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In Re BGC Partners, Inc. Derivative Litigation

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2018-0722-LWW

Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware; August 19, 2022; Delaware; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves a derivative action filed against BGC Partners, Inc., concerning its $875 million acquisition of Berkeley Point Financial, LLC from a Cantor Fitzgerald affiliate. The plaintiffs alleged that Howard Lutnick, the controlling stockholder of both BGC and Cantor, orchestrated the transaction to benefit himself at the expense of BGC's shareholders, claiming the deal lacked fairness in both price and process. The court denied motions to dismiss regarding demand futility and allowed claims against Lutnick and one special committee member, William Moran, to proceed. During trial, the plaintiffs highlighted issues such as the special committee's alleged manipulation by Lutnick and the inflated purchase price. However, the court found that the special committee and its advisors acted independently, negotiating a fair acquisition price. Lutnick and the Cantor entities were not found to have breached fiduciary duties. The judgment favored the defendants, concluding the transaction was fair to BGC and its minority shareholders, with the court ruling that Moran did not breach his fiduciary duties. The final judgment was submitted in favor of the defendants.

Legal Issues Addressed

Demand Futility in Derivative Actions

Application: The court evaluates the independence of board members to assess whether demand futility exists, considering the totality of circumstances.

Reasoning: The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that demand futility exists, which they argue is satisfied by demonstrating that board members Curwood and Moran lack independence from Lutnick and face a substantial likelihood of liability.

Entire Fairness Standard in Transactions Involving Controlling Shareholders

Application: The court applies the entire fairness standard to evaluate transactions involving self-dealing by controlling shareholders, encompassing both fair dealing and fair price.

Reasoning: In cases of self-dealing by controlling shareholders like Lutnick, the standard of judicial review is 'entire fairness,' which encompasses both fair dealing and fair price.

Independence of Special Committees

Application: The independence of the special committee members is crucial in determining whether the transaction process was fair, affecting the burden of proof in entire fairness analyses.

Reasoning: Ultimately, the Special Committee was deemed independent and effective, allowing for a burden shift under Lynch.

Role of Independent Advisors in Transaction Fairness

Application: The court considers the role of independent advisors in ensuring a fair process and validating the transaction's fairness.

Reasoning: The Special Committee engaged in extensive discussions and negotiations, meeting at least nine times over three months, and was well-informed about the transaction's material facts.

Valuation Methods in Determining Fair Price

Application: Recognized valuation methods, such as comparable company analysis and guideline transactions, are employed to determine the fair price of an acquisition.

Reasoning: Fair price analysis utilizes recognized valuation methods acceptable in the financial community, emphasizing that it is not merely a remedial calculation but rather an assessment of whether the transaction price falls within a reasonable range of fairness.