In the Interest of R.J.A., a Child

Citation: Not availableDocket: A22A1062

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; August 22, 2022; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Motions for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals of Georgia must be received within ten days to be considered timely. In the case concerning R. J. A., a minor accused of rape, both the superior court and juvenile court have refused to assert jurisdiction over the allegations. The superior court, which holds exclusive jurisdiction, initially transferred the case to juvenile court due to a lack of indictment within 180 days, as required by OCGA. 17-7-50.1. However, the juvenile court found that R. J. A. had not been detained for the entire period necessary for the transfer and identified no other legal basis for its jurisdiction, resulting in a transfer back to the superior court. R. J. A. appealed this transfer decision. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's actions, stating it was within its rights to evaluate jurisdiction and that no statutory grounds existed for the juvenile court to retain the case. The procedural history includes R. J. A.'s arrest and the subsequent legal motions concerning jurisdiction and transfer between the courts.

Jurisdiction over the appeal is established under OCGA § 15-11-564(a), allowing direct appeals from juvenile court orders that transfer delinquency cases to superior court. The state contends that this statute does not apply, arguing the juvenile court's transfer was not a traditional transfer under OCGA §§ 15-11-561 and 15-11-562, but rather a jurisdictional transfer under OCGA § 15-11-560. The court finds that the state fails to provide adequate reasoning to exclude jurisdictional transfers from direct appellate review.

The analysis centers on whether the juvenile court had the authority to assess its own jurisdiction regarding the delinquency charges against R. J. A. The juvenile court's ability to determine its jurisdiction is affirmed, as it is the duty of any court to inquire into its jurisdiction. The juvenile court was not bound by any superior court ruling on jurisdiction since neither court has corrective authority over the other.

The juvenile court is categorized as a court of special and limited jurisdiction, restricted to powers granted by the legislature. Under the Georgia Constitution, superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over felony cases, including certain juvenile offender cases. While the juvenile court generally has concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court for felony allegations, it does not possess concurrent jurisdiction over rape allegations against minors. Therefore, the superior court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the rape charge against R. J. A., and the juvenile court cannot adjudicate that charge.

The juvenile court's transfer order referenced that the juvenile code allows certain cases with exclusive superior court jurisdiction to be transferred to juvenile court, but this does not apply in the current situation. Specifically, OCGA § 15-11-560 (d) allows a district attorney to file a delinquency petition instead of pursuing charges in superior court, and OCGA § 15-11-560 (e) permits transfers except for rape allegations. Instead, the superior court's transfer was based on OCGA § 17-7-50.1, which mandates that a child detained for a crime within superior court jurisdiction must be presented to a grand jury within 180 days. If not indicted within that timeframe, the case should be transferred to juvenile court.

However, OCGA § 17-7-50.1 only applies if the child has been detained for at least 180 days before indictment. The term "detained" is not defined in the statute, but in *State v. Coleman*, the Supreme Court ruled that a juvenile released on bond is not considered "detained" for the purposes of this statute. R. J. A. contends that "detained" should include scenarios involving conditional releases like home monitoring, but *Coleman* counters this argument, affirming that once released on bond, the juvenile is not detained under OCGA § 17-7-50.1.

Consequently, R. J. A.'s release prior to the 180-day mark means he was not detained according to the statute, allowing the superior court to maintain exclusive jurisdiction over the case despite its citation of OCGA § 17-7-50.1 for the transfer. The statute divests the superior court of jurisdiction only if the indictment timeline is not met, and the transfer did not effectively transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court. Courts cannot transfer cases without explicit authorization, which was not present in this situation.

In Carpenter v. Carpenter, 276 Ga. 746 (2003), the superior court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a will caveat due to the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The transfer of the case from probate to superior court was invalid because the necessary statutory procedures were not followed, and consent from the state could not confer jurisdiction that the superior court did not possess. Similarly, in the case concerning R. J. A., the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate delinquency for acts constituting rape, despite initial consent for the case's transfer to juvenile court. However, the juvenile court was permitted to transfer the case back to superior court. R. J. A.'s claim that the juvenile court lacked authority for this transfer was rejected, as the juvenile court has jurisdiction to act as a court of inquiry and bind over individuals to the proper jurisdiction. The precedent in In the Interest of C. B., which involved a juvenile detained over 180 days without an indictment, was distinguished from R. J. A.'s case, where jurisdiction had not lapsed. Arguments regarding the state's procedural choices did not impact the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The judgment was affirmed, with concurrence from judges Gobeil and Land.