Com. v. Dejesus-Gonzalez, J.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 909 MDA 2021

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; August 8, 2022; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jesus Dejesus-Gonzalez was convicted following a jury trial on multiple counts, including aggravated indecent assault of a child and corruption of minors, related to incidents involving his twelve-year-old niece. He received a sentence of ten to twenty years in prison, followed by three years of probation. Dejesus-Gonzalez's appeal raises two main issues: the admission of hearsay evidence and the denial of a mistrial request based on potentially incriminating testimony from a detective. The victim alleged that Dejesus-Gonzalez assaulted her while she was asleep and attempted to bribe her to keep quiet. After reporting the incident to a volunteer at a local organization, a police investigation ensued, which included a forensic examination revealing DNA that matched Dejesus-Gonzalez. Although he initially denied any wrongdoing to detectives, he later admitted to giving the victim money and sleeping in the same bed with her. Dejesus-Gonzalez's habeas corpus petitions resulted in the dismissal of some charges, but two were refiled and consolidated for trial. The appellate court found no merit in his claims and affirmed the lower court's decisions.

Owens testified at trial that the victim, in tears, disclosed that Dejesus-Gonzalez had sexually assaulted her, specifically recounting that she woke up to find his hand in her underwear and he asked if she liked it. The court admitted this testimony as an excited utterance, despite objections regarding hearsay. Detective Szulborski also testified about Dejesus-Gonzalez's behavior when approached by police, including walking away during their conversation. Defense counsel objected, citing Fifth Amendment rights, but the court provided a curative instruction clarifying that exercising this right should not imply guilt. The jury found Dejesus-Gonzalez guilty on all counts, leading to a timely appeal.

On appeal, Dejesus-Gonzalez contends that the trial court improperly allowed Owens's testimony under the excited utterance exception to hearsay rules, claiming the victim's statement was influenced by reflection rather than immediate excitement. He also argues the court erred by not granting a mistrial based on Szulborski’s testimony, which he believes violated his right against self-incrimination. The appellate review emphasizes that evidence admission is at the trial court's discretion and can only be altered upon showing an abuse of that discretion. The definition of an excited utterance is highlighted, noting that it must relate to a startling event and occur while the declarant is under stress, without a strict time limit post-event. The court's assessment of such statements is fact-specific and varies by case.

The key issue is whether the victim's statement was made under the influence of ongoing nervous excitement, rather than reflective thought, despite a twelve-hour gap between the incident and the disclosure. The court considers various factors: the narrative form of the statement, elapsed time, whether the declarant communicated with others prior, and the context of the statement. While the court acknowledges that time generally reduces spontaneity, it distinguishes the case from Vining, where a victim’s response to a doctor's inquiry was deemed non-spontaneous due to the elapsed time and the nature of the questioning.

In the current case, the victim experienced a startling event—her uncle's sexual assault—twelve hours before speaking with Owens. The victim expressed fear and confusion about reporting the incident, indicating she was still emotionally affected. The court notes that, although the victim communicated with a friend before speaking to Owens, this did not undermine the spontaneity of her statement. Given the victim's age and the emotional trauma involved, the court relaxes the standard for excited utterances, emphasizing that statements made under intense emotional distress are admissible. 

The court concludes that the evidence of the victim’s distress when speaking to Owens, including visible upset and crying, supports the admissibility of her statement as an excited utterance, affirming the trial court's discretion in allowing Owens's testimony.

The victim's statement to Owens, made hours after a traumatic event, qualifies as an excited utterance despite its timing, rendering Dejesus-Gonzalez's first claim unsuccessful. He failed to demonstrate that any alleged error regarding the statement's classification as an excited utterance caused him specific harm, thus providing no basis for relief. In his second claim, Dejesus-Gonzalez argued for a mistrial due to Detective Szulborski's testimony, which he believed implied guilt by referencing his pre-arrest silence. Mistrials are only warranted when a trial is compromised, and the court's denial of such a motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Adequate cautionary instructions may negate the need for a mistrial. The evaluation hinges on whether improper evidence prejudiced the jury's impartiality. The Detective's comments about Dejesus-Gonzalez’s silence were not deemed reversible error, as the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit mention of silence unless it is exploited to imply guilt. Although there are acceptable contexts for referencing silence, the nature of the Detective's testimony was seen as too detailed and deliberate to avoid potential prejudice against Dejesus-Gonzalez.

The Detective's description of Dejesus-Gonzalez's physical movements was viewed as an attempt to imply guilt, particularly after Dejesus-Gonzalez walked away from the conversation. Following an objection to this testimony, the court issued a curative instruction, emphasizing that everyone has the right not to speak to police without facing negative implications. To evaluate the effectiveness of such an instruction in addressing references to a defendant's silence, courts assess the nature of the reference, how it was elicited, any exploitation by the prosecution, and the promptness and adequacy of the instruction. Although Dejesus-Gonzalez acknowledged the instruction, he argued it was insufficient to remedy the violation of his right against self-incrimination, without addressing the aforementioned factors or critiquing the instruction's wording.

The court found the curative instruction sufficient, noting it was timely and thoroughly communicated the right not to speak to law enforcement. It highlighted that the jury should not draw negative inferences from Dejesus-Gonzalez’s actions. The court noted that, while the Detective could have omitted references to Dejesus-Gonzalez’s movements, his testimony was not meant to imply guilt but rather to provide context for the investigation. Dejesus-Gonzalez's own statement indicated he was unaware of the conversation, contradicting any implication of guilt from his actions. The Detective refrained from using prejudicial language regarding Dejesus-Gonzalez’s movements, which were presented merely as background narrative.

The court concluded that the references did not violate Dejesus-Gonzalez’s Fifth Amendment rights and that the curative instruction effectively mitigated any potential negative perceptions by the jury. As a result, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial and affirmed Dejesus-Gonzalez’s judgments of sentence.