Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 12, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Donald G. Moore pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop involving a taxicab in which he was a passenger. The district court determined that Moore had consented to the search. His plea allowed for an appeal of the suppression ruling, which is now affirmed.
On February 24, 2000, Springfield Police officers conducted surveillance at an Amtrak station due to suspicions of drug couriers. After observing Moore's suspicious behavior upon his arrival, the officers followed him as he entered a taxicab. They stopped the cab for a traffic violation, and Officer Baxter approached the driver while Detective Welsh questioned Moore.
Welsh identified himself and asked Moore about his travel, to which Moore provided inconsistent information regarding his identity and residence. Unable to produce identification, Moore falsely claimed his name was "Brian Smith" and gave incorrect details about his age and address. Subsequently, Baxter's background check revealed Moore's deception, prompting Welsh to ask him to exit the cab, leading to further investigation.
Moore consented to a search by Officer Welsh during a traffic stop. After raising his hands on the van, Welsh discovered a hard object in Moore's jacket, which he suspected was crack cocaine. When Moore fled, officers apprehended him at a nearby hotel, where the object was confirmed to be 11 grams of crack. Moore was indicted for possession with intent to distribute. He initially pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the evidence, claiming the officers exceeded the scope of the traffic stop and unlawfully searched his jacket. The government countered that Moore provided valid consent and gave officers reasonable suspicion by providing false information about his identity.
A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, finding: the traffic stop was based on probable cause; the questioning by Officer Baxter was within the scope of the stop; Moore consented to both the questioning and the search; and the search was justified under the "plain feel" doctrine. The district court adopted this recommendation, leading to Moore changing his plea to guilty while preserving his right to appeal the suppression denial. On appeal, Moore contended that the officers' questioning exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop and that Welsh's search went beyond his consent. The court noted that the officers had probable cause to stop the cab for traffic violations, validating their initial actions.
Moore, as a passenger in a cab that was legally stopped by officers, was under their custody until their safety was assured. He could be questioned by the officers without this being considered a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, meaning reasonable suspicion or probable cause was not necessary for the questioning. When Officer Welsh approached Moore and asked if he would answer questions, this interaction was not an illegal seizure.
The issue of whether the questioning became unreasonable due to its duration or scope was acknowledged, but it was deemed unnecessary to address since Moore consented to further questioning, which does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
Regarding the subsequent search of Moore's jacket, he argued that Officer Welsh exceeded the scope of consent by reaching into his inner jacket pocket. However, the magistrate judge found Moore's account unconvincing and accepted Welsh's testimony that Moore had consented to a full search. Consequently, the district court concluded that the search was consensual, and thus the evidence obtained did not require suppression under the Fourth Amendment.
Moore's consent to the search negated the need for a warrant or probable cause, consistent with *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*. The courts favored Detective Welsh's credibility over Moore's, with the magistrate and district court finding Welsh's consistent testimony credible. Moore's attempt to challenge Welsh's reliability based on alleged inconsistencies between Welsh's testimonies at the suppression hearing and the grand jury was deemed weak. Although Moore argued that Welsh only sought consent for a "pat-down" search, Welsh clarified that he asked for permission to search inside Moore's clothing, a fact supported by the taxicab driver, Antle, who observed Moore’s behavior aligning with Welsh's account. The magistrate and district court concluded that Welsh's version was more credible, leading to the affirmation of the district court's denial of Moore's motion to suppress the search. Additionally, Moore's arguments regarding the officers' motives for stopping the cab were irrelevant, as they had probable cause to do so based on the cab driver's traffic violation, supported by *Whren v. United States* and *Maryland v. Wilson*.
Moore contends that the district court mistakenly determined he voluntarily consented to answer questions posed by Welsh. However, this argument was not presented to the magistrate judge, resulting in a waiver according to United States v. Melgar. At the suppression hearing, Moore acknowledged that he willingly agreed to respond to Welsh's inquiries. Consequently, the court refrains from determining the validity of his consent, noting that his claim of coercion is likely negated by Supreme Court precedents in Florida v. Bostick and United States v. Drayton.
After discovering that Moore provided false information, the officers had at least reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down for safety reasons, as established in Terry v. Ohio. They may also have had probable cause to arrest him for obstruction of justice, which would allow for a full search without consent, as outlined in United States v. Robinson. Although the government raised this point before the magistrate and the district court, it is not pursued on appeal.
Moore's act of placing his hands on the cab does not inherently indicate consent for a more extensive search than a pat-down, as officers typically ask suspects to assume this position for weapon searches. The district court inferred that the conflicting testimonies diminished Moore's credibility rather than directly concluding that he consented to a full search. Based on the determination of Moore's valid consent, the court does not express an opinion on whether Welsh's search could be justified under the "plain feel" exception established in Minnesota v. Dickerson.
