Jaime Ramirez Guardia and Andrea Martinez- Flores v. Department of Family and Protective Services

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-21-00069-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 4, 2022; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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On August 4, 2022, the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a bill of review filed by appellants Jaime R. Ramirez and Andrea Martinez-Flores, who sought to restore their parental rights to their two children, J.C. and E.C. The appellants claimed their relinquishments of parental rights, executed through affidavits in June 2018, were induced by fraud, specifically alleging that they were misled by a promise from the presiding judge regarding the placement of the children with paternal relatives in Panama. 

The removal of the children by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) was initiated due to concerns of abuse and neglect. After a mistrial in the first termination trial, the appellants relinquished their rights in the second trial, which led to the trial court awarding DFPS managing conservatorship and subsequently allowing A.C., the children's adoptive mother, to adopt them in November 2019. 

Appellants did not appeal the termination or adoption orders within the stipulated time. Their bill of review, filed on January 30, 2020, sought to set aside these orders based on alleged fraudulent inducement. However, the court concluded that the appellants did not establish grounds for jurisdictional error or entitlement to judgment, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's dismissal. The petition included affidavits supporting their claims but did not formally challenge the adoption orders.

Affidavits from counsel reveal that the presiding judge assured clients that relinquishing parental rights would result in their children being placed with a paternal aunt in Panama. The clients, represented as ready for trial, claim they would not have relinquished their rights had they known the children would not be sent to Panama. Ambassador Sosa supported this claim, stating he attended a hearing where the judge established a "quid-pro-quo" arrangement: Jaime would surrender his rights in exchange for placement in Panama. Sosa noted delays in the process, suggesting intentional obstruction to prevent the children's relocation. When the foster parent sought adoption, the promise of placement in Panama appeared jeopardized. A.C. responded to the appellants' bill-of-review petition, asserting defenses including statute of limitations and laches, and filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to the untimely filing of the petition under Section 161.211(a) of the Family Code. A.C. contended the appellants lacked standing for a collateral attack on the conservatorship order. DFPS also moved to dismiss based on the same jurisdictional issues. The trial court dismissed the bill of review and granted A.C.'s and DFPS's motions. The appellants appealed, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing their petition as untimely and claiming that Section 161.211(a) should not bar their fraud-based challenge. They asserted that a bill of review is an equitable remedy to set aside prior judgments, which is generally restricted to uphold judicial finality.

Finality in family law, particularly parental-termination proceedings, is emphasized by the Texas Supreme Court due to its significant implications for all parties involved, especially children. Parental terminations create compelling private interests, warranting stability and finality in judgments. Under the Texas Family Code, Section 161.211, the validity of a termination order based on an executed affidavit of relinquishment is immune from direct or collateral attack after six months from its signing, except for issues of fraud, duress, or coercion related to the affidavit's execution. 

In this case, the appellants claim their relinquishment affidavits are void due to alleged fraud stemming from the trial court’s misrepresentation about the children’s placement. Although their challenge falls within the permissible scope for attacks on termination orders under Section 161.211(c), they cannot litigate whether the affidavits were fraudulently induced. The resolution necessitates statutory construction, focusing on the Legislature's intent as expressed through the statute’s language. The court asserts that both subsections (a) and (c) of Section 161.211 broadly limit all forms of attack on termination orders, indicating a deliberate legislative choice to uphold the integrity and finality of such judgments.

Section 161.211(a) of the Texas Family Code prohibits any collateral or direct attacks on the validity of parental rights termination orders if the attack is made after six months from when the order was signed, specifically for individuals who have executed an affidavit of relinquishment. In Moore v. Brown, the court confirmed that such a petition for bill of review, filed by appellants in January 2020—more than six months after the June 12, 2018 termination order—was untimely. The court referenced multiple cases illustrating that petitions filed beyond the six-month deadline are considered untimely regardless of the circumstances. 

Appellants argued that Section 161.211(c) should be interpreted to allow for exceptions to the six-month deadline in instances of fraud, duress, or coercion. However, the court found no legislative intent within the statutory language to support this interpretation, emphasizing that Section 161.211(c) strictly limits the grounds for challenge without extending the time frame established in subsection (a). The Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged the necessity of finality in such cases, supporting the notion that legislative restrictions on post-judgment challenges are valid. 

Appellants further claimed that the temporal limitation in Section 161.211(a) infringes on their due process rights and the right to a jury trial under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. However, the statute's enforcement stands unless a constitutional barrier is demonstrated.

Appellants have failed to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of Section 161.211(a). The court reviews constitutional questions de novo, presuming statutory validity and that the Legislature acted reasonably. The burden lies with the challengers to prove unconstitutionality. While appellants reference equal rights provisions in the Texas Constitution, they do not provide relevant arguments, resulting in waiver of those claims due to inadequate briefing. A constitutional challenge can be facial or as-applied. Facial challenges are the hardest to succeed in, requiring proof that no circumstances validate the statute. The court focuses on the as-applied challenge, as the facial challenge was waived. Appellants did not show harm from the statute's application, thus failing to meet their burden of proof regarding their as-applied challenge.

In Walker v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court ruled against the appellants' petition for a bill of review, determining it was untimely under Section 161.211(a) of the Texas Family Code. The appellants failed to provide evidence that they could not challenge the termination orders within the statutory time frame, which expired on December 12, 2018. The termination orders were signed on June 12, 2018, and the trial court had already prohibited the children from being moved to Panama on July 26, 2018, well before the six-month deadline to challenge based on fraud. The appellants claimed ignorance regarding a promise made by the presiding judge, but did not demonstrate they were unaware of this before the expiration of the deadline. Furthermore, the court noted that Ambassador Sosa's affidavit indicated that the adoption request by A.C. on July 22, 2018, posed a risk to the promised placement, underscoring the appellants' opportunity to challenge the orders. 

The court also concluded that the appellants lacked standing to contest the conservatorship and adoption orders, as their parental rights had been terminated, stripping them of legal interest in the children. This determination is supported by Section 161.206(b) of the Family Code, which outlines that such termination divests all legal rights and duties between the parent and child, except for inheritance rights. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the appellants' petition.

In Glover v. Moore, the court ruled that a mother who sought managing conservatorship of her child after her parental rights were terminated lacked a justiciable interest in the litigation. Similarly, the case of Durham v. Barrow established that while a mother can contest the termination decree, she cannot challenge a subsequent adoption if the termination was valid. In In re Lambert, it was noted that former parents do not have standing to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction over conservatorship matters post-termination. Consequently, the appellants in this case lacked standing to contest the conservatorship and adoption orders, leading to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the appellate court. The court deemed the appellants’ challenge to the termination order untimely and their lack of standing on other trial court orders as decisive for the appeal, thus affirming the trial court's judgment without addressing the remaining issues raised by the appellants. The decision was issued by a panel consisting of Justices Landau, Guerra, and Farris.