nature of the equipment, emphasizing that the primary purpose of transporting such equipment was indeed its movement to job sites, thereby affirming its status as "property."
Interpreting a safety measure as exempting the defendant from the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulatory authority would be ironic. The pumping equipment on the defendant's trucks qualifies as 'property,' owned by the defendant, and transported in interstate commerce for commercial purposes. The FMCSA's comparison of this situation to Harshman is reasonable. Midwest’s self-propelled cranes are designed to operate on highways, transporting property for commercial functions, and their size and weight significantly risk highway safety. The FMCSA's jurisdiction over Midwest aligns with regulatory language and Congress’s prioritization of safety. Deference is given to the FMCSA's interpretation of Title 49 and its regulations. Therefore, Midwest's claim that its crane apparatuses are not 'property' and that the FMCSA acted arbitrarily in asserting jurisdiction is rejected. The Petition for Review is denied.
