Michael Anthony Conage v. United States

Citation: Not availableDocket: SC20-1441

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; August 25, 2022; Florida; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit regarding the interpretation of "purchase" in Florida's drug trafficking law. The court determined that a completed purchase of illegal drugs requires the purchaser's possession of those drugs, rejecting the notion that payment alone signifies completion of a purchase. The case involved Michael Conage, who was previously convicted of a gun possession offense and sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which necessitated finding three prior "serious drug offenses." One such offense was a 2006 cocaine trafficking conviction under section 893.135(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes.

The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Federal courts apply a "categorical approach," focusing solely on the conviction and the statutory definition rather than the underlying facts. Under Florida law, drug trafficking includes multiple actions, including selling and purchasing drugs. The court noted that for a trafficking conviction to qualify as an ACCA predicate, each action must align with the ACCA's definition. Conage's appeal centered on trafficking by purchase, arguing that a purchase is complete upon payment, thus not requiring proof of possession. However, the court concluded that possession is implied when a purchase is completed, supporting the ACCA's criteria for a "serious drug offense."

The Eleventh Circuit requires clarification on how Florida law defines "purchase" in relation to drug trafficking under Section 893.135(1) due to the lack of a statutory definition and limited case law. The court emphasizes the significant implications of this definition, noting that if Conage's interpretation is correct, it would prevent any drug trafficking conviction under this statute from qualifying as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The court has received arguments from Conage, the United States, and a supporting brief from the State of Florida. Previous district court cases cited by Conage and the State concerning double jeopardy do not provide sufficient guidance, as they did not analyze the definitions of purchase or possession. The certified question seeks to determine whether a completed purchase under this statute necessitates actual or constructive possession of the drugs. The Eleventh Circuit intends to focus on the conduct prohibited by the purchasing element of Florida's drug trafficking law and is evaluating statutory interpretation approaches, expressing skepticism towards the outdated maxim from Holly v. Auld, advocating for a comprehensive analysis of textual and structural clues in statutory language.

Traditional canons of statutory interpretation serve as flexible guidelines rather than rigid rules, assisting throughout the interpretive process. It is important to consider the statutory context and apply relevant canons rather than isolating terms to determine their "plain" meaning. The Eleventh Circuit’s inquiry consists of two components: the meaning of "purchase" under Florida law in section 893.135(1) and whether this definition includes possession as defined by federal law. Under federal law, "possession" encompasses both actual and constructive possession, with actual possession defined as having direct physical control and constructive possession as having dominion or control over an item, or the intent to exercise such control.

The Eleventh Circuit's task is to ascertain if "purchase" under Florida law necessitates possession as understood in federal law. The government argues that a purchase is not complete until the buyer has possession of the drugs, while the opposing view suggests that a purchase occurs when money is exchanged, prior to actual possession. The summary concludes that the ordinary meaning of "purchase" implies both the act of giving consideration and obtaining the item, as supported by dictionary definitions which define "purchase" as obtaining something in exchange for money, thereby reinforcing the notion that possession is inherent in the concept of purchase.

A defendant is not required to have actual physical possession of an item to be considered to have "obtained" it; rather, they must have control, or constructive possession, as understood under federal law. The term "purchase" encompasses both the exchange of consideration and the buyer's control over illegal drugs, aligning with how this Court has previously defined "sale." The Legislature, when criminalizing trafficking by purchase, would have understood that a purchase necessitates both payment and control to maintain consistency with related statutory terms. The statute identifies different methods of drug trafficking, all requiring some form of control over the drugs. Consequently, a completed purchase under section 893.135(1) requires proof that the defendant (1) provided consideration and (2) gained control of a trafficking quantity of illegal drugs, including through an agent. Counterarguments presented by Conage, which suggest that a purchaser could merely pay for someone else without obtaining control, are dismissed as irrelevant. The example of a "middleman" is addressed, indicating that they would either be a copurchaser or an aider and abettor, thus liable under the definition of "purchase." Conage's reliance on everyday usage of the term "purchase," such as in online transactions, is acknowledged but ultimately deemed insufficient to alter the legal interpretation.

Typical speakers may have different views on whether a commercial purchase is complete before a consumer gains control of the item. However, the Court has established that a sale, particularly in the context of Florida's chapter 893 regarding drug law, requires both consideration and delivery, as highlighted in the case of Milazzo. While everyday language might suggest a vendor has "sold" an item before delivery, this does not align with the legal definition applicable to drug sales. The State argues that one can acquire the right to control an item prior to actual control, as in online purchases, but this contradicts the Court's ruling that a sale of illegal drugs is not complete merely when an obligation to deliver arises.

Furthermore, legitimate commercial transactions are governed by enforceable rights, which do not apply to illegal drug trafficking. The concept of constructive possession in this context implies that a defendant must have the recognized authority to possess the drugs. The statutory history of section 893.135(1) indicates that drug trafficking laws have evolved, with various methods of committing the crime articulated since the law's inception in 1979, and the addition of trafficking by purchase in 1987. The arguments presented by Conage and the State suggest an overly narrow interpretation of possession, relying on Florida law rather than federal law. Florida's definition of constructive possession requires knowledge and control over the substance, yet the definitions cited are outdated due to amendments to jury instructions in 2018 and 2019. Current jury instructions clarify that to establish possession, the State must prove that the defendant knew of the substance's existence and intentionally exercised control over it, emphasizing that mere proximity is insufficient without further evidence.

The determination of whether Conage and the State accurately interpret Florida law on constructive possession is not the focus here. The ruling clarifies that "purchase" in section 893.135(1) necessitates a broader form of control-based constructive possession recognized federally, rather than the narrow definition suggested by Conage and the State. If their interpretation is correct, the 1987 legislative addition of trafficking by purchase would indeed have altered the legal landscape by criminalizing conduct involving consideration and control that was not previously captured by the statute’s definition of possession.

The statute lists separate forms of drug trafficking, such as sale, delivery, and possession, despite potential overlaps among them, indicating legislative redundancy. The court refrains from adopting Conage and the State’s definition of trafficking by purchase, suggesting that any specialized definition should be explicitly established by the Legislature.

Regarding the rule of lenity, Florida Statutes section 775.021(1) mandates strict construction of criminal code provisions, favoring the accused when ambiguities remain after traditional statutory interpretation methods. However, the court contends that this rule does not apply in this context, as it pertains to a generic defendant rather than Conage specifically. Conage’s interpretation of section 893.135(1) is found plausible but not compelling enough to favor him; thus, the interpretation favoring the United States prevails.

In summary, a completed purchase under section 893.135(1) requires proof that the defendant both (1) provided consideration for and (2) gained control of a trafficking quantity of illegal drugs, with control reflecting the broader range of conduct recognized as constructive possession under federal law.

The Eleventh Circuit’s certified question is addressed without attempting to predict how the State might demonstrate control in trafficking by purchase under section 893.135(1). Justices Canady, Polston, Lawson, Couriel, and Grosshans concurred, while Justice Labarga concurs with the result but expresses concern regarding the majority’s dismissal of the principle established in Holly v. Auld, which the Court had recently reaffirmed in a unanimous opinion from May 26, 2022. Labarga emphasizes that when a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, it should be interpreted based on its plain meaning, without resorting to additional rules of statutory construction. The document notes the participation of various legal representatives for both the appellant and the appellee, along with an amicus curiae from the State of Florida. The ruling is not final until the time for a rehearing motion expires or is resolved if filed.