Rudy Hernandez and Manuel Renta appeal the denial of their motions to dismiss a defamation lawsuit filed by Krystle Guerra in the 139th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. Both appellants argue for dismissal under the election-of-remedies provision of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), asserting that Guerra's claims stem from conduct within the scope of their employment with the City of Pharr Fire Department. Hernandez additionally claims dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), arguing Guerra's allegations are based on his rights to free speech and petition, and contending that Guerra cannot establish a prima facie case. He also asserts the defense of absolute privilege, supporting his motion with an affidavit, an internal complaint detailing Guerra's alleged unprofessional conduct, and related correspondence. Renta supports his dismissal motion by citing evidence provided by Hernandez, maintaining that his comments regarding Guerra were made in the context of addressing a hostile work environment. Guerra did not respond to the motions, and the trial court denied both, prompting the current appeal under TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. 51.014(a)(5), which allows appeals from orders denying claims of immunity.
Hernandez and Renta argue that the trial court incorrectly denied their motion to dismiss Guerra’s lawsuit, asserting it should be treated as a suit against them solely in their official capacities under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) election-of-remedies provision. The TTCA offers limited immunity waivers for tort claims against governmental entities and mandates that plaintiffs choose to sue either the governmental unit or its employees individually, not both. According to the TTCA, if a lawsuit targets a government employee for actions within their employment scope, it is deemed a suit against the employee in their official capacity, allowing for dismissal unless the plaintiff amends the pleadings to name the governmental unit within 30 days of the motion. A defendant must prove three elements for dismissal: their status as a governmental employee, their actions within the scope of employment, and that the suit could have been filed against the governmental unit. The motion to dismiss is treated as a challenge to the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, which is reviewed de novo. The court can consider evidence beyond the pleadings to resolve jurisdictional issues, and if factual disputes regarding jurisdiction exist, the plea cannot be granted. The appellants’ employment status and the possibility of filing under the TTCA are undisputed, necessitating an examination of whether they acted within the scope of their employment.
Hernandez and Renta assert that their statements regarding Guerra's relationship with Martinez were limited to Hernandez's workplace complaint and thus fall within the scope of their employment. The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) defines 'scope of employment' as performing duties assigned by competent authority, where the employee's motives and state of mind are irrelevant, provided the conduct aligns with job responsibilities. The TTCA does not waive immunity for intentional torts like defamation, but tort claims against the government may still be pursued under the TTCA regardless of immunity waivers. Hernandez's complaint about Guerra's unprofessional behavior included allegations of a sexual relationship with Martinez, which he first communicated verbally to Renta. Renta then made the allegedly defamatory statement in response. The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Laverie v. Wetherbe emphasizes that assessing whether statements were made within the scope of employment is an objective inquiry, focusing on the connection between job duties and the conduct, rather than the employee's intentions. The Court concluded that even if defamation occurred, it was during the fulfillment of job duties, leading to dismissal of the claims. This case parallels Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, where a manager's allegedly defamatory statement was made during a workplace investigation, further illustrating the objective scope of employment analysis.
A jury initially found a manager and his employer jointly and severally liable, determining the manager acted within the scope of his employment. However, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the employer, citing a lack of evidence supporting the jury's conclusion. The Court highlighted a distinction between defaming someone for an employer's benefit versus defaming someone to an employer, emphasizing that the former is within the scope of employment while the latter is not. The Court referenced the Minyard case, which ruled that the manager's defamatory statements during an investigation did not further the employer's business objectives. In contrast, the Laverie case involved statements that were made in furtherance of the university's interests, thus deemed within the scope of employment. The distinction between the two cases lies in the nature of the statements; in Minyard, the statements concerned personal misconduct, while in Laverie, they related to a candidate's qualifications relevant to the employer's interests. The current case is more aligned with Laverie, as the statements discussed a colleague's inappropriate behavior, which affected the workplace, thereby classifying them as made for the employer's interests. The motivations behind the statements or their truthfulness are not relevant to determining the scope of employment.
Renta’s statement and Hernandez’s dissemination of it were determined to be objectively related to their job responsibilities. Citing case law, the document references prior rulings that support the position that statements made by employees about workplace issues, such as patient care or harassment, fall within the scope of employment. Specifically, it cites Rios, Brooks, Cai, and Vinson as precedents where employee statements were deemed to be made within the course of their duties. Guerra's argument regarding 'unspecified defamatory statements' failed to demonstrate any evidence of such statements occurring outside the scope of employment. As a result, Renta and Hernandez successfully established their right to dismissal under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) section 101.106(f). The court upheld Hernandez’s jurisdictional argument, rendering the need to address his secondary issue regarding the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) unnecessary. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and dismissed Guerra's claims against both Renta and Hernandez.
