Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; April 28, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Cynthia J. DeWitt appeals her sentence following a guilty plea for possessing pseudoephedrine, knowing it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). She contends the government violated their plea agreement, which specified a base offense level of 16 based on 1.12 grams of pseudoephedrine. The indictment included a second count against co-defendant Robert D. Hall related to a similar offense.
During sentencing, the United States Probation Office recommended a higher base offense level of 28, attributing an additional 51.9 grams of pseudoephedrine from Hall's offense to DeWitt as "relevant conduct." DeWitt objected to this increase, arguing it contradicted the plea agreement. The government asserted that the agreement allowed for the introduction of evidence regarding any conduct charged in the indictment. The district court permitted this evidence while DeWitt maintained her objection. The Court of Appeals reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing, agreeing with DeWitt that the government breached the plea agreement.
The government's attorney acknowledged an understanding among the parties regarding the amount specified in the plea agreement, but clarified that this does not limit the introduction of additional evidence. The district court noted that it was not bound by the plea agreement and could consider relevant conduct, allowing the government to present evidence accordingly. The court found DeWitt accountable for the quantity noted in the presentence report, adopting a base offense level of 28, which was subsequently reduced by seven levels for mitigating factors, resulting in a total offense level of 21. With a criminal history category II, DeWitt's sentencing range was determined to be 41-51 months, leading to a sentence of 41 months imprisonment and a three-year supervised release.
The interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements are reviewed de novo, as they are contractual and must adhere to general contract principles. In this case, the plea agreement stipulated that the applicable drug quantity was 1.12 grams of pseudoephedrine with a base offense level of 16. The government attempted to present evidence for a higher drug quantity and corresponding offense level, which was deemed a breach of the plea agreement. The government contended that the agreement allowed for the introduction of evidence regarding relevant conduct and argued that the stipulations applied only to Count I of the indictment. However, this interpretation was rejected, as the plea agreement's language indicated that the total drug quantity applied to the entire case, not just a portion, confirming the parties' mutual agreement on the total drug quantity attributable to DeWitt.
Paragraph 3 of the plea agreement allows the consideration of uncharged related criminal activity as "relevant conduct" under USSG 1B1.3(a)(2) for calculating the offense level. However, the court emphasizes that this provision does not allow the government to advocate for a drug quantity exceeding the specific amount agreed upon in paragraph 11. Under contract interpretation principles, the specific stipulations regarding drug quantity and base offense level take precedence over the general provisions concerning relevant conduct. The court asserts that accepting the government's broader interpretation would undermine the stipulation regarding DeWitt's total drug quantity intended for sentencing calculations.
The government also contends that paragraph 10 of the plea agreement permits it to present evidence for a higher base offense level in response to DeWitt's objections to the presentence report. However, the court finds that paragraph 10 does not support the government's position. The presentence report is not considered evidence, and once DeWitt objected to the drug quantity, the government could not present evidence to contradict the established stipulation without a basis for liability. The court interprets paragraph 10 as allowing the government to respond to issues not covered by stipulations rather than to counter objections aimed at enforcing the agreed terms.
The ruling clarifies that the restrictions apply only to the government under DeWitt's plea agreement, which was not governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). Thus, while the district court is not bound by the parties' stipulations regarding drug quantity or base offense level, it retains the authority to evaluate evidence independently when imposing a sentence, in accordance with the sentencing guidelines.
The court is not required to accept the parties' stipulation when determining the factual basis for sentencing. It will consider the stipulation alongside the presentence investigation results and any other pertinent information. If there are discrepancies between a presentence report's recommendations and the stipulation, and the court questions the stipulation's accuracy, it can call witnesses to clarify the facts relevant to sentencing, as supported by case law. Upon remand, the sentencing court has the authority to independently determine the appropriate sentence, unaffected by the plea agreement or the presentence investigation (PSI). Acknowledging that there would be no breach of the plea agreement if the district court required the government to present contradictory evidence, the court noted that a potential independent conclusion by the district court does not negate the breach by the government. Furthermore, if the government stipulates to a drug quantity and base offense level, it cannot subsequently seek a harsher sentence, even if it believes the stipulation was erroneous. Consequently, due to the identified breach of the plea agreement by the government, the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing before a different judge, emphasizing that the reassignment does not imply any unfairness on the part of the original sentencing judge.
