The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of the respondent-mother regarding her minor child, H.B. The case stemmed from a series of Child Protective Services (CPS) reports initiated shortly after H.B.'s birth on March 13, 2015, due to allegations of neglect linked to the mother's substance abuse. Despite multiple reports and interventions, including a 2019 incident where the mother gave birth to a premature son who tested positive for drugs, previous CPS cases were closed without further action.
The mother acknowledged her substance abuse issues, admitting to marijuana use and a past incident of cocaine use, but failed to complete a required substance abuse assessment due to lack of Medicaid coverage. Home visits by the Robeson County Department of Social Services (DSS) revealed troubling conditions: H.B. was often unsupervised, living with her paternal grandmother, and the mother's living situation was unstable, lacking basic utilities. The mother was also diagnosed with bipolar disorder but was not receiving treatment.
Throughout the DSS investigation, the mother displayed a lack of consistent involvement in H.B.'s life, including failing to attend meetings and maintain adequate care. The court ultimately found sufficient grounds for terminating her parental rights, citing ongoing neglect and a failure to remedy the issues that posed risks to H.B.'s welfare.
On 10 June 2019, the Department of Social Services (DSS) discovered that the mother had only attended two classes at Premier Behavioral and was not compliant with required interventions. Consequently, on 11 June 2019, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging neglect of H.B. due to her living conditions and dependence on DSS for care. The trial court ordered nonsecure custody for both H.B. and A.L. on the same day, scheduling a subsequent hearing. Following hearings on 12 and 26 June 2019, the court determined both children were neglected as per N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-101(15) and placed them in DSS custody.
On 24 July 2019, the mother entered a Family Services Agreement committing to address multiple issues, including housing and mental health assessments. A hearing on 12 September 2019 led to findings that both children were to remain in DSS custody. The court noted the mother's lack of availability to develop a Family Services Case Plan and accepted various DSS reports into evidence, ultimately concluding that continued custody with DSS was in the children's best interest.
A review on 25 March 2020 maintained the children's custody with DSS. A permanency planning order on 14 May 2020 prioritized reunification with a concurrent adoption plan while noting an open investigation into the mother due to another child in her care testing positive for cocaine. Following another order on 1 July 2020, the court found the mother had failed to participate in her case plan or maintain consistent visitation. H.B. was ordered to be placed back into the mother's care while visitation was restricted, and DSS was instructed to pursue termination of the mother’s parental rights regarding A.L. H.B. was removed from Ms. Bullard’s home on 8 July 2020 due to being found unsupervised with injuries, leading to a substantiation of an injurious environment.
On March 11, 2021, the mother's parental rights regarding A.L. were terminated. Subsequently, the Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition on April 5, 2021, for the termination of parental rights concerning H.B., who was placed in a licensed foster home under DSS supervision. H.B. had been in DSS custody since a Non-Secure Custody Order on June 11, 2019, and was adjudicated as a neglected juvenile on September 12, 2019.
DSS's petition cited grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. 7B-111, asserting that the mother willfully left H.B. in foster care for over twelve months without making reasonable progress to address the conditions prompting the child's removal. Additionally, the mother was accused of neglect as defined by N.C.G.S. 7B-101, based on the prior adjudication, and of failing to contribute financially to H.B.'s care for the six months preceding the petition, despite being able to do so. Termination was deemed in the best interest of the child.
Supporting evidence included H.B.'s birth certificate, a permanency planning order, and an extensive affidavit detailing DSS's interactions with the mother since H.B.'s birth, including a 14-page timeline of events from March 13, 2015, to March 11, 2021. This timeline highlighted the mother's failure to attend visitations and DSS's unsuccessful attempts to contact her.
During the July 28, 2021, termination hearing, DSS social workers provided testimony indicating the mother's lack of compliance with her family services plan, failure to prove completion of a substance abuse assessment, secure housing, or employment, and her inconsistent attendance at visitations. Following testimony, DSS successfully amended its petition to correct the adjudication hearing date to September 12, 2019.
The trial court adjudicated the minor as neglected due to improper care and substance abuse issues, with the child placed in the custody of the Department of Social Services (DSS) since September 12, 2019. The mother failed to complete her care plan, did not make payments for the child's care, and showed no efforts to improve her situation for the child's return. The child has been in foster care with Arthur and Jessie Kelly multiple times, and DSS presented evidence to support a motion for termination of parental rights, including the child's birth certificate and affidavits related to the case.
The court noted that the child had been out of the mother's home for over 12 months without evidence of reasonable efforts by the mother to change her circumstances, affirming the child's status as neglected. Testimony from caseworker Ms. McKoy indicated that while the mother had engaged with various service providers, she did not follow through, including an unsuccessful job opportunity and current living situation with her boyfriend. In contrast, the child was thriving in the prospective adoptive placement.
The court found sufficient grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights, stating that the mother had not maintained a significant relationship with the child, failed to visit regularly, and acknowledged her prior unsuccessful attempts with DSS regarding parental rights termination. The child has a strong bond with the prospective adoptive parents and resides with a biological sibling, reinforcing the decision to terminate parental rights and continue the adoption process.
The Court determined that H.B. has been separated from her mother due to past neglect and the likelihood of ongoing neglect, given the mother's history of inadequate care and failure to comply with a plan to regain custody. The mother has not made reasonable progress to rectify her situation, continuing a pattern of inaction that is detrimental to H.B.'s well-being. The Court found that any further efforts by the mother would not serve the child's best interests, leading to the conclusion that her lack of progress was willful. As a result, the Court granted the petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, allowing H.B. to remain in the custody of DSS for adoption and terminating any visitation rights with the mother.
The Court's findings are based on clear and convincing evidence, including that H.B. resides in a licensed foster home and that the mother was properly notified of the termination proceedings. The Court noted that H.B. was adjudicated as a neglected juvenile in September 2019 and acknowledged DSS's attempts to assist the mother in improving her circumstances. The mother had failed to contribute financially to H.B.'s care and has a history of prior involuntary termination of parental rights for another child, indicating her inability to provide a safe home. The Court accepted the DSS Timeline report as credible and reliable in its decision-making process.
DSS’s Timeline, referenced in the trial court's findings, outlines events from March 1, 2021, when the mother's case was assigned to Ms. McKoy, to July 19, 2021, shortly before the termination of parental rights hearing. Key points include: the mother completed a mental health assessment in January 2021 but did not attend a follow-up appointment; she missed scheduled visits in April 2021; during a PPR meeting on June 3, 2021, which she did not attend, the team recommended continuing with the adoption plan and pursuing termination of her parental rights; on June 9, 2021, she reported being clean for eight days; she failed to attend a substance and mental health assessment on June 15, 2021, and missed family visits on July 7 and 19, 2021; and on July 19, 2021, she informed Ms. McKoy that she had not secured employment.
The trial court found sufficient grounds to terminate her parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111, citing that the child had been in DSS custody for over six months, the mother willfully failed to progress in correcting the conditions leading to the child's removal, and she neglected the child by allowing an injurious living environment. Additionally, the court noted her failure to financially support the child despite the ability to do so and her previous involuntary termination of rights with another child.
The court determined that termination of the mother's rights was in the best interest of the child, who has been in DSS care since June 11, 2019, and is thriving in a licensed foster home with Arthur and Jessie Kelly, where she is well-bonded and calls them 'mama and daddy.' The plan for the child is adoption, and the likelihood of this is very high. It was noted that there is no existing bond between the child and the mother.
The trial court ordered the termination of the mother's parental rights and all visitation rights regarding the child. The mother appealed on September 15, 2021, arguing procedural errors in the trial court's handling of the termination petition and lack of sufficient findings to support its conclusions regarding the termination grounds and best interest determination. The appeal first addresses whether the findings of fact adequately supported the court's legal conclusions.
A trial court's adjudication is reviewed to ensure findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, which also must support the conclusions of law. Unchallenged findings by the respondent are considered binding on appeal. In termination of parental rights cases, the finding of any one statutory ground is sufficient for termination. The court focuses on N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(2), which allows termination if a parent has willfully left a juvenile in foster care for over 12 months without demonstrating reasonable progress in correcting the conditions leading to removal. The trial court may take judicial notice of previous findings but must also receive oral testimony and make independent determinations. The respondent mother did not dispute the trial court’s findings, especially that H.B. spent over twelve months outside her care. The trial court identified grounds for termination under subsection (a)(2), asserting that the mother willfully left H.B. in custody of DSS without making reasonable progress. The court characterized a purported conclusion of law as a finding of fact, noting that findings are statements of events and do not require legal principles to be classified as such. The court considered evidence from prior proceedings, testimony from DSS social workers, and did not solely rely on prior orders in determining the termination of the mother's parental rights.
The trial court conducted a termination hearing where oral testimony was presented alongside evidence from Juvenile File 19JA173 and DSS’s Timeline, illustrating the Department of Social Services' (DSS) interactions with the mother from the birth of her child, H.B., until the permanency planning order on May 12, 2021. The evidence revealed that the mother had willfully left H.B. in DSS custody for over 12 months, with H.B. having lived outside the mother’s care for most of her life due to unsafe living conditions. The mother failed to attend scheduled appointments and visits, did not contribute to H.B.'s care costs for six months prior to the petition, and had a history of parental rights termination regarding another child, A.L. The court found that the mother lacked the ability and willingness to provide a safe home and had made no progress towards reunification.
Despite the trial court's findings being poorly articulated, they sufficiently supported the decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights under subsection (a)(2). The court's oral and written orders, though not identical, do not affect the legitimacy of the judgment. The court's discretion in assessing the juvenile's best interest is reviewed for abuse, which occurs if the ruling lacks reasonable support or is arbitrary. According to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110, after establishing grounds for termination, the court must determine if termination serves the juvenile's best interests, considering factors such as the juvenile's age, adoption likelihood, the impact of termination on the permanent plan, and the relationships involved.
The trial court is mandated to evaluate statutory factors for terminating parental rights but must only provide written findings on those factors deemed relevant, which is determined by the presence of conflicting evidence. The mother's appeal centers on the trial court's finding of no bond between her and her child, H.B. She argues this flawed belief influenced the court's best interest determination, claiming an abuse of discretion. However, since her challenge pertains solely to the bond finding, all other findings remain binding.
The court referenced N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110, indicating that the existence of a parental bond is not the sole dispositive factor. Although the trial court acknowledged H.B. had a bond with her mother, it emphasized that H.B. was strongly bonded to her foster parents and thriving in their care, with excellent adoption prospects. The Guardian ad Litem (GAL) report corroborated that, despite H.B.’s bond with her mother, her overall well-being in foster care and the lack of consistent parental engagement by the mother were critical considerations.
The trial court's finding of no significant relationship was supported by the GAL report and additional evidence, confirming that the mother had failed to provide care and consistent visitation. The court also noted multiple factors under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110 in its decision, including H.B.’s age, her good prospects for adoption, and her positive relationship with prospective adoptive parents. Consequently, the court concluded there was no abuse of discretion, affirming the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
Additionally, the mother’s claim regarding the Department of Social Services (DSS) amendment to its petition mid-hearing was dismissed, as the amendment did not affect her notice of termination grounds and was merely a correction of a minor error. Since the mother did not object to this motion, it was deemed not to constitute reversible error.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Wood argues that the trial court did not adequately provide substantive findings of fact to justify its legal conclusions for terminating Mother’s parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111. The dissent calls for vacating the court's order and remanding it for further findings. The factual background outlines that on August 19, 2021, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her child, H.B. The court made 14 findings, including that H.B. resides in foster care and that Mother had been notified of the proceedings. It noted the absence of a father listed on the birth certificate and acknowledged that the child had been adjudicated as neglected. The court identified that Mother had willfully left the child in foster care for over 12 months without making reasonable progress to rectify the situation and had neglected the child by failing to provide a safe environment. Additionally, it was noted that Mother had not contributed to the costs of care and that her parental rights to another child had been previously terminated. The trial court concluded, based on credible evidence, that grounds existed for termination. Mother appealed on the grounds of procedural errors during the hearing, lack of substantive findings to support the termination, and an unsupported basis for the best interest determination concerning the parent-child bond. The discussion section indicates that the appeal will assess whether the trial court's findings are backed by clear evidence and whether those findings substantiate the legal conclusions reached.
Findings of fact that are not challenged by the respondent are considered supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. The trial court's findings, if backed by clear and convincing evidence, are conclusive, even if there is some evidence suggesting contrary findings. In termination of parental rights cases, a trial court's finding of any one enumerated ground suffices for termination. If any statutory ground under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a) is supported by competent evidence, further grounds need not be considered. Specifically, under subsection (a)(2), a trial court may terminate parental rights if a parent has willfully left a juvenile in foster care for over 12 months without showing satisfactory progress in rectifying the circumstances that led to removal. The court may take judicial notice of prior findings but must also receive oral testimony to independently assess the presented evidence. In this case, the mother did not dispute the findings, including that her child had been outside her care for over 12 months. The trial court identified grounds for termination based on the mother’s failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions leading to the child's removal, establishing that she willfully left her child in custody of DSS for over a year without improvement. Findings of fact detail the events and timeframes relevant to the case.
A trial court's pronouncement that does not invoke legal principles is classified as a finding of fact, irrespective of its label in the order. The trial court recognized the underlying Juvenile File 19JA173 and the Department of Social Services (DSS) efforts regarding the respondent mother, accepted a Timeline from DSS into evidence, and heard testimony from relevant social workers. While the court took judicial notice of the juvenile file and associated findings, it did not rely solely on these documents; oral testimony at the termination hearing also informed its decision.
The juvenile file illustrated DSS's engagement with the mother since her child H.B.'s birth, culminating in a permanency planning order to focus on adoption. The Timeline detailed the mother's failure to attend appointments and visits from March to mid-July 2019, during which H.B. lived outside her care. Testimony corroborated the file and Timeline, demonstrating the mother’s willful abandonment of H.B. for over 12 months, her neglectful living arrangements, and her failure to contribute financially to H.B.'s care for six months prior to the petition.
The court found that H.B. had been adjudicated neglected, the mother’s rights to another child had been terminated, and she lacked the ability or willingness to provide a safe home. The mother had consistently failed to adhere to her case plan, and DSS's attempts to contact her were unsuccessful. Although the trial court's findings were poorly articulated, the circumstances were clear-cut, and discrepancies between the oral and written orders were deemed inconsequential. The written judgment is crucial for appellate review, and a trial court must enter a written order to facilitate this process.
The trial court's order provides sufficient support for the conclusion to terminate the mother's parental rights regarding H.B., based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110. The court's assessment of the juvenile's best interests is subject to abuse of discretion review, which occurs when a ruling lacks reasonable support or is arbitrary. After establishing grounds for termination, the court must assess whether it serves the juvenile's best interests, considering factors such as the juvenile's age, likelihood of adoption, impact on the permanent plan, and the nature of the bond with the parent and potential permanent placements. While the court is required to consider all statutory factors, it need only make written findings on those deemed relevant, particularly where evidence is conflicting.
The mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion by asserting no bond existed between her and H.B., arguing this flawed belief influenced the best interest determination. However, since her challenge pertains solely to the bond finding, all other findings remain binding. Moreover, the law does not support her claim that the presence of a bond is the decisive factor, as other factors may be weighted more heavily by the court. Notably, the Guardian ad Litem reported that despite H.B. being in foster care for over two years, a bond with her mother persists.
H.B. is thriving in her foster placement, showing a strong bond with her foster parents and living with her sibling, A.L., who also has an adoption plan. The mother’s parental rights to A.L. were terminated on March 11, 2021, and she had previously agreed to a case plan to address issues related to substance use, mental health, parenting, housing, and employment, but made no progress over two years. The Guardian ad Litem (GAL) report recommended terminating the mother's rights regarding H.B., as there was no bond between them, substantiated by the trial court's findings that the mother had not cared for or visited H.B. consistently while under the custody of the Department of Social Services (DSS). The trial court's findings aligned with statutory factors under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110, including H.B.'s age, likelihood of adoption, lack of bond with the mother, and the positive relationship with her prospective adoptive parents. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights, stating there was no abuse of discretion. Additionally, the court dismissed the mother's claim of error regarding DSS's amendment of its petition during the hearing, noting it did not affect her notice of termination grounds and she had not objected to the amendment. A dissenting opinion expressed concerns about the trial court's findings supporting the termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111.
The trial court's order terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.B. is to be vacated and remanded for further factual findings. The trial court previously made 14 findings, including that H.B. resides in a licensed foster home under the Robeson County Department of Social Services and that Mother was served with the termination petition. It was noted that there is no father listed on the birth certificate, and an unknown father was served by publication. H.B. was adjudicated as a neglected juvenile in September 2019, and the court acknowledged efforts to assist the mother and the unknown father. The findings indicated that Mother had willfully left H.B. in foster care for over 12 months without demonstrating reasonable progress to rectify the circumstances of removal, and there was a high likelihood of continued neglect. Additional findings highlighted that Mother neglected H.B. by failing to provide a safe environment, did not pay for the child's care, and had prior involuntary termination of rights to another child. The unknown father also failed to show progress in establishing paternity or support for H.B. The court concluded that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the grounds for terminating Mother's parental rights.
The court accepted the Timeline report as credible in its findings regarding the unknown father and the respondent mother. It determined there was no bond between the minor child and the mother, leading to the termination of her parental rights over H.B. The mother filed an appeal. The process for terminating parental rights involves two stages: the adjudicatory stage, where the petitioner must prove grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence as outlined in N.C.G.S. 7B-1111, and the dispositional stage, where the court assesses the child's best interests. On appeal, the court evaluates whether the trial court's findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and if those findings justify the legal conclusions reached. The appellate review of the trial court's findings is de novo, while the determination regarding the child's best interests is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The mother contends that the trial court failed to make substantive findings to support its legal conclusions regarding the grounds for terminating her parental rights. The court must take evidence and adjudicate the existence of circumstances under G.S. 7B-1111 to authorize the termination.
In termination of parental rights proceedings, a trial court's finding of any single enumerated ground is adequate to support termination. However, when issuing a termination judgment, the court is required to: (1) specifically find the facts, (2) separately state its legal conclusions, and (3) direct the appropriate judgment. The factual findings must go beyond mere allegations and present specific ultimate facts that allow an appellate court to verify the judgment's support by competent evidence. The court's duty to find and state facts and conclusions applies regardless of whether it grants or denies the termination petition. Proper factual findings must clearly delineate the facts determining the parties' rights, enabling appellate review.
In the case of In re Anderson, the court found that the trial court's order contained only three findings of fact, which were insufficient for supporting the legal conclusions necessary for termination. Two findings merely noted the filing of a petition and proper service, while the third was a simple recitation of allegations. Furthermore, the oral adjudication made by the trial court does not equate to a formal judgment; it is merely a preliminary announcement and does not fulfill the requirements set forth in statutory law. The trial court’s oral adjudication included various exhibits related to the case, but these do not replace the necessity for a properly entered judgment.
An oral ruling by a trial court is not a final order unless it is written, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk, as per N.C. Gen. Stat. 1A-1, R.58. Oral findings can be modified before the final written order is issued. A written order may differ from the oral ruling, and detailed findings of fact are not required in open court but are necessary in written orders. The trial court must ensure that the written order aligns with its oral findings, regardless of who drafts it. In this case, the court made several oral findings that were absent from the written order, indicating that the trial court may have changed its confidence in those findings before the written order was signed. Consequently, the appellate review is constrained to the written order, not the oral adjudication. The majority opinion concluded that the trial court established grounds to terminate parental rights based on the mother's failure to show reasonable progress, but this conclusion overlooks the trial court's duty to provide specific factual findings. The initial findings listed are procedural recitations rather than the ultimate facts needed to support the legal conclusions, and subsequent findings also fail to provide specific ultimate findings.
Parental rights may be terminated based on specific statutory criteria outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111. These criteria include: (1) evidence of abuse or neglect, with neglect defined as creating a harmful living environment; (2) a parent's willful failure to make reasonable progress in correcting conditions leading to a child's foster care placement for over 12 months; (3) failure to pay a reasonable portion of the child's care costs for six months, despite being financially able; and (4) involuntary termination of parental rights regarding another child, indicating an inability or unwillingness to provide a safe home. In this case, findings of fact numbered 8, 10, 11, and 12 reflect the statutory language but lack sufficient specificity to constitute ultimate findings of fact, as mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. 1A-1, R. 52(a)(1). Consequently, these findings do not adequately support the trial court’s judgment, as they do not represent logical conclusions drawn from the evidentiary facts.
Findings of fact numbers 13, 14, and 15 are inadequate to justify terminating Mother's parental rights to H.B. Finding 13 pertains to the unknown father and is irrelevant to Mother. Finding 14 is more of a legal conclusion than a factual finding, as it states that sufficient evidence exists to terminate Mother's rights, requiring judicial judgment regarding the evidence's sufficiency. Although labeled a finding of fact, it should be classified as a legal conclusion. Finding 15 references a Timeline (DSS Exhibit) used by the court but fails to specify the information relied upon or the exhibit's identification number, hindering appellate review of the trial court's factual findings and legal application. The trial court's findings were deemed insufficient, particularly given the importance of a parent's constitutional rights in such cases, prompting a recommendation to vacate and remand the judgment for further factual findings.
Additionally, Mother disputes finding of fact number 8, asserting it lacks competent evidence, which led to an abuse of discretion in the best interest determination. This finding claims there is no bond between Mother and H.B. However, evidence from DSS witness Chandra McKoy and the guardian ad litem indicated that H.B. recognizes and is happy to see Mother, suggesting a bond remains despite the child being in foster care for over two years. The majority opinion attempts to support the trial court's conclusion of no bond by referencing other parts of the guardian ad litem’s report, despite contradicting testimony.
H.B. demonstrated positive adaptation to foster care, while the mother had previously lost parental rights to another child and was not progressing in drug rehabilitation. However, these factors do not substantiate a lack of bond between mother and child, as they do not provide evidence of the parent-child relationship. Previous cases cited by the majority involved specific evidence of a deficient parent-child bond, such as lack of visitation or minimal involvement, which are absent in this case. Testimonies indicated that visitations were positive and a bond existed between the mother and H.B., contradicting the trial court's finding of no bond.
Moreover, the mother contended that the trial court erred by allowing the Department of Social Services (DSS) to amend the termination petition to include a claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(9) during the hearing. Established case law prohibits such amendments during termination hearings, indicating that the trial court made an error.
The conclusion highlights that the trial court failed to provide specific findings of fact necessary to support its legal conclusions regarding the termination of parental rights. The absence of these findings renders the judgment unsupported by competent evidence, warranting vacatur and remand for further factual determinations.
