Plaintiffs, including the Lawyers’ Committee for 9/11 Inquiry, Inc. and various individuals related to the September 11 attacks, filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York after submitting a petition to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. This petition alleged that the collapse of the World Trade Center was caused by explosives rather than the impact of airplanes and requested a grand jury investigation. They sought (1) disclosure of grand jury records related to their petition and (2) a court order to compel the defendants to present their petition to a grand jury if they had not already done so. The district court dismissed the case citing lack of standing and failure to state a claim. Upon appeal, the Circuit Court found no merit in the plaintiffs' challenges and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The plaintiffs had previously submitted extensive evidence and testimony to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, including a First Amended Petition, but their requests were not acted upon, prompting the litigation.
Plaintiffs sought to compel defendants to disclose information presented to a grand jury regarding their Petition and to require defendants to submit the Petition to the grand jury, asserting violations of the First Amendment and seeking relief under the Federal Mandamus Statute and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that plaintiffs lacked standing to compel the grand jury submission and failed to state a valid claim regarding the release of grand jury information. On appeal, plaintiffs contended they had standing to compel the submission and that the court erred in denying the release of grand jury records. However, the appellate court found both arguments unmeritorious. It clarified that plaintiffs lacked standing to compel submission due to a failure to demonstrate a concrete injury, as established in previous cases. Specifically, the court referenced the necessity for a plaintiff to show an "injury in fact" for Article III standing, asserting that the mere denial of the ability to provide information to a grand jury does not constitute an injury. Thus, the court concluded that plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient injury to support their standing claims against the U.S. Attorney.
Plaintiffs fail to establish standing for their claims. They first argue injury based on their inability to receive a reward from the State Department’s Rewards for Justice Program, contingent on their Petition leading to a grand jury indictment. However, mere interest in potential rewards does not suffice for standing. They also assert that the Lawyers’ Committee and AE have organizational standing due to alleged concrete injuries from defendants' actions affecting their missions related to the September 11 attacks. Despite claims of resource drain from ongoing investigations and litigation, they did not demonstrate how defendants imposed additional costs, especially since their investigations were likely completed prior to the Petition submission. Previous rulings indicate that costs incurred from new activities in response to a defendant's actions do not establish injury for standing. Furthermore, plaintiffs cannot claim standing based on a desire for federal investigation and prosecution, as private citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution decisions of the government, making their claims speculative.
In regard to the First Amendment claim, the plaintiffs allege that their right to petition was violated when defendants refused to submit their Petition to a grand jury. The district court dismissed this claim due to lack of constitutional standing. While the First Amendment protects the right to petition the government, plaintiffs must still demonstrate actual injury for standing. They could not show a constitutional injury, as the right to petition does not inherently include direct communication with a grand jury, which is an executive function reserved for the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys. Thus, plaintiffs do not have standing to compel defendants to submit their Petition to a grand jury under the Federal Mandamus Statute or the APA.
Prosecutors possess broad discretion regarding the submission of evidence to a grand jury, which is essential to maintain the U.S. Attorney's role as the exclusive authority in federal prosecutions. Allowing individuals to compel the U.S. Attorney to present their materials to a grand jury would undermine this function and invite misuse of the grand jury process. Plaintiffs have not cited any legal precedent supporting their claim. The Supreme Court has clarified that the First Amendment does not compel the government to respond to citizen communications. The plaintiffs' comparison to cases such as Morello v. James and Franco v. Kelly, which addressed prisoners' rights to access courts, is not applicable here, as those cases did not involve compelling action from a governmental entity. The First Amendment right was satisfied when the plaintiffs submitted their Petition to the U.S. Attorney, and it does not extend to forcing a grand jury presentation of their materials.
Furthermore, the district court acted within its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' requests for the release of grand jury materials, which were based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3). This rule outlines specific circumstances for disclosing grand jury materials, none of which apply to the plaintiffs' requests. Therefore, the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue Count 2 and have not demonstrated a cognizable injury under the First Amendment.
Certain special circumstances may warrant the release of grand jury records outside the parameters of Rule 6(e), as recognized by prior cases. Courts evaluating such requests consider various factors, including the identity of the requester, opposition from the defendant or government, the purpose of the request, the specific information sought, the timing of the grand jury proceedings, and the ongoing relevance of secrecy. The burden of proof lies with the requester, with a presumption against disclosure.
In this case, the district court determined that the factors weighed against disclosure. The government's opposition to release, the timing of requests, and the continued existence of individuals related to the September 11 attacks, some of whom may still be alive, supported maintaining secrecy. Additionally, the plaintiffs are not parties to the grand jury proceedings, and the materials they seek have never been made public, reinforcing the argument against disclosure.
The plaintiffs argued for a distinction between ministerial records and substantive grand jury proceedings, claiming the records they requested were ministerial. However, this court has not recognized such an exception, and the requested records pertain to substantive aspects of grand jury proceedings, which are protected under Rule 6(e). The plaintiffs sought information that relates to whether their petition was submitted to the grand jury, which is considered substantive and thus non-disclosable.
The court concluded that allowing such disclosures could lead to an unwarranted expectation of updates from the U.S. Attorney’s Office regarding grand jury investigations, which lacks statutory or case law support. Consequently, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.
