Liberty Mutual Insurance Company appeals a trial court's order awarding attorney’s fees and costs, totaling $24,028.27, to Pan Am Diagnostic Services, Inc. The case arose from a dispute over the non-payment of 14 cents in statutory interest due on a personal injury protection (PIP) benefit. The Provider, as the insured’s assignee, claimed the Insurance Company owed additional interest when it issued a delayed payment for medical services rendered. The Insurance Company argued that all benefits and interest had been paid prior to the lawsuit and contended that the Provider did not satisfy the prerequisite of providing a presuit demand, thus claiming no attorney’s fees were owed. The Provider asserted that the failure to pay the correct interest amount justified its claim for attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled in favor of the Provider, leading to the appeal. The appellate court concluded that statutory interest does not constitute a PIP benefit under Florida law, thus reversing the trial court's decision on the grounds that the Provider was not entitled to attorney’s fees.
The trial court awarded the Provider $24,028.27 for attorney’s fees, clerical fees, taxable costs, and an expert witness fee. Following the denial of the Insurance Company’s motion for reconsideration, the Insurance Company filed a notice of appeal. The appellate review of a trial court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees is conducted de novo, referencing S. Fla. Pain Rehab. of W. Dade v. Infinity Auto Ins. Co., 318 So. 3d 6, 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
The analysis focuses on section 627.428(1) of the Florida Statutes (2019), which stipulates that a judgment against an insurer in favor of an insured or beneficiary mandates a reasonable attorney’s fee award. A key requirement for such an award is that it must arise from a judgment or decree related to a policy executed by the insurer. The Provider failed to demonstrate entitlement to fees based on any relevant policy or contractual provision concerning late payments of PIP benefits.
For PIP litigation, section 627.736(8) delineates attorney fee entitlement, stating that sections 627.428 and 768.79 apply to disputes under ss. 627.730-627.7405, barring specific exceptions. The Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, outlined in section 627.730, establishes that it provides various benefits without regard to fault and limits damage claims for pain and suffering related to motor vehicle accidents. Section 627.736(1) mandates that PIP policies include medical, disability, and death benefits, while section 627.736(4) emphasizes that benefits are primary, except for those under workers’ compensation laws, and defines overdue benefits as those not paid within thirty days of the insurer receiving written notice of the loss and amount.
Subsection (4)(d) of Florida Statute 627.736 stipulates that overdue payments accrue interest, detailing how to calculate that interest and mandating its payment when the overdue claim is settled. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied as written without further interpretation. The doctrine of in pari materia requires related statutes to be construed together to reflect legislative intent.
In analyzing sections 627.730, 627.731, and 627.736, it was concluded that while there is a statutory entitlement to interest on overdue Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, this interest is not classified as a PIP benefit that would entitle a claimant to attorney’s fees under section 627.736(8). Consequently, disputes regarding the payment of interest do not trigger entitlement to attorney’s fees. This aligns with the precedent set in South Florida Pain, where obligations for penalty and postage were deemed not covered benefits under the statute or policy.
The court found that awarding attorney’s fees to the Provider was erroneous, as no contractual or policy provision supported such an award for enforcing interest payments. The trial court's judgment awarding attorney’s fees was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to vacate that judgment, allowing for the possibility of imposing taxable costs. The concurring opinion noted a separate issue about the minimum amount for which a provider might seek legal recourse, humorously referencing a case where an amount as low as fourteen cents was at stake.
The case at hand raises concerns about the judicial resources expended on a claim involving just fourteen cents. The provider initiated a lawsuit, went through discovery, and hired experts, leading to significant time and resource consumption by the lower court and appellate court, as well as costs incurred by the insurance company in response. The legal principle of 'de minimis non curat lex,' meaning the law does not concern itself with trivial matters, is highlighted as relevant to this situation. Citing precedents, including Alfonso, where a $2.53 claim was dismissed based on this doctrine, and references to Judge Barton's dissent in Peachtree, the document argues for similar dismissal due to the minimal amount in controversy ($0.89). The passage underscores historical applications of this doctrine in Florida law, with various cases affirming that small monetary issues do not merit further litigation, effectively calling for an end to the proceedings based on the triviality of the claims involved.
Florida courts have encountered numerous personal injury protection cases where litigants engage in disputes over minimal amounts of money. A notable case, *Precision Diagnostic, Inc. v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co.*, involved a claim regarding a mere $4.17 in interest, with other cases debating even smaller sums, such as $2.53 and $0.89. In the current case, the amount in dispute is just $0.14. The litigation was not merely about recovering this small amount; the appellee would refuse even a nominal settlement, as the case revolved around obtaining attorney’s fees rather than a legitimate claim for money owed. Judge Levine highlighted that such cases often lack justification beyond the pursuit of fees, contrasting them with civil rights cases where attorney’s fees may be awarded for public policy reasons even with nominal damages.
The majority opinion clarified that this case did not involve underpayment of benefits by an insurer and could not be likened to cases awarding fees for public interest. The awarded fees and costs were extraordinarily disproportionate—over 171,000 times the amount claimed. A related case, *Batista v. S. Fla. Woman’s Health Assocs.*, indicated that attorney fees could be denied if counsel's conduct appeared to be fee-churning in frivolous litigation. The court found the fee demand excessive compared to the minimal work required to resolve the issue, suggesting a strategy to inflate legal costs. Courts possess the inherent authority to deny fee awards in cases that squander judicial resources. The majority opinion's rationale for reversing the lower court's fee award is supported, and had the de minimis issue been raised, it would have also warranted reversal. The case remains pending until resolution of any timely filed motion for rehearing.
