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Easton v. H. Boker & Co.
Citations: 226 Ark. 687; 292 S.W.2d 257; 1956 Ark. LEXIS 545Docket: 5-1021
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; July 2, 1956; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
The case involves a workmen’s compensation claim by Easton against H. Boker Company following an injury sustained on June 2, 1953, while changing a grinding wheel at their scissors manufacturing plant. Easton fractured a bone in his left elbow, resulting in significant pain and incapacitation. He received temporary partial disability compensation until January 15, 1954, when payments were stopped. Easton asserts he remains disabled, while the appellees contend he was fully able to work as of that date. The appeal focuses on whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding that Easton’s temporary partial disability ended on January 15, 1954. It is acknowledged that Easton was disabled until that date, but the appellees argue he regained full capacity thereafter. Key evidence includes: 1. A December 28, 1953, report from the operating doctor indicating Easton would have one more week of total temporary disability. 2. A January 6, 1954, report from the same doctor stating Easton should be considered disabled until post-operative recovery was complete, anticipated within two weeks. 3. A February 10, 1954, report declaring Easton had reached maximum benefit from treatment, yet still experiencing pain and not stating he was capable of full work. The inconsistency between the reported assessments and the decision to terminate benefits on January 15, 1954, raises questions regarding the Commission's ruling, as it suggests Easton was not restored to full work capacity by that date. On March 24, 1954, a doctor reported on Mr. Easton's condition, detailing his disability history and current state. The examination revealed hypalgesia in the left hand and disturbances in sensation that did not align with known anatomical distributions. The doctor noted that Mr. Easton experienced pain and would likely struggle if returned to work immediately, recommending a gradual transition to less demanding tasks. Despite these findings, Mr. Easton’s disability payments were terminated on January 15, 1954. The report indicates ongoing pain and limitations in Mr. Easton’s ability to perform a full day’s work, countering any claims of his recovery. The excerpt emphasizes that the medical reports do not substantiate a full recovery, and it questions the justification for the termination of benefits given the evidence presented. It cites legal precedents indicating that expert opinions cannot override clear physical evidence or common sense. Mr. Easton has been found to be temporarily partially disabled since his injury in June 1953, with overwhelming evidence supporting this claim. During a hearing on January 15, 1955, he presented witnesses and a doctor's report confirming his ongoing disability, which limited his ability to work fully due to significant pain and swelling in his left arm. The Circuit Court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for the Commission to award Mr. Easton temporary partial disability benefits and additional compensation for the period from January 15, 1954, until a later determination of his recovery status. The doctor noted potential permanent disability, while definitions from medical dictionaries highlighted conditions of diminished sensitivity to pain. Additionally, Mr. Easton's application for unemployment benefits during a factory shutdown was acknowledged by opposing counsel as insufficient evidence of his ability to work at that time. The document references prior case law regarding the standard of substantial evidence.