Durbin W. Kerr, the plaintiff-appellant, appeals a judgment from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment to OhioHealth Corporation, determining that Kerr was not entitled to workers' compensation for injuries sustained on January 25, 2019. Kerr was employed as a social worker in OhioHealth's hospice department, responsible for connecting patients with resources and providing support. He traveled to patients' homes or nursing facilities within Franklin County, usually visiting four to five patients daily, using his personal vehicle, for which he received mileage reimbursement.
On the day of the incident, Kerr and a chaplain, Reverend Nooks, traveled together to patient visits that began at 10:30 a.m. After their morning appointments, they went to lunch at a nearby restaurant before their next scheduled visit. While walking towards the restaurant, Kerr slipped on ice in the parking lot, resulting in a concussion and wrist fracture. After lunch, he sought medical attention at the emergency room. The court affirmed that Kerr's injuries occurred while he was not engaged in work-related duties, thus disqualifying him from accessing the workers' compensation fund.
Kerr applied for workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained on January 25, 2019. Following a hearing on June 14, 2019, the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied his application, determining that the injuries did not arise from his employment with OhioHealth. This decision was upheld by a staff hearing officer, and the commission declined further appeals. On November 12, 2019, Kerr initiated a trial court action under R.C. 4123.512 to contest this ruling.
OhioHealth filed a motion for summary judgment on September 17, 2020, arguing that the coming-and-going rule barred Kerr from receiving benefits and that his injuries were not work-related. Kerr countered with his own motion on September 21, asserting the inapplicability of the coming-and-going rule. Both parties submitted memoranda opposing each other's motions.
On July 19, 2021, the trial court granted OhioHealth's summary judgment motion, finding that Kerr was a fixed situs employee, which subjected him to the coming-and-going rule, thus preventing his participation in the workers' compensation fund. The court further concluded that even absent this rule, Kerr's injuries did not occur in the course of his employment.
Kerr appealed, raising two assignments of error: first, claiming the court erred in classifying him as a fixed situs employee under the coming-and-going rule; second, arguing that the court wrongly determined his injuries did not arise from his employment. The appellate court reviews summary judgment grants de novo, meaning it independently evaluates the record without deferring to the trial court’s findings. Summary judgment is granted only when there are no genuine material facts in dispute, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn, which is unfavorable to the opposing party.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, courts must favor the non-moving party and resolve doubts in their favor. The moving party is responsible for demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as per Civ. R. 56(C). If the moving party meets this burden, summary judgment is warranted unless the non-moving party provides specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Ohio workers' compensation statutes provide that employees injured during employment are entitled to compensation, with 'injury' broadly defined to include any injury arising from employment. The determination of entitlement to compensation focuses on the causal connection between an injury and employment, rather than employer fault. The courts apply a flexible approach to evaluate facts in each case, referencing precedents like the 'coming-and-going' rule, which generally denies compensation for fixed situs employees injured while commuting. Kerr's first assignment of error contends that the trial court incorrectly classified him as a fixed situs employee subject to this rule, which limits compensation eligibility for injuries occurring during commutes.
The coming-and-going rule applies exclusively to employees with a fixed work location, termed as having a fixed situs. Fixed situs employees begin their substantial duties only upon arrival at a specific site designated by their employer. The determination of whether an employment situs is fixed or non-fixed hinges on whether travel is integral to the employment, based on the job's nature or the employment contract.
In the case of Ruckman, the court identified well-drilling riggers as fixed situs employees since their work necessitated travel to distinct drilling sites where they had no duties outside of those locations. Their workday commenced and concluded at these sites, despite potential reassignment to different locations regularly.
Similarly, in Cunningham, the court recognized an injured worker applying waterproofing paint to homes as a fixed situs employee, as his duties began only upon reaching each designated job site, which were fixed locations. The court emphasized that the worker’s detour to his home to retrieve supplies was not part of his employment duties and did not constitute the commencement of his work responsibilities.
Several appellate decisions, including Cunningham, have affirmed that employees with multiple job sites within a day can still be considered fixed situs employees if they have no responsibilities outside their designated work locations. For instance, a home healthcare aide visiting multiple patients was deemed a fixed situs employee regarding each visit, as she had no obligations beyond those specific homes.
In Green v. Marc Glassman, Inc., the court established that a fixed-situs employee is one who begins their job duties at a specific, identifiable work location designated by the employer, even if that location varies periodically. Similar rulings in Palette v. Fowler Elec. Co. and Smith v. Akron confirmed that employees who report to multiple job sites in a single day can still qualify as fixed-situs employees if they commence their duties at those locations. However, in Ruckman, it was clarified that changing work sites multiple times within a single day does not support fixed-situs classification.
The Supreme Court emphasized the need to assess the distinct facts of each case. In Kerr's situation, while patient visits were critical, his responsibilities extended beyond them, including charting, phone calls, and team meetings. The trial court acknowledged these additional obligations but deemed them non-substantial, a view echoed by OhioHealth, which likened Kerr's duties to those of a home health aide in Gilham. However, the Gilham case highlighted that the aide had no duties outside patient visits, contrasting with Kerr's broader obligations.
Kerr's charting and participation in phone calls were deemed significant by the court, as failure to complete them would mean not fulfilling essential job responsibilities. Although he typically completed these tasks at home, he also indicated that his schedule might require him to perform them in the field or at other locations.
Kerr is a non-fixed situs employee, as his job requires him to travel for patient visits and he does not remain at a single worksite throughout his workday. This classification exempts him from the "coming-and-going rule." In his second assignment of error, Kerr contends that the trial court wrongly determined his injury did not occur in the course of his employment. To establish a compensable injury, an employee must demonstrate it occurred during their work duties and was related to their employment. The "in the course of employment" prong assesses the time, place, and circumstances of the injury to establish a nexus to the employment relationship. Although an injury need not occur during actual work performance, it must arise from activities aligned with the employment contract and related to the employer's business. The "arising out of" prong requires a causal connection between the injury and employment, evaluated based on various factors, including proximity to the workplace, employer control over the accident scene, and the benefit to the employer from the employee’s presence. These factors are not exhaustive; an employee can prove causation even if some factors are not met. For non-fixed situs employees who travel for work, injuries sustained during employment-related trips are generally compensable unless they occur while the employee is running a personal errand, as outlined by the "traveling employee" doctrine.
In Cline v. Yellow Transp. Inc., the court established that a traveling employee's injury is compensable only when the travel itself is mandated by work and is the primary duty for which the employee is paid. Courts are instructed to apply the "in the course of" and "arising out of" tests from Fisher and its related cases, even if the travel has a personal purpose. For fixed situs employees injured on their employer's premises during breaks, injuries are generally compensable. However, injuries sustained off-premises during lunch are typically not compensable under the coming-and-going rule.
In Cline, a truck driver injured while walking to a restaurant from an employer-provided hotel during a mandated rest period was found not to be in the course of employment, as he was free to choose his meals and the trip was deemed a personal errand. The court noted that the company had no control over the accident site and derived no benefit from the driver's presence there. Similarly, in Elsass v. Commercial Carriers, a truck driver's injury while seeking food after leaving the motel was ruled non-compensable, as it was taken at his own risk without any benefit to the employer.
In Richardson v. Admr. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., the court ruled that a traveling employee's injury, sustained after leaving an employer-provided hotel to dine at a restaurant, was not compensable because the employer neither paid for the meals nor controlled the employee's dining arrangements. Similarly, in Marbury v. Indus. Comm., an employee's injury while purchasing a T-shirt during a business trip was deemed non-compensable, as it was considered a personal errand outside the course of employment.
Conversely, in Jones v. USF Holland, Inc., an over-the-road truck driver who slipped in his hotel bathroom was found to have sustained an injury in the course of employment, but not arising out of it, due to lack of proximity to the company’s terminal and insufficient causal connection to his job duties. In Lippolt, a traveling employee's injury while walking from a rental car to an employer-provided hotel was compensable, as the trip was part of his job responsibilities and benefited the employer by facilitating store visits.
Additionally, in Cossin, a sales consultant's injury from an automobile accident was compensable because it occurred while traveling directly from a sales appointment to home, establishing a clear causal link to his employment duties. Finally, in Jones v. Multicare Health. Edn. Servs. Inc., the court identified unresolved factual issues regarding whether a home healthcare worker's injury during an automobile accident was related to his employment.
The injured worker, identified as Kerr, was a non-fixed situs employee who sustained an injury while driving to a pharmacy after his lunch break to pick up a prescription for a patient. The court found that reasonable minds could conclude the injury arose during the course of employment since the job required the worker to make such a trip. However, the evidence did not support that Kerr's injury was work-related. OhioHealth did not provide Kerr with a formal lunch hour, reimburse him for lunch, or impose any policies on where he could eat. Kerr confirmed that his lunches were his own responsibility and he was not required to discuss patient care or complete work tasks during lunch.
Kerr's injury occurred during a 1 hour and 45-minute gap between patient visits, with no indication that he was obligated to perform work-related duties during this time. While traveling employees are typically covered if injured during work-related travel, Kerr's injury occurred at a restaurant after he chose to stop for lunch, rather than while traveling between patients. There was no evidence that his presence at the restaurant was due to an employment obligation. The circumstances of the injury—a slip and fall in a restaurant parking lot—were deemed risks faced by the general public, not unique to his employment. The Workers' Compensation Act does not make employers liable for all employee injuries but only those related to work duties. Thus, the court concluded that Kerr's injury was not compensable as it did not occur in the course of his employment.
The 'arising out of' prong of the statutory test requires a causal connection between employment and injury, evaluated through the totality of facts and the Lord factors. Kerr asserts that the accident occurred near his workplace, as the restaurant was en route to a patient visit in Clintonville. Although there is no evidence detailing the distance from the restaurant to the patient’s residence, Kerr's testimony could suggest proximity. However, regarding control, Kerr admits OhioHealth did not manage the Rusty Bucket parking lot, where the injury occurred, indicating that the control factor focuses on the employer's authority over the injury location rather than employee actions. Despite the absence of control not being decisive against coverage, Kerr claims OhioHealth benefitted from his presence at the restaurant as he and Reverend Nooks informally discussed patient care. However, Kerr later testified he could not specifically recall these discussions, and OhioHealth did not mandate such conversations during lunch. Additionally, while Kerr argues that OhioHealth benefitted from having a refreshed employee post-lunch, prior cases, including Cline and Jones, illustrate that general benefits to an employer from an employee’s well-being are insufficient to establish a causal link between personal activities (like eating lunch) and employment-related injuries. Thus, the mere presence of a benefit does not create a necessary causal nexus.
Kerr was injured while walking into a restaurant for lunch, not while performing work-related duties or traveling to a work obligation, distinguishing his case from Jones v. Multicare. Since OhioHealth did not mandate Kerr to eat at the restaurant or engage in work activities during lunch, his presence in the parking lot did not benefit the employer. This situation aligns with Cline, categorizing Kerr's lunch trip as a personal errand. The evidence fails to establish a causal link between Kerr's lunch and OhioHealth's business activities. Therefore, even when viewed favorably to Kerr, he did not sustain injuries arising from his employment. The court overruled Kerr's second assignment of error and, despite disagreeing with the trial court's classification of Kerr as a fixed situs employee, affirmed the summary judgment in favor of OhioHealth. The judgment is legally sound, as appellate courts must uphold correct judgments even if based on erroneous reasoning.
