Moses Villot v. Benjamin Varner the District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania

Citations: 373 F.3d 327; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 13486; 2004 WL 1462240Docket: 01-1505

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; June 30, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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Moses Villot pled guilty to murder in exchange for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's agreement not to seek the death penalty, resulting in a life sentence after being classified as a first-degree murder. He subsequently filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on three grounds. The District Court dismissed his petition, ruling that two claims were procedurally defaulted due to Villot's failure to satisfy Pennsylvania's innocence requirement for collateral relief under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). The court also found that the claim raised on direct appeal was defaulted because Villot did not seek further review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the innocence provision in § 9543(a)(2)(iii) constitutes a substantive requirement rather than a procedural rule, thus it cannot lead to procedural default of federal claims. The court clarified that under federal law, proof of innocence is not a prerequisite for relief from a guilty plea, and a state cannot impose more stringent substantive requirements that affect the viability of federal constitutional claims. The court also found that Villot had fully exhausted his third claim by petitioning the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review, satisfying the requirement for "one complete round" of state appellate review. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case for a merits consideration of all claims.

In October 1990, Moses Villot pled guilty to first-degree murder in Pennsylvania and received a life sentence. He later sought to withdraw his plea, claiming ineffective assistance from his counsel, particularly regarding a conflict of interest involving the victim and a key witness. The Court of Common Pleas denied his motion, and his subsequent appeal to the Superior Court was also denied, with Villot not pursuing further review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

In January 1997, Villot filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), asserting that his counsel's ineffectiveness compromised the truth-determining process and unlawfully induced his plea. Appointed counsel submitted a no-merit letter, leading to the dismissal of Villot's petition without an opinion. The Superior Court later granted him the right to appeal, where he raised three claims of ineffective assistance: coercion into pleading guilty, inadequate pre-plea consultation, and the aforementioned conflict of interest. The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal, noting a 1995 amendment to the PCRA required petitioners to assert innocence to contest a guilty plea. Villot's claims were deemed "not cognizable" as he did not assert his innocence.

In November 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his appeal. In October 2000, Villot filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in federal court, reiterating his three ineffective assistance claims. A Magistrate Judge found the first two claims procedurally defaulted but deemed the conflict of interest claim properly exhausted. The Judge cited a Pennsylvania Supreme Court order clarifying that further petitioning was not required for exhaustion in such cases. Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying the conflict of interest claim.

The District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations for the first two claims in Villot's case but ruled that the conflict of interest claim was procedurally defaulted. The Judge determined that Order 218, issued in May 2000, was not retroactive and did not apply to Villot's direct appeal, which was denied by the Superior Court in May 1993. Referencing Wenger, the Judge concluded that since the time to petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had expired long before Order 218 was issued, Villot's conflict of interest claim was therefore procedurally defaulted. Consequently, the District Court dismissed the petition in February 2001 without addressing the merits.

A motions panel granted a certificate of appealability regarding the first two ineffective assistance claims but denied it for the conflict of interest claim, as it was clearly defaulted. The panel sought briefing on whether the Superior Court's determination that Villot did not meet the innocence requirement under 9543(a)(2)(iii) constituted an independent and adequate state law ground that would prevent federal review under the procedural default rule. 

Upon review, the court found it unnecessary to address the innocence requirement issue, ruling instead that this provision is substantive rather than procedural. Thus, the procedural default rule pertains only to state procedural rules. The court also noted that Villot's failure to comply with certain state procedural rules, not previously discussed by the District Court, did not substantiate a finding of procedural default since the Superior Court did not rely on these grounds. Ultimately, the court held that Villot had properly exhausted all his ineffective assistance claims in the PCRA proceeding, mandating that the District Court consider the merits of all claims on remand.

The innocence requirement in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9543(a)(2)(iii) is classified as substantive, not procedural, meaning it does not lead to procedural default of Villot's federal claims. Under procedural default rules, a federal claim is barred unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice for the default or demonstrates a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Villot did not invoke these exceptions concerning his failure to allege innocence in his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) proceeding. The Superior Court's ruling was independent of federal law, as there was no indication that it was intertwined with such law. The focus of the parties was on whether the innocence clause supports the Superior Court's judgment, but the court determined that the clause serves as a substantive requirement, thereby altering the standards for obtaining relief. Prior to a 1995 amendment, PCRA petitioners had to show their guilty plea was unlawfully induced, but after the amendment, they must also demonstrate that they are actually innocent. This change adds a substantive element to the criteria for collateral relief. The state argued that the innocence requirement was procedural based on general pleading requirements, but the court rejected this notion, clarifying that the substantive nature of the innocence requirement remains unaffected by procedural aspects of the statute. The court also noted that Villot's own admissions indicated that he was not innocent, undermining his position.

The innocence requirement in Pennsylvania's evaluation of ineffective assistance claims related to guilty pleas is more stringent than the federal standard. Under federal law, a 2254 petitioner alleging ineffective assistance leading to an involuntary or unknowing plea does not need to prove innocence to obtain collateral relief. Instead, the petitioner must demonstrate that (i) counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the petitioner would have opted for a trial rather than a guilty plea. Notably, while past assertions of innocence can support the claim of would-be trial preference, lack of an innocence assertion does not bar a finding of prejudice. Conversely, Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) mandates that a petitioner must "plead and prove" innocence, introducing an additional requirement beyond federal law.

The procedural default rule, which stems from the independent and adequate state ground doctrine, restricts federal court review of state court decisions based on independent state law grounds. This rule applies solely to procedural issues and bars federal habeas claims when a state court declines to address federal claims due to a prisoner's failure to meet state procedural requirements. Consequently, similar to cases of unexhausted state remedies, a habeas petitioner who does not meet state procedural standards prevents state courts from considering their federal claims initially. When a state imposes substantive requirements that exceed federal standards, it forgoes its opportunity to adjudicate the federal claims of petitioners unable to meet these additional state-imposed requirements, with the principles of comity and federalism being inapplicable in such situations.

An interpretation of the procedural default rule that aligns with state substantive limitations on federal claims would contravene the supremacy clause outlined in the U.S. Constitution. States are not required to offer collateral relief to convicted individuals, and any relief they do provide does not need to mirror federal standards. Thus, Pennsylvania's legislature can impose stricter criteria for collateral relief than those established by federal law. If the procedural default rule were applied in this case, it would unjustly enforce Pennsylvania's non-constitutional restrictions on federal habeas proceedings, which are governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254(a) that allows relief for violations of U.S. constitutional laws.

The analysis does not require a determination on whether the Superior Court's application of 9543(a)(2)(iii) meets the 'independent and adequate' state ground test, as it cannot eliminate federal habeas review of Villot's ineffective assistance claims. Villot’s habeas petition is not considered procedurally defaulted based on his non-compliance with 9543(a)(3). Although the Superior Court based its denial on 9543(a)(2)(iii), it could have also cited procedural grounds, specifically that Villot did not plead and prove that his claims had not been previously litigated or waived.

The state argues that Villot waived two ineffective assistance claims by not raising them before the PCRA proceedings. However, this argument is rejected since the Superior Court did not invoke 9543(a)(3) in its denial. The Superior Court could have found that some of Villot's claims were previously litigated or waived, particularly the conflict of interest claim, which was addressed in his motion to withdraw his plea and on direct appeal. The claim regarding his counsel's failure to interview him adequately and investigate could be viewed as waived, as it was not raised in earlier proceedings. The claim of coercion into pleading guilty might be seen as a variation of the conflict of interest claim, potentially rendering it previously litigated, or if treated as distinct, it may be viewed as waived for similar procedural reasons.

The Superior Court's ruling on Villot's PCRA appeal was based solely on subsection 9543(a)(2)(iii), without reference to 9543(a)(3) or any other procedural grounds. Consequently, if the last state court did not enforce the procedural rule at issue, federal habeas review could not be precluded by procedural default, as outlined in Harris v. Reed and County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's refusal to review the Superior Court’s decision is presumed to be based on the same grounds, as established in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, and the federal court should not impose an unmentioned procedural bar. Furthermore, Villot's conflict of interest claim was deemed not defaulted due to the state proceedings. Although the motions panel initially found this claim procedurally defaulted for failure to exhaust it on direct appeal, it overlooked that Villot did present this claim to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court during the PCRA proceedings. The court determined that all three of Villot's ineffective assistance claims were properly exhausted. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), state prisoners must exhaust state court remedies before federal courts can grant habeas petitions. This exhaustion provides state courts with the opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims. A claim is technically exhausted if the state court declines to consider it due to procedural noncompliance, as outlined in Coleman v. Thompson. Thus, procedural defaults can impede federal review unless the petitioner demonstrates 'cause and prejudice' or a 'fundamental miscarriage of justice.'

The District Court determined that Villot did not fully exhaust his conflict of interest claim on direct appeal, as he failed to petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review after the Superior Court's denial of his appeal. Nonetheless, Villot successfully presented this claim, along with two others, to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court during his PCRA appeal. According to legal precedent, a prisoner needs to complete "one complete round" of the state's appellate process to meet the exhaustion requirement, which Villot achieved during the PCRA proceedings. 

If the innocence provision outlined in 9543(a)(2)(iii) were procedural rather than substantive, the District Court's ruling would stand. However, since it has been established that this provision is substantive and the Superior Court did not deny Villot's PCRA appeal on procedural grounds, it is concluded that Villot properly exhausted his ineffective assistance claims by bringing them to the state's highest court during his PCRA proceedings. 

The court will reverse the District Court's dismissal of Villot's habeas petition, remanding the case for consideration of the merits of all three claims. Additionally, while there is a potential argument that Villot's third ineffective assistance claim is defaulted, the Superior Court did not dismiss it on that basis. Villot's guilty plea to two weapons offenses runs concurrently with his life sentence for murder. The PCRA allows for relief if a petitioner demonstrates that their conviction resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel that undermined the truth-determining process.

In July 1999, the Superior Court ruled on Villot's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) appeal, adhering to a precedent that ineffective assistance claims regarding guilty pleas were not cognizable under subsection (a)(2)(ii), as such pleas did not affect the "truth-determining process." This interpretation was supported by several prior cases, including *Commonwealth v. Laszczynski*. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied Villot's petition. However, in the later case of *Dadario v. Goldberg*, the court reversed this stance, asserting that subsection (a)(2)(ii) included all claims of ineffective assistance, including those related to guilty pleas. The scope of relief is contingent on compliance with state constitutional law, though that issue was not addressed in Villot's case.

The document outlines that a claim is considered previously litigated if the highest court has ruled on its merits. A claim may be waived if not raised at trial or in prior proceedings. Historically, defendants needed to present ineffective assistance claims at the earliest opportunity when the counsel in question no longer represented them, as established in *Commonwealth v. Hubbard*. However, in 2002, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reformed this requirement, allowing claims to be raised during collateral review instead. This reform applied retroactively to direct appeals but not to collateral reviews, which was not applicable to Villot as his cases had concluded prior to the *Grant* decision.

Villot's current counsel does not clarify the basis for his ineffective assistance claim, but it appears to stem from Villot's assertion that his plea counsel pressured him into pleading guilty to avoid cross-examining a key witness. This assertion aligns with Villot's previous conflict of interest claim.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Carpenter establishes that the "previously litigated" prong of subsection (a)(3) prevents both simple variations and identical claims from being re-litigated. The court acknowledges that it cannot definitively state whether Villot could have raised valid objections to the procedural default rule if the Superior Court had applied 9543(a)(3) to deny his PCRA appeal. This rule does not apply if the state court was not presented with the federal claim, allowing federal habeas courts to deem such claims procedurally defaulted if the state court would have barred them. However, since Villot's federal claims were presented in PCRA courts, the Harris rule applies.

The case of Cabrera v. Barbo, cited by the state, is distinguished as it involved New Jersey courts relying explicitly on a state waiver rule to deny a prisoner's post-conviction relief, making its holding inapplicable to Villot's case. The scope of issues on appeal is limited to those within the certificate of appealability (COA), but a merits panel may expand this scope. Villot's lack of request for expansion does not preclude the merits panel from acting sua sponte to include his conflict of interest claim. The Supreme Court's ruling in O'Sullivan emphasizes that state prisoners must file for discretionary review as part of the ordinary appellate process. This was addressed by Pennsylvania's Order 218, which aimed to remove such petitions from the ordinary appellate review procedure.

Order 218 does not affect the AEDPA's exhaustion requirement in Villot's case, as the time to petition for discretionary review had expired years before the order was issued. The state has suggested that the court address the merits of Villot's claims directly on appeal, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) permits federal courts to deny habeas petitions on the merits even if state remedies were not exhausted. While this provision typically does not apply in procedural default scenarios, precedent from Hameen v. Delaware indicates it can be used to reach the merits without addressing procedural default. However, a decision on whether to adopt the state's proposal is unnecessary due to insufficient record on appeal, specifically the lack of a transcript from the evidentiary hearing regarding Villot's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and missing pages from the transcript of the degree of guilt hearing, including testimony from a key witness.