Bioconvergence LLC D/B/A Singota Solutions v. Singh

Citation: Not availableDocket: Civil Action No. 2021-2090

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; August 22, 2022; Federal District Court

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Bioconvergence LLC, operating as Singota Solutions, has filed a lawsuit against Simranjit Singh, alleging his involvement in the theft of trade secrets by his wife, Jaspreet Attariwala, a former employee. Singota, based in Indiana, claims Attariwala misappropriated confidential client contacts and proprietary information during her tenure as a business development manager from September 2015 to December 2018, particularly while applying for a position with competitor Emergent. The company asserts that Attariwala violated her employment contract, which included confidentiality and a non-compete clause, by stealing sensitive information both before and after securing employment with Emergent. 

Singota contends that Singh aided Attariwala in this misconduct by facilitating the transfer of confidential data to his personal email and cloud storage. Following these events, Singota issued a cease and desist letter to Attariwala in January 2019, demanding compliance with her non-compete agreement. When Attariwala allegedly continued to use Singota's proprietary information, the company initiated legal action in Indiana state court, resulting in a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against her. This order required her to refrain from using Singota’s data and mandated the preservation and return of any confidential information in her possession, with a forensic expert appointed to assist in identifying such data. The court will deny Singh's motion to dismiss the complaint.

Singota alleges that Attariwala delayed in providing necessary devices and information, including those belonging to Mr. Singh, to the court-appointed expert. Due to Attariwala's non-cooperation and failure to pay the expert as ordered, the Indiana state court found her in contempt in April 2019. Following this, Singota attempted to amend its complaint to include Singh as a defendant but later withdrew the request, allowing for the possibility of refiling. Meanwhile, Attariwala removed the case to federal court. In December 2019, Judge Sarah Evans Barker granted Singota further preliminary injunctive relief, stating Attariwala had misled Singota in its search for stolen trade secrets. Although the case was stayed during Attariwala’s bankruptcy, discovery resumed, with dispositive motions due by September 2022 and trial set for July 2023.

In June 2019, Singota again sought to add Singh as a defendant in its case against Attariwala, alleging conspiracy and misappropriation of trade secrets. In March 2020, the Southern District of Indiana dismissed Singh from the case due to lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that he did not purposefully direct tortious conduct at Indiana. However, the court retained the authority to enforce its injunction against Singh if he assisted Attariwala in evading compliance.

Singota is currently pursuing two actions against Singh in another district. In October 2020, it filed a case related to Singh’s alleged efforts to evade deposition service, which is pending before Judge Contreras. In August 2021, Singota initiated a civil action against Singh, repeating allegations from the earlier case and including seven counts related to trade secret violations, conversion, and civil conspiracy, as well as seeking recovery under the Indiana Crime Victims Relief Act. Singh, representing himself, has moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it is speculative and raising issues such as lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. Singota opposes this motion, which is now under review by the court.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and allows for all reasonable inferences from those facts, but does not accept legal conclusions. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court's jurisdiction, placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. The court may consider undisputed facts or resolve disputed facts to ensure jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion assesses whether the complaint contains sufficient factual content to plausibly state a claim for relief, allowing the court to draw reasonable inferences of liability against the defendant.

In Singh's motion to dismiss, he challenges Singota’s complaint on grounds of federal jurisdiction, venue appropriateness, and the need to consolidate this case with related claims. He argues that this case improperly attempts to relitigate claims previously dismissed by the Southern District of Indiana. The court rejects Singh's view, clarifying that the prior dismissal was based on lack of personal jurisdiction and did not address the merits of the claims. Consequently, Singh's motion to dismiss is denied.

The court further addresses Singh's claims regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata bars subsequent lawsuits if they involve the same claims, parties, and culminated in a final judgment on the merits from a competent court. Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues that were previously contested and determined by a competent court, provided there is no unfairness in applying preclusion. Singh’s request for leniency in his pleadings is denied, as he is a trained attorney, and regardless, he has failed to demonstrate grounds to dismiss any claims in Singota's complaint.

Both preclusion doctrines necessitate a final determination by a competent court, which the Southern District of Indiana's dismissal of Singh for lack of personal jurisdiction fails to provide. Such a dismissal does not constitute a merits decision for res judicata purposes, and Judge Barker’s ruling that personal jurisdiction was lacking did not address any merits issues. Consequently, the dismissal does not invoke either res judicata or collateral estoppel. Singh misinterprets Judge Barker’s opinion, suggesting it commented on the strength of allegations, whereas it merely indicated that certain allegations were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The analysis did not pertain to the merits of the claims.

Regarding Singh's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, he argues that the federal question presented is frivolous and seeks to dismiss the state-law claims. The Court disagrees, noting that Singota claims federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on a violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Singh's assertion that the claim is frivolous is unconvincing for two reasons: first, Singota's decision to add the federal claim later in the process does not indicate improper tactics; and second, the prior dismissal did not assess the merits of the claim. The Court finds no basis for dismissing the Defend Trade Secrets Act claim and confirms jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in the complaint, as they are closely related to the federal claims involving Singh's alleged trade secret violations, fulfilling the criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). There is no basis to decline this jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) since Singh's argument hinges on the assumption that the federal claim would be dismissed, which the Court has already rejected. 

Regarding venue, Singh's motion to dismiss for improper jurisdiction is denied; venue is appropriate in the District of Columbia where Singh, the sole defendant, resides. 

In addressing the sufficiency of allegations, the Court finds Singh’s arguments for dismissal due to failure to state a claim unpersuasive. Singh incorrectly assumes that a prior dismissal in the Southern District of Indiana has preclusive effect, which the Court has determined does not apply. Specific claims against Singh are adequately pled, particularly under the Indiana Crime Victims' Relief Act (ICVRA). The Court notes that Singota only needs to allege a “pecuniary loss,” which it has done, asserting that Singh's alleged conversion of confidential information caused economic damages, including lost profits. This satisfies the pleading requirements at this stage.

Singota has sufficiently alleged that Singh acted with the requisite intent for various claims, despite Singh's contention that the allegations do not meet the intent element. The court clarified that previous rulings did not assess the overall intentionality of Singh’s actions. Specific actions attributed to Singh, such as downloading confidential information, copying documents, and withholding certain devices, suggest willful intent. Additionally, Singota's claims of conspiracy are supported by allegations that Singh and his wife conspired to commit torts like conversion and theft. Evidence includes their joint refusal to cooperate with investigations and the transmission of confidential documents to Singh’s personal email, implying an agreement to misappropriate information. The court will not dismiss the conspiracy claim. Singh’s attempts to refute the allegations, citing inaccuracies or incomplete narratives, cannot be considered at this stage, as they contradict the complaint's assertions and introduce new facts. Consequently, Singh has failed to demonstrate grounds for dismissing the claims for lack of sufficient allegations.

Singh seeks dismissal of the complaint's request for injunctive relief, but the Court finds his arguments unpersuasive. Singh's first argument relies on a prior order from the Southern District of Indiana, which he misinterprets. Judge Barker indicated that some injunctive measures were unnecessary due to changes in circumstances, specifically Attariwala's termination from a competing firm, but did not rule out the need for any injunctive relief entirely. Additionally, Singh's assertions regarding the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction are irrelevant, as Singota has not requested one or had the opportunity to litigate the merits of the case.

Regarding the laches defense, Singh argues that it should bar Singota's relief request. Laches aims to prevent stale claims due to a lack of diligence and requires both a lack of diligence by the claimant and prejudice to the defendant. The Court finds this defense unsuitable for a motion to dismiss due to its fact-intensive nature and rejects Singh's reliance on an out-of-context quote from a related case. The earlier ruling did not address laches but assessed whether Singota had "good cause" for amending its complaint.

Lastly, Singh's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for failure to join necessary parties is denied. The Court outlines the three-step Rule 19 analysis for determining if a party must be joined, noting that the burden lies with Singh to demonstrate how the absence of the party impairs their ability to protect their interests or exposes existing parties to inconsistent obligations.

Under Rule 12(b)(7), the court evaluates claims regarding the necessity of an absent party by accepting the complaint's allegations as true and considering extrinsic evidence. Courts typically resist granting motions for dismissal under this rule unless there is a serious and incurable defect. Singh failed to demonstrate that the alleged co-conspirators—Attariwala, Emergent, and Honey Ji—are necessary parties under Rule 19. His assertion that the case cannot progress without them is insufficient, as co-conspirator joint tortfeasors are not deemed indispensable. Moreover, Singh's general reference to the risk of inconsistent rulings does not substantiate the necessity of these parties. Singh's mention of separate lawsuits against these defendants does not indicate a significant risk of inconsistent obligations. The court clarifies that these parallel actions do not stem from improper forum shopping or attempts to disrupt ongoing proceedings. Consequently, Singh did not meet the burden for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(7). Additionally, arguments raised in Singh's reply brief regarding trade secret misappropriation and statute of limitations are not addressed, as they were not part of the initial motion. The court will deny the motion to dismiss, with a separate order to follow.