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United States v. George Rivera, Also Known as Boy George

Citations: 376 F.3d 86; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15188; 2004 WL 1632591Docket: 03-1401

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 22, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves an appeal by George Rivera, who challenged the denial of his motion to correct a sentence of life imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute heroin and attempted tax evasion. Originally sentenced in 1991, Rivera argued that his sentence was illegal under the precedent set by Apprendi v. New Jersey. The U.S. District Court had denied his motion, stating that the relevant version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, from 1988, only allowed sentence corrections upon appellate remand, which did not occur in Rivera's case. Additionally, the court treated Rivera's motion as a second or successive collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, requiring permission from the appellate court, which he lacked. On appeal, Rivera claimed that the termination date of his conspiracy should have been determined by a jury as per Apprendi, but the court maintained that the conspiracy continued beyond the legal cut-off, validating the 1988 Rule 35's applicability. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, ruling that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to Rivera’s case and that his motion was untimely and unauthorized under the procedural rules, thus denying relief.

Legal Issues Addressed

Application of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35

Application: The court applied the 1988 version of Rule 35, which permits sentence correction only upon appellate remand for error, to deny Rivera's motion as no such remand had occurred.

Reasoning: The district court denied his motion, stating that the 1988 version of Rule 35 permitted sentence correction only upon a remand for findings of error, which had not occurred in Rivera's case.

Conspiracy Duration as an Element of the Offense

Application: The court found that the jury was not required to determine the specific end date of the conspiracy as an element of the offense under Apprendi.

Reasoning: On appeal, Rivera argued that the termination date of a conspiracy should be considered an element of the offense, requiring jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt based on the precedent set in Apprendi.

Distinction Between Rule 35 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motions

Application: Rivera's Rule 35 motion was improperly used to collaterally attack his sentence, and the court clarified that such motions are not extensions of the appellate process.

Reasoning: Rivera contends that his motion should not be classified as a 2255 collateral attack, asserting it is valid under the premise that the former Rule 35 is an extension of the appellate process, citing Heflin v. United States.

Jurisdiction for Second or Successive Motions Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

Application: The court determined Rivera's motion was a second or successive § 2255 motion requiring appellate court permission, which he did not have.

Reasoning: Although Rivera labeled his motion as one under Rule 35, the court classified it as a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, marking it as a second or successive motion since Rivera had already filed one in 1994.

Retroactivity of Apprendi v. New Jersey

Application: Rivera's argument that his sentence was illegal under Apprendi was rejected because Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.

Reasoning: His application to file a second § 2255 motion, citing Apprendi, was denied, as the court ruled that Apprendi did not apply retroactively.