Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; June 11, 1951; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
A civil suit was initiated by a taxpayer seeking to recover a Chevrolet truck claimed to belong to Miller County, Arkansas, pursuant to Act 193 of 1945. Hon. Elmer Freeman, the County Judge until December 31, 1950, ordered a new GMC truck from Hughes Motor Company, planning to trade the Chevrolet truck valued at $510. Prior to this, Freeman requested appraisals for the Chevrolet truck from the County Tax Assessor and Cargile Motor Company, which valued it at $475 and $500, respectively. No official records were made regarding these transactions. On December 4, 1950, Hughes Motor Company delivered the GMC truck and accepted the Chevrolet as a trade-in, with Eason, the Road Supervisor, surrendering possession of the Chevrolet and purchasing it for $510. Miller County later spent $104.09 on repairs. On December 20, 1950, Freeman approved a payment to Hughes Motor Company for the GMC truck. After Freeman left office, Jewel Evers, as a taxpayer, filed suit on January 12, 1951, to recover the Chevrolet truck from Eason. The Chancery Court ruled that Act 193 applied to the case, that the transaction substantially complied with the Act, and dismissed the taxpayer's complaint for lack of equity.
The appeal contests the Chancery Court's ruling regarding the disposition of county property under Act 193 of 1945. Prior to this Act, case law established that county courts held authority to manage and sell county property, as seen in various precedents. Act 193, which outlines the procedures for selling county property, stipulates that the county court must issue an order detailing the property's description, sale reasons, and appraisal directions. The county assessor is tasked with appraising the property and filing a certificate of appraisal. If the property’s appraised value is under $500, the county judge can sell it at a public or private sale for at least three-fourths of the value; if it exceeds $500, a sealed bidding process and Approval Board oversight are required. Conveyances not adhering to this act are deemed void, allowing for taxpayer lawsuits. The appeal identifies several failures in compliance with the Act, including the lack of a recorded court order, absence of an order to the county clerk for assessment, and the lack of a filed appraisal certificate. The Chancery Court concluded there was substantial compliance with the Act, a point the appeal will evaluate regarding whether the actions taken in this case meet the standard for substantial compliance.
Judge Freeman requested the Tax Assessor to appraise a Chevrolet truck, which the Tax Assessor subsequently did in a letter referencing Section 4 of Act 193. Judge Freeman received and retained this letter. The key issue is whether these actions constituted "substantial compliance" with Act 193, which aims to ensure public awareness of county property dispositions. The Act mandates that an appraisal order be recorded, involving multiple county officials beyond just the Tax Assessor. The County Judge is responsible for entering orders to inform taxpayers, and merely retaining a letter does not satisfy this requirement. No formal order was recorded during Judge Freeman's term, leading to the conclusion that there was insufficient compliance with Act 193.
Regarding ratification, the appellee argues that the County Court's allowance of a $1,983 claim on December 20, 1950, ratified the earlier conveyance of the truck to Hughes Motor Company, as the claim referenced an allowance for the truck. Legal precedents indicate that a contract initiated solely by the County Judge can be ratified by subsequent approval from the County Court, and such ratification can occur through the allowance of a claim. The court acknowledges that the contract was effectively ratified on December 7, 1948, and confirms that the ratification process holds the same legal weight as the original authorization would have required.
Act No. 193 of 1945 mandates specific essentials and formalities for the County Court in handling county property, which must also be followed for ratification of actions taken under this act. According to legal precedent, a ratification must adhere to the same formalities as the original authorization. This principle indicates that if a deed must be executed under seal, its ratification must also be under seal; similarly, if an act requires an ordinance for authority, the ratification must be by ordinance.
A ratification must be performed by the party originally authorized to make the contract, following the legal requirements for the initial act. This ensures that invalid contracts can only be ratified if the same formalities required for valid contracts are observed.
Counties are considered municipal corporations and derive their powers from legislative authority. The County Judge acts as an agent for the County, thus requiring the same formalities for ratification as for original authorization. Act 193 of 1945 specifies certain prerequisites before the County Judge can validly dispose of county property, regardless of the property's appraised value. Key requirements include the entry of an order in the County Court records detailing the property description and a certificate from the County Clerk, as well as an order approving the sale after its completion, each requiring a description of the sold property.
The court determined that an order allowing a claim against the County for purchasing a new CMC truck, while crediting the trade-in of a Chevrolet pickup, did not satisfy the requirements of Act 193 of 1945, rendering the attempted ratification invalid. The appellee argued that the County was estopped from denying the validity of the transaction by accepting and using the CMC dump truck, citing several cases to support this claim. However, the court found the estoppel argument unmeritorious, emphasizing that the transaction was initiated by a taxpayer on behalf of the County and that any sale of County property not adhering to the Act is null and void. The statute allows taxpayers to contest such sales within two years, with the court affirming that the law must be enforced as written. The Chancellor noted Jewel Evers as both a taxpayer and the County Judge, commending his efforts to recover County property. The court reiterated the necessity for compliance with legislative prescriptions regarding the sale of County property, citing relevant cases that delineate the limits of ratification by counties. The decree from the Chancery Court was reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a decree consistent with this opinion.
