International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 295 v. Broadmoor Builders, Inc.

Citations: 225 Ark. 260; 280 S.W.2d 898; 1955 Ark. LEXIS 577; 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2499Docket: 5-710

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; June 27, 1955; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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The Chancery Court determined that the picketing conducted by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 295 and its business agent, Harold Veazey, was unlawful, leading to a permanent injunction against the union. The picketing occurred at the entrances of Broadmoor Addition in Little Rock, where the union aimed to pressure the construction contractor, Broadmoor Builders, Inc., to award electrical work to union contractors. The union's actions included placing signs at the entrances stating, "No member of L.U. 295 I.B.E.W. Employed on this Job," which were intended to coerce the contractor and its employees regarding labor choices. The court found that the picketing obstructed traffic and created a hazard on Hayes Street, a busy thoroughfare, thus violating Arkansas law as outlined in Amendment 34 of the Arkansas Constitution and Act 101 of 1947. The appellants assert that the court's injunction infringes upon their First Amendment rights to free speech as protected by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Appellants reference multiple Supreme Court cases related to picketing, including Thornhill v. Alabama and American Federation of Labor v. Swing, among others. The appellee presents several arguments to support the affirmation of a Chancery decree declaring the picketing unlawful. These contentions include: 

1. The primary goal of the picketing was to compel the appellee to violate its contract with Price-Fewell Company, citing relevant Arkansas cases.
2. The picketing aimed to violate Arkansas' 'Freedom to Work' Constitutional Amendment No. 34 and Act 101 of 1947.
3. The stated purpose of the picketing contradicted established rights related to picketing, supported by testimony from appellant Veazey, who indicated the picketing was to inform members about job conditions.
4. The appellee argued that the picketing did not pertain to any economic dispute involving the appellee, referencing Veazey's testimony which clarified that the picketing was not specifically aimed at Broadmoor Builders, Inc. and that the union typically does not engage directly with general contractors.

Veazey explained that the union's focus was on subcontractors and indicated a lack of prior negotiations with Broadmoor Builders.

The opinion is based on the conclusion that the picketing conducted was excessively broad and affected areas unrelated to the specific labor dispute at hand. The Price-Fewell Company was involved in electrical work for only six houses in the Broadmoor Addition, while at least 75 other houses under construction in the same area had no labor disputes or electrical workers present. The broad picketing obstructed normal deliveries of essential construction materials such as concrete, lumber, and doors to these unrelated sites, causing significant disruption. 

The right to picket is acknowledged but is subject to limitations, as established in various case precedents. Notably, picketing is not permissible when it forces violations of law or contravenes public policy. The Arkansas Legislature has previously indicated that picketing becomes unlawful if it obstructs deliveries to entities not involved in the dispute. The picketing in question effectively halted truck shipments to 75 unrelated jobs while targeting only six jobs associated with Price-Fewell Company. The appellant Union had no dispute with the general contractor, indicating that the picketing was misdirected and overly broad.

Appellants' picketing effectively halted the delivery of materials to 75 unrelated construction jobs, which was deemed unlawful. The court argued that if the appellants were allowed to picket all access routes to Broadmoor due to a few electrical jobs, they could similarly claim the right to picket all highways leading into Little Rock based on unrelated jobs. The appropriate scope of picketing should have been limited to those jobs directly associated with Price-Fewell Company, rather than impacting an entire 190-acre area with 75 unrelated houses. Testimony revealed that Mr. Goode aimed to have sub-contracts awarded to union members, a fact that was uncontested. Additionally, the appellee had previously secured injunctions against picketing from the Chancery Court, which included multiple union defendants who did not appeal the decision. It was indicated that Broadmoor Builders, Inc. could have resolved the issue by ensuring compliance with the prevailing wage scale for electrical workers. Legal definitions of picketing emphasize its need to occur near the workplace being protested, and while picketing involves elements of communication, it is not solely protected as free speech. The balance between this protection and state regulations on picketing activities is acknowledged, with the state’s judgments being respected by the court, provided they align with constitutional limitations.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter highlighted the unique nature of industrial picketing, distinguishing it from standard forms of communication like newspaper publications. He noted that picketing serves as both a mode of communication and a means of exerting influence in a specific locale, with the physical presence of a picket line prompting actions that differ from those elicited by printed materials. The emotional and loyalty responses generated by picket lines are more impactful than those resulting from written appeals. While the Supreme Court has established that the National Labor Relations Act preempts certain labor issues from state court intervention, cases such as United Const. Workers v. Laburnum affirm that state courts retain the authority to address specific labor-related matters and can define public policy regarding industrial disputes.