United States v. Charleston County, South Carolina Charleston County Council John O. Conlon Toi Ahrens Estes Cindy M. Floyd A.D. Jordan Barrett S. Lawrimore Timothy E. Scott Leon E. Stavrinakis Charles Wallace Curtis E. Bostic, as Members of the Charleston County Council, and Charleston County Election Commission Ruth C. Glover, Lee H. Moultrie George Freeman Maggie McGill Sandra Fowler v. Charleston County Council
Docket: 03-2111
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; April 29, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Charleston County, South Carolina, has been governed by a nine-member County Council elected through county-wide, partisan elections since 1969. Despite a significant minority population, there has been minimal electoral success for minority-preferred and minority candidates. The United States initiated a lawsuit alleging that the at-large election system diluted minority voting strength, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The district court concurred, citing severe voting polarization, the electoral structure, and the county's size as factors that hindered minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice. The court's findings were deemed not clearly erroneous, leading to an affirmation of the decision.
Charleston County, encompassing over 900 square miles and featuring various municipalities and islands, has a diverse demographic. Of its approximately 310,000 residents, 60.8% are white, 34.3% are black, and 4.9% belong to other racial or ethnic groups. However, voter registration and turnout reflect a disparity: as of November 2000, 69.1% of registered voters were white, and only 30.9% were nonwhite, with white voters also showing higher participation rates in elections. The County's own expert indicated consistently lower turnout among minority registered voters compared to their white counterparts.
The County Council, responsible for local governance issues such as economic development and public safety, consists of nine members elected through staggered at-large, partisan elections. The council includes three members from Charleston, three from North Charleston, two from West Ashley, and one from East Cooper. Charleston County uniquely elects its council at-large among the state's majority-white counties, contrasting with less populated counties like Hampton and Jasper, which also use at-large elections but have balanced demographics. The current at-large voting system was established in 1969 and approved under the Voting Rights Act. In a 1989 referendum, residents narrowly rejected a shift to single-member districts, with significant polarization: 98% of minority voters favored the change, while 75% of white voters opposed it. Since 1970, only three minority members have served on the Council, highlighting the difficulty minority candidates face in elections, although some white candidates preferred by minorities have had more success. The Voting Rights Act's Section 2(a) prohibits voting practices that deny citizens' rights based on race, and Section 2(b) emphasizes equal participation opportunities. The 1982 amendment clarifies that both intentional and unintentional discriminatory practices are condemned. The Supreme Court's Thornburg v. Gingles established criteria for proving vote dilution: the minority must be large and compact enough to form a majority in a single district, demonstrate political cohesion, and show that the white majority votes as a bloc to defeat minority-preferred candidates.
The trier of fact must assess whether a violation of Section 2 has occurred if three specific preconditions are met. The Supreme Court advises using the totality of circumstances, referencing the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act for guidance. Key factors in this assessment include the extent to which minority group members hold public office and the degree of racial polarization in voting. Additional, supportive considerations may include historical voting discrimination, discriminatory voting practices, exclusion from candidate selection, the use of racial appeals in campaigns, and the impact of past discrimination on minority political participation, though this list is not exhaustive.
In a case involving Charleston County's at-large electoral method, both the United States and local voters argued this system unlawfully diluted minority voting strength, with private plaintiffs additionally claiming intentional discrimination against minorities. They sought partial summary judgment on the Gingles preconditions for demonstrating a § 2 violation. On April 26, 2002, a magistrate judge recommended granting this motion after analyzing expert testimonies. The judge found that Charleston County's minority population was large and compact enough to support a majority in a single-member district (first Gingles precondition) and that minority voters demonstrated political cohesion in 85% of contested elections since 1988 (second Gingles precondition).
The magistrate judge examined evidence indicating that minority voters' preferred candidates are often defeated by cohesive white voting, affirming that causation is not relevant to the determination of whether white voting occurs as a bloc, as established in Lewis v. Alamance County. The judge noted that the reasons behind such voting patterns are only pertinent in the broader context of the totality of circumstances after the Gingles preconditions are met. On July 10, 2002, the District Court for South Carolina adopted the magistrate's findings, granting summary judgment to the United States and private plaintiffs regarding the three Gingles preconditions. A subsequent trial found that the County's at-large electoral system diluted minority voting strength, violating § 2, although the court rejected claims of intentional discrimination against minorities.
Charleston County is appealing this decision, accepting the first two Gingles preconditions but disputing the third—white racial bloc voting—arguing that the district court erred by not requiring proof that this bloc voting was racially motivated rather than driven by partisanship. The County asserts that both white and black voters tend to support candidates of their respective parties regardless of race, and thus, claims that the United States must demonstrate that race, not partisanship, prompts the polarized voting behavior. The United States counters that evidence of partisanship should be assessed in the totality of circumstances analysis, post-Gingles preconditions. Both parties agree that causation is relevant, particularly in evaluating whether white bloc voting consistently undermines minority-preferred candidates.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act allows courts to consider factors beyond race when assessing the political success of minority groups, as established in *LULAC v. Clements*. The Act's protections are specifically aimed at electoral defeats due to race or color. Disagreements exist regarding when causation evidence should be introduced in the vote dilution analysis. The precedent set in *Alamance County* suggests that causation is irrelevant for the initial Gingles preconditions but relevant in the broader totality of circumstances inquiry. The Gingles preconditions serve as a preliminary check on whether an at-large voting system may breach § 2. To prove an actual violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the electoral scheme diminishes the voting strength of the protected class, as noted in *Voinovich v. Quilter*. This requires a thorough evaluation of relevant facts and voting patterns, particularly why racial polarization occurs. The court has rejected attempts to broaden the third Gingles precondition to include causation in its initial assessment. Furthermore, the term "legally significant" white bloc voting, as defined by the Gingles Court, pertains to the frequency of racially polarized voting rather than the motivations behind it. The County has not argued that its white bloc voting is insignificant; instead, evidence indicates that minority-preferred candidates are typically defeated by such voting, confirming the fulfillment of the third Gingles precondition by the district court.
The County contends that even if the Gingles preconditions are met, the district court erred in concluding that its at-large voting system violated § 2. The County argues that the court failed to consider significant evidence indicating that party affiliation, rather than racial animus, influences voting patterns, particularly given the County's strong Republican base. It asserts that, although the court appropriately excluded this partisanship evidence regarding the third Gingles precondition, it should have weighed this evidence in evaluating the overall circumstances. The County emphasizes the importance of understanding the reasons behind polarized voting in its analysis.
Examples provided include Timothy Scott, a minority Republican who was elected with substantial support from white voters, suggesting that minority candidates can succeed if they align with the prevailing political views of the majority. Additionally, two white Democratic candidates lost elections but later won as Republicans, further indicating that electoral outcomes are more influenced by party affiliation than race.
The County argues that this demonstrates electoral defeats for minority-preferred candidates stem from partisan politics rather than racial factors. The court's role involves a detailed examination of local electoral dynamics and is not to re-evaluate evidence but to assess whether the district court's findings of vote dilution are clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court's familiarity with local political realities is essential for such determinations.
Despite the County's arguments, the district court’s finding of a § 2 violation is supported by substantial credible evidence, including data presented by the County's own expert, Dr. Weber. Central to the assessment of vote dilution are factors such as the extent of racially polarized voting and the electoral success of minority groups, both of which were uncontested in the district court. The United States provided undisputed evidence of significant racial polarization and minimal success for minority candidates in elections.
Dr. Weber's analysis indicated that from 1988 to 2000, racially polarized voting occurred in 75.8% of contested County Council elections, with complete polarization (100%) noted in elections featuring minority candidates. Dr. Arrington, the United States' expert, reported an even higher polarization rate of 94% for the years 1984 to 2000. Both experts supported the district court's finding that voting patterns in Charleston County Council elections were significantly divided along racial lines. A 1989 referendum highlighted this divide: 98% of minority voters favored a shift from an at-large election system to single-member districts, whereas 75% of white voters wanted to maintain the at-large system.
Since 1970, only 3 out of 41 elected members of the nine-member Council were minorities, with only Timothy Scott serving in the last decade. The district court determined that the earlier electoral successes of Hamilton and Amos-Frazier were not relevant to assessing current minority access to the electoral process, emphasizing the significance of more recent elections. The court noted that the infrequency of minority success in elections was not unique to the County Council and acknowledged the County’s argument that the assessment should consider the overall success of minority-preferred candidates, not just minority candidates. However, the district court clarified that while the number of elected minorities was a factor in evaluating vote dilution, it was not definitive. The court focused on whether minority voters had the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, regardless of the candidates' race, as part of a broader totality of circumstances analysis.
The district court did not overlook the success of minority-preferred candidates in its assessment of the electoral system. The County's claim that the court ignored numerous elections over the past thirty years is overstated; most of those elections occurred before 1988, a period not considered by Dr. Weber, the County's expert. Although minority-preferred candidates had some success post-1988, Dr. Weber testified that they were generally defeated by white bloc voting, supporting the court’s conclusion that the at-large electoral system diluted minority vote strength. The district court extensively analyzed reports from Dr. Weber and Dr. Arrington regarding post-1988 elections, countering the County's assertion of a narrow focus.
The district court also found that the electoral structure and size of Charleston County hindered minority voters' ability to elect representatives. Candidates must qualify from four residency districts and are elected in staggered terms, which the parties’ experts agreed complicates success for minority-preferred candidates. This structure creates a de facto majority vote requirement and limits single-shot voting opportunities. Furthermore, the County's large size poses significant challenges for minority candidates, particularly in terms of campaign financing, as they typically have fewer resources for costly advertising.
The County's argument that partisanship, rather than race, drives voting patterns lacked systematic evidence. Dr. Weber admitted he could not determine the extent of racial bias in voting and acknowledged that race and partisanship are closely linked. Despite the possibility of isolating these factors, no such evidence was presented to the district court, as party registration data and relevant survey research were unavailable for Charleston County Council elections.
The County presented anecdotal evidence of political partisanship, highlighting instances of candidates switching parties and the election of a minority Republican. It also referenced non-partisan Charleston County School Board elections, arguing they showed less racial polarization. However, the district court found this evidence lacking in comprehensiveness and persuasiveness. Specifically, it questioned the value of School Board election evidence due to expert disagreements on its racial polarization, and noted that better outcomes for minority candidates might stem from unique circumstances, such as running unopposed or a split white vote.
The court also found the evidence of party-switching inconclusive, unable to determine if minority voters' loss of support for certain candidates was purely partisan. Ultimately, the district court identified strong evidence of severe voting polarization and minimal electoral success for minorities, alongside a large voting district. Dr. Weber indicated that minority-preferred candidates face more defeats than white-preferred candidates, demonstrating racial polarization among voters.
The court concluded that race plays a significant role in voting patterns, even when controlling for partisanship, which aligned with the framework for vote-dilution claims established by Congress and the Supreme Court's Gingles decision. The district court's findings were deemed not clearly erroneous, affirming that various factors collectively proved a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed.
Individuals of Hispanic, American Indian, Alaskan Native, Asian, or Hawaiian or Pacific Islander descent are included in the category of other racial or ethnic descents. The private plaintiffs' appeal is noted; however, the affirmation of the district court's finding that the County's at-large system violated § 2 by diluting minority voting strength negates the need to consider the plaintiffs' claim of intentional discrimination. Single-shot voting, which allows a minority group to secure at-large seats by concentrating votes behind a few candidates, is ineffective in one-seat elections and generally limited in two-seat elections.
The district court's analysis centered on key factors it deemed most significant, alongside the historical context of discrimination affecting minority voting rights. While acknowledging instances of minority-preferred candidates being elected, the court found that these successes were overshadowed by a pattern of white bloc voting that typically defeated such candidates. The County's assertion that the court ignored numerous Council elections over the past thirty years is inaccurate, as most cited elections occurred before 1988, which the district court did not consider per expert testimony.
For post-1988 elections, although some success was noted for minority-preferred candidates, expert testimony indicated that such candidates often faced defeat due to white bloc voting. The district court thoroughly reviewed expert reports related to these elections, countering claims of insufficient analysis. Furthermore, the electoral structure of the County, characterized by residency districts, staggered terms, and a primary system, was found to hinder minority candidates’ electoral success, as both parties' experts agreed on the challenges posed by this structure.
Residency districts and staggered terms in Charleston County limit County Council elections to single-seat or two-seat contests, resulting in a primary nominating system that typically yields only two viable candidates per seat. This structure effectively enforces a majority vote requirement and restricts minority voters' ability to utilize single-shot voting. Charleston County, the largest in South Carolina with a long coastline, poses challenges for minority candidates, particularly due to the high costs of necessary campaign tools like television ads and direct mail, which are burdensome for those with fewer financial resources. The County contended that partisanship drives the racially polarized voting patterns, yet lacked systematic evidence to substantiate this claim. The County's expert, Dr. Weber, admitted the difficulty in isolating racial bias from partisanship in voting behavior. Moreover, essential data such as party registration and survey research were unavailable for Council elections, as voters are not required to register by party for general elections. The County provided anecdotal evidence of partisanship, including instances of party-switching candidates and minority Republican successes, but the district court found this evidence to be insufficiently comprehensive. It questioned the relevance of evidence from non-partisan School Board elections and noted that favorable outcomes for minority candidates in those elections might stem from unique conditions. Ultimately, the district court concluded that the evidence regarding partisanship as a key factor in voting was inconclusive, affirming the significance of race in electoral outcomes.
Severe voting polarization, a lack of minority electoral success, and an unusually large voting district were evidenced in Charleston County. Dr. Weber acknowledged that minority-preferred candidates, especially minority Democrats, have consistently lost elections, while white Democrats have occasionally won. Minority voters tend to support minority candidates more cohesively than white candidates, whereas white voters show the opposite trend. This racial polarization persists even when factoring in partisanship during Council elections. The district court's conclusions that the at-large voting system violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act were not clearly erroneous, as supported by the framework established by Congress and the Supreme Court's Gingles decision. While the County's evidence of partisanship was unconvincing, the combination of voting polarization, minimal minority success, and the electoral structure was sufficient to demonstrate a violation. The court affirmed its judgment, noting that its findings were reinforced by expert testimony and a thorough evaluation of local electoral conditions. The appeal by private plaintiffs regarding intentional discrimination was unnecessary to address, given the affirmation of the vote dilution claim. Factors such as past discrimination were also considered in the court's decision.
