Petitioners Peggy LeMaster and Kathleen Martinez contested the validity of their deceased brother Mark A. Coffman's 2018 will, executed shortly before his death, claiming it was the result of undue influence exerted by his surviving spouse, Dorothy Coffman. The trial court, however, granted a directed finding in favor of Dorothy, determining that the petitioners did not establish a prima facie case of actual or presumptive undue influence. The petitioners argued on appeal that the trial court failed to apply a presumption of undue influence due to a fiduciary relationship and misanalyzed the necessary elements for such a presumption. Additionally, they contended that a presumption should apply even without a fiduciary relationship if the chief beneficiary of a will procures it when the testator is debilitated. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Mark Coffman was married to Dorothy in 1994, and they had no children together. Mark was a long-time president and majority owner of Coffman Truck Sales, Inc. His prior 2001 will, which appointed Dorothy as his agent for health care and property, bequeathed the majority of his estate to her, including a family trust. It included a $100,000 bequest to Courtney Coffman Crenshaw, Mark's daughter from a previous relationship, and classified his business interests as excluded assets, directing that they be passed to the petitioners after Dorothy's death.
In June 2016, Mark was diagnosed with laryngeal cancer, leading to extensive treatments including surgeries, radiation, and chemotherapy. His condition worsened, with cancer metastasizing to multiple areas, including his hip by late 2017. On January 30, 2018, he was admitted to Rush University Medical Center due to increasing pain, and later became an inpatient after being referred to the emergency room on March 11, 2018. He underwent an MRI under sedation, which resulted in delirium. By March 15, Dr. John Showel informed Mark's family that he had only six to eight weeks to live, recommending hospice care.
On March 16, attorney John Hynds began drafting estate planning documents for Mark after discussing with Dorothy. The next day, Hynds visited Mark to execute a new will, witnessed by Hynds and his assistant, Lisa Barkley, with Dorothy involved in discussions regarding the documents. The 2018 will included a $100,000 bequest to Courtney and all residences and personal property to Dorothy, differing from a previous 2001 will in the handling of the residuary estate. The 2018 will allowed Dorothy to designate the disposition of trust assets if she survived Mark, establishing a family trust funded with approximately $4 million, including specific assets, and granting her broad powers regarding trust distributions.
Mark transitioned to a rehabilitation facility on April 9, 2018, and later opted for hospice care on April 15. He passed away on April 26, 2018, at age 68. Dorothy filed for probate of the 2018 will on May 9, and it was admitted to probate on May 17, 2018.
On October 22, 2018, petitioners filed a verified petition to contest the validity of Mark's 2018 will, seeking to declare it invalid and instead admit the 2001 will to probate. They argued that the 2018 will revoked the 2001 will and made significant changes that favored Dorothy at the expense of the petitioners, specifically regarding the distribution of interests in family businesses. The 2001 will included provisions to keep these interests within Glenn’s descendants, allocating Mark’s interests in Coffman Truck Sales and Coffman Real Estate in trust for Dorothy’s benefit during her lifetime with the remainder going to the petitioners or their descendants after her death.
In contrast, the 2018 will lacked safeguards for the descendants of the founder, granting Dorothy comprehensive control over the disposition of Mark's business interests, including powers as a trustee. Petitioners contended that the 2018 will was the result of undue influence from Dorothy, claiming Mark was in a physically and psychologically weakened state, heavily reliant on Dorothy for daily living and financial matters, especially during his last month, when he was prescribed morphine and advised he had limited time left to live. They noted that Dorothy exercised her power of attorney to amend the operating agreement for Coffman Real Estate shortly before Mark's death.
The hearing began on November 30, 2020, with testimony from petitioner Peggy LeMaster, who had a vested interest in Coffman Real Estate. She described Mark as a diligent and hands-on manager, who lived near his parents and managed the family business until his death. LeMaster communicated with Mark regularly, both before and after he lost his ability to speak due to illness. Her last text from him was on March 11, 2018, and she visited him at Rush Hospital shortly thereafter, where she learned he was expected to live only a few more weeks. She described Mark’s condition during his hospital stay, noting that he was often confused and under the influence of anesthesia leading up to the execution of the 2018 will on March 17, 2018.
On April 7, 2018, Dorothy reported that Mark appeared very tired and had lost significant weight, expressing concern over his condition. From April 7 to April 26, LeMaster visited Mark daily at a rehabilitation facility, observing his grave condition and heavy medication use, which left him "out of it." One week prior to Mark's death, LeMaster signed partnership documents for Coffman Real Estate and Coffman Brothers, L.L.C. in Mark's room, presented by Dorothy, who insisted on urgency, despite LeMaster's request to review them at home. Testimony from LeMaster indicated a positive relationship with Dorothy, who cared for Mark during his illness, but claimed Dorothy exerted undue influence over Mark regarding his 2018 will, although she was not present during its execution and had not heard Mark express any pressure from Dorothy.
In February 2018, Mark was still occasionally working and engaged in significant business activities. On March 15, Dorothy informed LeMaster about lawyers coming to discuss a will with Mark. After March 17, LeMaster noted that Mark did not express any concerns regarding the will or pressure from Dorothy. LeMaster had never discussed Mark’s prior 2001 will or the future of the business with him. On April 22, 2018, LeMaster learned from Dorothy that Mark's 2018 will left his business interests to her, while Mark was in a compromised state.
Dr. John Showel, Mark's oncologist, provided testimony indicating that he treated Mark regularly from July 2016 to March 2018, and saw him almost daily during hospitalization. Following a March 11 emergency admission, initial examinations showed Mark was alert, but subsequent evaluations revealed confusion and acute delirium. Despite some improvement noted later, Dr. Showel anticipated that Mark would need assistance with daily living upon discharge.
On March 15, 2018, Dr. Showel recommended hospice care for Mark, believing further cancer treatment would be futile and prioritizing comfort. Mark's pain was rated at 8 or 9 out of 10, though he was more oriented and alert according to Dr. Lin’s observations. Medications including gabapentin and morphine were discontinued on March 14, which Dr. Showel noted improved Mark's cognitive functioning. By March 15 and 16, Mark showed no signs of confusion, and discussions about his care took place directly with him.
On March 17, Mark's attorney visited, and hospital notes indicated he was aware of the visit and engaged in discussions about his will. Dr. Lin confirmed Mark remained oriented and alert on that day, and his acute delirium was resolved by March 18. Although Mark was sometimes alert in mid-March, he was not making decisions about his care toward the end of the month.
Dr. Showel stated that Mark generally made his own care decisions until he became less decisive. Despite being on pain medications, he indicated that this did not necessarily imply diminished capacity. Attorney John Hynds, who has extensive experience in estate planning, represented both Mark and his wife, Dorothy. On March 16, Hynds received a call from Dorothy stating Mark wished to change his will, referencing a prior recommendation about estate tax and distribution to family members. He did not speak to Mark directly during this conversation, but Dorothy asserted Mark was capable of communication.
Hynds and McInerney drafted three estate planning documents: two wills disinheriting Mark's sisters and one codicil, which maintained the same beneficiaries as the 2001 will but incorporated the 2009 tax changes. They did not communicate with Mark prior to finalizing these drafts. On March 17, 2018, Hynds, along with Barkley, met with Mark and Dorothy at the hospital, where they discussed the estate plan while Mark remained in bed. Hynds did not offer Mark a private discussion or an opportunity to read the will in seclusion. Hynds and Barkley witnessed the will's execution, with Dorothy initially questioning the use of a family trust but later accepting it due to its tax advantages.
Following the will's execution, Hynds prepared a memo indicating that both Dorothy and Mark had long recognized the need to revise the estate plan and were aware of potential estate tax implications. They wanted Dorothy to have complete control over the assets after Mark's death, rejecting the concept of a marital trust and any inheritance for the petitioners. Hynds emphasized that Mark desired to ensure Dorothy could direct asset distribution, which was crucial to him.
Mark instructed Hynds to remove a clause granting petitioners a right of first refusal on certain assets, seeking to eliminate any legal restrictions on Dorothy's decisions regarding those assets. The primary discussions were with Mark, although Dorothy contributed minimally. Mark read the will with Hynds, who estimated his estate to be worth about $10 million. Due to Mark's impaired right arm, he signed the document with his left hand, and Dorothy had previously signed on his behalf.
Hynds did not inquire about Mark's motives for giving Dorothy control over the disposition of his assets, stating he only asked about the distribution of his estate. He believed Mark was competent and understood his wishes. Following March 17, 2018, Hynds had no further communication with Mark but spoke to Dorothy the next day, confirming no changes were needed. Hynds understood that Dorothy was acting on Mark's direction when she called him on March 16, and he noted that during their conversation, Mark recognized him and displayed adequate mental capacity. Hynds concluded that Dorothy did not dominate the decision-making process, emphasizing that Mark was decisive in choosing to use a trust over outright distributions.
Attorney Peter Wilson Jr., with over 53 years of experience, testified regarding his work with Coffman Truck Sales and related entities. In April 2018, he prepared amended operating agreements that removed mandatory buyout provisions at the request of the members, following discussions with Mark, who expressed his desire to eliminate such provisions. The original shareholder agreement mandated that shares be sold to the company upon a shareholder's death, which Wilson's firm later addressed by drafting a termination agreement to remove the buyout language.
In March or April 2018, Wilson discussed the mandatory buyout issue with Mark, who was in a rehabilitation facility. Mark expressed a desire to remove the buyout provision from the entities’ documents, indicating he understood the conversation and was not under pressure. Barkley, a legal assistant with over 40 years of experience, witnessed Mark's 2018 will execution and testified that Mark appeared lucid and comprehended the discussions about the will, including estate tax implications. Dorothy, Mark's wife, was present during the discussions and did not pressure him; she participated by asking questions. Mark reviewed the will and requested a section he disagreed with to be deleted before signing. Barkley confirmed Mark's sound mind and memory at the time of signing, based on her knowledge of him and the events during the will execution. Dorothy, married to Mark when he executed his 2001 will, noted that Mark was president of Coffman Truck Sales and was communicative during his hospitalization, despite being told he was unaware of the time and date. Retired attorney John Rooks, who handled Mark's estate planning, testified about his long-standing client relationship with Mark.
Michael Coffman, part owner and officer of Coffman Truck Sales, testified about his close working relationship with Mark from 2006 to 2018, noting Mark's hands-on management style and extensive work hours. He revealed that some text messages exchanged between them during March and April 2018 were sent by Dorothy. Kathleen Martinez testified she had never discussed Mark's estate plans with him and was unaware of his wills. She had known Mark for years, having worked at Coffman Truck Sales in high school, and noted that after Mark’s illness, he communicated more via text. On March 15, 2018, Dorothy informed Martinez that Mark was more alert than before, and he requested Martinez not to visit him on March 17 due to legal discussions about his will. During visits, Dorothy remained in the hospital room, unlike prior visits when she would leave. Martinez did not witness Dorothy encouraging Mark to execute the 2018 will.
In spring 2018, while visiting Mark, Martinez signed documents related to the family’s real estate entities at Dorothy's request, despite Mark being incoherent. A meeting occurred shortly before Mark's death regarding the future of Coffman Truck Sales, during which Dorothy reacted defensively and asserted her control over the business, while Mark was unresponsive. On January 4, 2021, Dorothy filed a motion for a directed finding, arguing that the petitioners had not established sufficient evidence of undue influence over Mark regarding the 2018 will. She claimed she was neither a fiduciary nor a disproportionate beneficiary and maintained that she did not influence the will's procurement.
On January 11, 2021, the trial court ruled in favor of Dorothy, granting her motion for a directed finding, validating the 2018 will, and denying the petitioners' challenge to its validity. The court found no evidence of actual undue influence and determined that the petitioners failed to establish a prima facie case for presumptive undue influence. Key points of the court's analysis include:
1. Dorothy, although holding power of attorney, was not deemed a fiduciary as there was no evidence she acted to benefit herself or a third party.
2. Both the 2001 and 2018 wills named Dorothy as a substantial beneficiary, with her benefits remaining consistent; the 2018 will merely altered her control over property after her death.
3. The court observed that Mark was not in a dependent relationship with Dorothy, given their long marriage and his active role in making treatment decisions and engaging with attorneys.
4. There was no indication that Mark placed extraordinary trust in Dorothy regarding the will's decisions, as he actively participated in estate planning discussions and made independent choices.
5. The court found no involvement by Dorothy in preparing or executing the will that would suggest undue influence, noting Mark's competence was not disputed.
6. The petitioners had no expectancy of inheriting Coffman Truck Sales due to a shareholder agreement requiring the company to buy back shares of any deceased shareholder.
The petitioners' appeal was based on their belief that the trial court failed to apply a presumption of undue influence due to a supposed fiduciary relationship and that Dorothy's role as chief beneficiary warranted further scrutiny. The court rejected these arguments, referencing Section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which outlines the directed finding process in bench trials, emphasizing that the trial court's assessment of the evidence was appropriate.
If a court finds that a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, it then evaluates the evidence to decide if that case is sustainable. If the trial court stops at the initial stage, its ruling is reviewed de novo. Under section 2-1110, evidence must demonstrate the plaintiff's case by a preponderance. The court's grant of a section 2-1110 motion is upheld unless it contradicts the manifest weight of the evidence, which occurs when the findings are unreasonable.
Undue influence sufficient to invalidate a will occurs when a testator cannot exercise free will in estate disposition, and this influence must be linked to the will's execution. It can be shown through either direct evidence of undue influence or through a fiduciary relationship that raises a presumption of such influence. In this case, petitioners only contested the trial court's finding that no presumption of undue influence applied, not the absence of actual undue influence.
Testamentary capacity, which concerns the testator's awareness of their property and beneficiaries, was not disputed. A presumption of undue influence arises when a fiduciary relationship exists between the testator and a beneficiary who has a disproportionate benefit from the will, and the beneficiary plays a significant role in the will's procurement. The trial court concluded that Dorothy did not act as a fiduciary, which supported its judgment, leading to the decision not to address the remaining elements of the presumption.
Mark independently made his treatment decisions, directed Dorothy to consult his longtime attorneys, and managed the estate planning process. There was no indication of unusual confidence in Dorothy, and Mark actively participated in discussions about estate planning, ultimately rejecting Dorothy's proposal for an outright bequest in favor of a tax-saving option. The court emphasized that the petitioners had no expectation of inheriting Coffman Truck Sales. To establish undue influence, a plaintiff must provide evidence for each essential element of their claim. If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the will's proponent to present counter-evidence, which must be substantial if a strong presumption exists. The inquiry involves three steps: verifying a prima facie case of undue influence, assessing whether the defendants provided adequate rebuttal evidence, and determining if the court's ruling on undue influence is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Regarding the first element—whether a fiduciary relationship existed—the petitioners argue the trial court erred by stating no such relationship existed between Mark and Dorothy. They assert that Dorothy, as Mark's agent under a statutory power of attorney for property, was legally a fiduciary. The petitioners criticize the trial court for relying on a precedent that addressed the absence of a fiduciary relationship concerning a health care power of attorney, which the court distinguished from cases involving property and financial matters. The prior case did not clarify whether a health care power of attorney alone could create a presumption of undue influence in financial situations.
The court clarified that a statutory short form power of attorney for health care does not mandate the agent's signature, and the agent is only required to act with due care when exercising the powers granted. A fiduciary relationship is established only when the agent accepts the delegated powers, which cannot be inferred from the mere execution of the power of attorney without evidence of acceptance. The court distinguished cases involving property and financial matters, emphasizing that the fiduciary relationship arising from a health care power of attorney is confined to health care decisions and does not extend to property management. It also noted that the specific power of attorney executed by Mark in 2001 granted Dorothy broad powers over his property but did not impose an obligation on her to exercise those powers. As of the time of the 2018 will execution, Dorothy had neither accepted nor exercised the power of attorney, thus she was not considered a fiduciary responsible for Mark's property affairs.
The Illinois Power of Attorney Act establishes that an agent's fiduciary duty arises only when the agent exercises power under the authority granted by the principal. In this case, Dorothy exercised her power of attorney to amend documents related to real estate one month after Mark executed his will; however, these amendments did not pertain to estate planning. The Act explicitly states that Dorothy lacked the authority to create or alter a will on behalf of Mark, undermining the argument that she was a fiduciary capable of exerting undue influence over him regarding the will.
Regarding the fourth element of undue influence—whether the will was procured or executed with the beneficiary's involvement—petitioners claim the trial court wrongly concluded that Dorothy did not participate in procuring Mark's will. They assert that the trial court incorrectly applied legal standards and misinterpreted relevant precedents, leading to findings contrary to the evidence presented. The petitioners argue the court conflated two key issues: whether a beneficiary's involvement in making a will indicates participation in its procurement and whether such involvement proves undue influence.
The court's procedural ruling, as an appeal from a directed finding, required it to first assess whether petitioners established a prima facie case before evaluating the evidence. The court found that the petitioners did not meet this burden. Petitioners argue against the court’s determination that Dorothy did not procure the will, claiming this was based on an irrelevant assumption about her actions. They contend that any request from Mark to call Hynds is irrelevant to whether Dorothy was instrumental in the will's preparation and execution, and they criticize the court for relying on Dorothy's self-serving testimony.
The court rejected the petitioners' argument regarding the relevance of Dorothy's call to Hynds’s firm, affirming that it could be considered as supportive evidence for the petitioners' prima facie case. The court noted counter-evidence that challenged the interpretation of the call. On March 15, 2018, Dr. Showel recommended hospice care for Mark, indicating further treatment was futile. Dorothy testified she called Hynds on March 16 at Mark's direction, highlighting that Hynds’s firm had previously prepared Mark’s will. Both Hynds and Barkley confirmed that Mark initiated the decision to create a new will and directed its contents. Hynds visited Mark in the hospital on March 17 with various estate planning documents, discussing options under Mark's guidance. Mark's communication difficulties due to his tracheostomy justified Dorothy making the call on his behalf.
The petitioners contended that the court misapplied case law concerning undue influence. Relevant cases were analyzed, including In re Estate of Glogovsek, which highlighted factors indicating undue influence, such as the testator’s interactions with the attorney and changing intentions regarding beneficiaries. The court also referenced Maher, where allegations of undue influence were sufficient to proceed due to the fiduciary relationship and the respondent being the sole beneficiary. Additionally, Swenson illustrated a case where undue influence was affirmed due to the defendant's role in managing the testator's affairs and benefiting disproportionately from the new will. The court's analysis incorporated these precedents to assess the nuances of undue influence related to Mark's situation.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict, concluding that the evidence did not support a claim of undue influence by the testator's cousin in the creation of a new will. The cousin facilitated the retrieval of the old will, organized an appointment with the attorney, and accompanied the testator, but there was no indication that she influenced the testator's decision to change the will. Although the testator occasionally looked at the cousin during the attorney consultation, the cousin refrained from providing input, while the testator articulated her wishes directly to the attorney. The cousin received a minor benefit as executor and a bequest of a china cabinet, which did not indicate substantial gain.
The court also addressed petitioners' assertion that the trial court misapplied case law regarding the procurement of wills. The facts in this case were distinguished from previous cases like Glogovsek, Maher, and Swenson, particularly noting that the testator, Mark, made autonomous decisions regarding his will, despite some involvement from Dorothy, who did not exhibit coercive behavior. The attorney testified that Mark actively participated in the will's preparation and understood the implications of his choices.
Regarding the presumption of undue influence when a chief beneficiary procures a will for a debilitated testator, the court clarified that this presumption does not apply in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, referencing the overruled precedent from Mitchell v. Van Scoyk. The court concluded that the presumption is no longer valid law, thereby rejecting the petitioners' argument that the trial court should have applied it in this case.
Petitioners failed to establish a prima facie case of undue influence over Mark by Dorothy, as evidence indicated Mark was not debilitated or infirm due to his illness. Dr. Showel’s testimony highlighted that, on March 15, 2018, he recommended hospice care without noting any cognitive confusion from Mark, who was oriented and alert. Subsequent notes from nursing staff and Dr. Lin confirmed Mark’s mental clarity and ability to engage in discussions about his care and estate planning. Hynds, who drafted documents based on Dorothy's guidance, reported that Mark actively made decisions, recognized him, and engaged in discussions about his will. Witnesses, including Barkley and attorney Wilson, supported that Mark appeared to understand the matters at hand and was not pressured by Dorothy. Overall, the evidence did not support the claim that Mark was overpowered by Dorothy's influence, leading to the affirmation of the circuit court's judgment.
