Sandra L. Charles v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security
Docket: 03-1371
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 26, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Sandra L. Charles appeals the Eighth Circuit Court's affirmation of the Social Security Administration's denial of her disability benefits claim. The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that while Charles could not return to her previous employment, she was capable of performing a significant number of jobs available in the economy, leading to the determination that she was not disabled. Charles, who worked as an assembler until 1995 when her job was eliminated, claimed disability due to back and neck injuries, arthritis, and a leg fracture, alleging she could not lift over nineteen pounds or sit or stand for extended periods.
Despite her claims, Charles engaged in various activities, including light cooking, dishwashing, and grocery shopping, and was able to drive herself to the hearing. At the hearing, she testified about her ability to manage personal hygiene and perform household tasks, although she experienced difficulties with vacuuming and mopping due to bending. Her medical history included a lower back injury that led to disc surgery in 1992, and a functional capacity evaluation indicated she could perform light work with positional changes every thirty minutes. Charles had ongoing medical treatment, including periodic check-ups and vitamin B12 injections, and reported shoulder issues linked to a workers' compensation injury. The court found the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, leading to the affirmation of the denial of benefits.
In October 1996, Charles consulted rheumatologist Dr. Edward Ford for joint pain in her feet, hands, shoulder, and thigh, with Dr. Ford diagnosing her with osteoarthritis and recommending a rehabilitation program. He noted her recent hypothyroidism diagnosis, suggesting it could affect her musculoskeletal health, and anticipated improvement as her thyroid condition normalized. By January 1997, after beginning a swimming program, Charles reported left shoulder pain to Dr. Rock, who advised her exercise instructor to consider her functional limitations. In August 1997, Charles noted a decrease in arthritis-like pain, but in September reported intermittent fatigue, followed by complaints of tinnitus in October, prompting an audiologist to suggest further testing.
In July 1998, at the request of a state disability evaluation agency, Dr. Lawrence Jedlicka examined Charles, who reported a past left leg fracture and ongoing low back and neck pain. Imaging revealed mild arthritis and degenerative disc disease in her cervical and lumbar spine, alongside mildly limited range of motion and muscle spasms during examination. Despite these findings, Dr. Jedlicka observed normal muscle strength and reflexes, concluding that Charles experienced cervical and lumbar strain.
Charles revisited Dr. Rock in August 1998 with a recurrence of low back pain but showed adequate range of motion and strength during the examination. Dr. Rock prescribed Darvocet and advised follow-up if symptoms persisted. Various opinions emerged regarding Charles's work capabilities: Dr. Jedlicka assessed her ability to lift ten pounds intermittently and recommended limited physical activity, while Dr. Frances Peccoraro later indicated she could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, capable of standing, walking, or sitting for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. Dr. Thomas Chisholm concurred with this assessment in October 1998, affirming that Charles could perform light work.
Andrew Steiner, M.D., a physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist, testified at an administrative hearing regarding Charles's medical conditions, which included low back pain, neck pain, tinnitus, slight hearing loss, and anemia. Dr. Steiner noted the absence of neurological loss associated with Charles's degenerative disc disease and stated that she could lift ten pounds and stand indefinitely if allowed to move. He advised against activities involving repetitive neck motion, bending, twisting, stooping, kneeling, or crawling.
Vocational expert Juletta Harren was presented with a hypothetical scenario mirroring Charles's limitations, indicating that such an individual could lift ten pounds occasionally and sit or stand for only brief intervals. Harren confirmed that jobs like security guard, stock checker, machine tender, and office clerk were viable options for someone with these restrictions, estimating around 12,500 such jobs available in Minnesota.
After the hearing, Dr. Rock submitted a letter agreeing with Dr. Jedlicka's assessment and recommended that Charles limit her work to four hours per day initially. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Charles could not return to her previous role as an assembler but retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform other work, given her lifting and movement limitations. Thus, the ALJ determined that Charles was not disabled, as she could engage in a significant number of jobs in the economy.
The Commissioner raised a jurisdictional issue, claiming that Charles's appeal was untimely due to the improper filing of her Rule 59(e) motion. The Commissioner argued that this motion did not extend the appeal period, while Charles asserted that an initial extension had been granted by the district court, which should toll her appeal time despite the later order striking the motion.
Jurisdiction must be established at the beginning of an appeal, with appellants typically required to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of a district court's final judgment, as outlined in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Failure to meet this requirement precludes consideration of the case's merits. However, the notice period may be tolled under the "unique circumstances" doctrine if a district court mistakenly assured a litigant that a Rule 59(e) motion was timely filed, and the litigant relied on that assurance. This doctrine is narrowly interpreted to avoid undermining the statutory framework of appellate jurisdiction. In this instance, Charles's late appeal is deemed timely under this doctrine, allowing jurisdiction to review her case.
On the merits, Charles contends that the central issue is the number of hours she can stand during a workday, asserting that her physician limited her to four hours, thus excluding her from the light exertional work category. She argues that the ALJ improperly dismissed her physician's opinion in favor of less comprehensive evaluations from consulting doctors. The review standard for the court is narrow, affirming the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is defined as evidence sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept it as adequate. The court must affirm the Commissioner's findings if two inconsistent interpretations of the evidence exist, even if it would have weighed the evidence differently.
Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's denial of benefits in Charles's case, despite her contention regarding Dr. Rock's assessment of her standing ability. Charles argues that Dr. Rock's opinion, which limits her standing to four hours in an eight-hour day, contradicts the views of four other consulting physicians who believe her standing is not limited. While treating physicians' opinions generally hold significant weight, they do not automatically prevail if the overall record is considered. The treating physician's opinion may be given less weight if it is vague or conclusory. Conversely, the opinion of a consulting physician who examined the claimant only once is typically not regarded as substantial evidence if contradicted by the treating physician.
The ALJ has the discretion to consider the opinion of an independent medical advisor when assessing the claimant's impairment. Regulations stipulate that a treating source's opinion can be controlling if well-supported by clinical evidence and consistent with other substantial case record evidence. In this instance, the ALJ found Dr. Rock's determination regarding Charles's standing ability unsupported by medically acceptable techniques.
Dr. Rock treated Charles after her work-related injury in 1992 and continued to do so through various complaints, including shoulder and back pain, while she worked light-duty. His later treatments focused on fatigue and joint pain, with referrals to a rheumatologist who diagnosed osteoarthritis and advised water therapy. Despite ongoing issues, Dr. Rock acknowledged Charles's chronic lower back pain and prescribed pain medication after her first benefits application was denied. In his April 1999 correspondence, he expressed agreement with restrictions from a consulting physician but reiterated that she should not stand more than four hours per workday initially.
Dr. Jedlicka's examination of Charles indicated a history of left leg issues (resolved), neck problems (some improvement), and recurrent lower back issues. Clinical tests revealed minimal problems, while diagnostic tests showed degenerative spinal changes. Dr. Jedlicka diagnosed cervical and lumbar strains, allowing for unrestricted standing as long as Charles could alternate positions. However, Dr. Rock's assertion that Charles could only stand for four hours daily lacks substantial evidence, with no records indicating such restrictions. Charles's condition was primarily managed with medication and minimal activity limitations, with no severe standing or walking restrictions reported by Dr. Rock, whose opinion was deemed conclusory and unsupported by medical findings. The ALJ relied on consulting physicians' assessments, which indicated Charles could stand for at least six hours a day, qualifying her for light work and denying her Social Security disability benefits. The Commissioner is not required to reestablish Charles's Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) at step five, as the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate other work Charles could perform. Judge Heaney dissented, advocating for a remand to clarify whether the Commissioner met the burden of proving Charles's capacity for light work involving six hours of standing.
The critical issue in the case is the duration Charles can stand during an eight-hour work day. Dr. Rock, her long-term physician, asserts that she should not stand for more than four hours daily. A vocational expert confirmed that under these circumstances, Charles would be considered disabled. Dr. Jedlicka, who examined her for the Commissioner, noted that she can only stand, walk, or sit for ten minutes before needing to change positions, a view supported by Dr. Pecoraro. The district court interpreted their statements as implying Charles could stand for six hours if allowed to move. However, there is no evidence in the record that jobs suitable for her would permit alternating between standing and sitting.
Dr. Steiner, a neutral expert, observed limitations on standing and sitting, stating that repetitive motions would be restricted, but it is ambiguous whether he envisioned a job allowing Charles to alternate positions. The district court's conclusion that Charles can stand for six hours contradicts her own testimony that she "can't stand for very long," reinforcing the need for her to alternate positions.
The conclusion suggests that if Charles must stand for six hours continuously, she would be unable to work, and recommends remanding the case to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to further examine the testimonies of Drs. Jedlicka, Pecoraro, and Steiner, as well as the vocational expert, to clarify whether Charles can work under these conditions without alternating between sitting and standing.
