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Gray v. Butrum
Citations: 217 Ark. 967; 234 S.W.2d 774; 1950 Ark. LEXIS 535Docket: 4-9313
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; December 18, 1950; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
A bill in equity was brought by plaintiff Butrum, seeking to have a deed declared a mortgage and canceled upon payment of the mortgage debt. The Chancellor ruled in favor of Butrum, leading to an appeal by defendant Gray, the grantee under the deed. The land in question, comprising 20 acres with minimal improvements, was inherited by Butrum after the death of his brother-in-law Lipscomb, who had been granted a life estate in the property through a deed executed in 1935. Lipscomb had an outstanding mortgage debt to Rose, which Gray later satisfied, obtaining the assignment of that debt and mortgage. A 1938 agreement between Lipscomb and Gray stipulated that an absolute deed would be executed but only upon Lipscomb’s repayment of the debt. The formal deed was not executed until December 29, 1941, and was signed by both Lipscomb and Butrum. Butrum testified he believed the deed was a mortgage, while Gray claimed to have paid Lipscomb $200 in addition to assuming the debt, though this was not corroborated. The deed’s consideration was recorded as $158.50, aligning with the debt amount. After Lipscomb's death in 1949, Butrum continued living on the land, but Gray claimed possession, leading to the current litigation. The Chancellor found the total debt plus taxes paid by Gray to be $276.04 and ordered the deed to be canceled upon payment of that amount. Gray contested that the evidence was inadequate to support the conclusion that the deed was a mortgage. However, the court affirmed the Chancellor's findings, stating that the evidence clearly showed the 1941 deed was executed per the 1938 contract, indicating it was intended as a mortgage. Gray also challenged the exclusion of evidence from a prior case involving the same parties. Although prior testimony was allowed to show contradictory statements, the Chancellor ruled the cases were not consolidated for trial, which was found to be decisive. Additionally, the evidence from the previous trial was not properly authenticated, and its review did not suggest a different outcome would be justified. The decree was ultimately affirmed.