Mildred Clark v. Kansas City Missouri School District, Linda Lollis Benjamin Demps Kansas City Missouri School Board Helen J. Ragsdale Lee Barnes, Jr. Duane Kelly Harriett Ann Plowman Patricia Kurtz Michelle S. Hensley Albert Mauro, Sr. Elma Warrick Fifi Wiedman
Docket: 03-2950
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 12, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Mildred Clark, a teacher employed by the Kansas City, Missouri School District, filed a lawsuit under section 1983, claiming her due process rights were violated when the District allegedly deprived her of property without due process. After a jury ruled in her favor, the District sought judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, but the district court denied these motions and awarded Clark attorney fees. The District appealed, arguing that the actions taken by its employees did not constitute a deprivation of property since they followed established procedures, and they contended that Missouri law provided Clark with an adequate postdeprivation remedy.
The background of the case reveals that Clark was transferred from Southeast Middle School to J.A. Rogers Middle School due to a reorganization. After receiving permission from Principal Linda Lollis to remove her personal belongings, Clark returned to Southeast on August 29, 1996, to collect the remaining items. Upon her return, Lollis began removing materials from Clark's boxes, prompting Clark to leave to contact the District's superintendent. When she returned, security guards were present, and Clark communicated her ownership of the materials. Consequently, Lollis requested that a guard escort Clark out of the building.
Afterward, Clark went to the superintendent's office and discussed the incident with Assistant Superintendent Dr. Ida Love, who accompanied her back to Southeast to sort through the materials. They identified Clark's belongings, with Clark managing to retrieve some items. Later, Clark learned that some of her materials had been placed outside the school, but she was advised by police not to collect them. These boxes were eventually delivered to her at Rogers, although Clark believed some of her property remained at Southeast. The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment, remanded the case, and vacated the award for attorney fees, concluding that the District's procedures were adequate under Missouri law.
Clark received an email from Sally Newell, the principal, notifying her that materials held from Southeast would be returned unless ownership could be verified through receipts or a company statement within three days. Clark did not provide the requested verification and indicated she would have difficulty doing so, but did not ask for more time. Instead, she attempted to invoke the grievance procedure outlined in the District's employee handbook, which requires a series of steps beginning with an oral presentation of the grievance to the principal. Although Clark discussed the matter with Newell and later submitted a letter requesting relief, she never received a hearing or decision.
On March 11, 2001, Clark sued the District and several individuals, claiming deprivation of personal property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury ruled in her favor, leading the District to file motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, both of which were denied by the district court. The court awarded attorney fees to Clark. The District then appealed, raising several issues, including sufficiency of evidence for the due process claim and claims of improper jury instructions and courtroom conduct. The appellate court, however, focused solely on the due process claim, ultimately concluding that it failed as a matter of law and thus did not address the additional issues raised by the District.
To prove a procedural due process violation, Clark must demonstrate that the District deprived him of a property interest without sufficient process. The District concedes to the deprivation of property, shifting focus to whether adequate process was provided. Due process requires procedural protections tailored to the situation, emphasizing the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and manner. If a state employee's unauthorized actions cause property deprivation, this does not breach due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available. However, if an established procedure causes the loss, the adequacy of post-deprivation remedies is irrelevant, and the focus shifts to the established procedure's process.
In this case, the actions of the District's employees—Lollis, Dr. Love, and Newell—were deemed unauthorized and random, lacking adherence to any established procedures. Lollis removed Clark from Southeast and interfered with his property without evidence of following District procedures. Dr. Love also acted outside established norms when assisting in sorting materials and limiting Clark's ownership verification to a two-day window. Newell failed to comply with the grievance procedure by not granting a hearing or providing a written decision, which violated the expected adherence to the established policy. Clark did not provide evidence that the District had a procedure allowing such noncompliance, indicating that Newell's actions were also unauthorized and random.
Lollis, Dr. Love, and Newell engaged in unauthorized acts, leading to an assessment of whether Missouri offers an adequate postdeprivation remedy for Clark. Missouri law allows for replevin, which is deemed an adequate remedy for the tortious taking of property by state employees, as established in Allen v. City of Kinloch. Under Missouri's replevin statutes, a claimant can regain possession of personal property by filing an affidavit and bond, or by requesting a prompt hearing. Following a trial, if the claimant is found entitled to possession, they can recover the property or receive a monetary judgment. Although state remedies may not fully match what could be pursued under section 1983, including attorney fees, they are sufficient to uphold due process requirements. Consequently, Clark's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim fails as a matter of law. As Clark is no longer the prevailing party following the reversal of the district court's judgment, the award for attorney fees is vacated. The court remands the case for judgment in favor of the District, and notes that further discussion regarding the grievance process is unnecessary, as inferences drawn from the jury's verdict do not warrant speculation about Clark's credibility. All other defendants were dismissed prior to the trial's conclusion.
