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Moshe Feldhendler and Leah Feldhendler v. Julie Blasnik and All Occupants 6608 Crestland Avenue Dallas, Texas 75252

Citation: Not availableDocket: 05-20-00063-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; July 29, 2022; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of tenant Julie Blasnik, rejecting the claims made by landlords Moshe and Leah Feldhendler. The Feldhendlers argued that the trial court improperly applied property code section 92.006(e) instead of section 92.006(f), misinterpreted paragraph 18 of the lease, incorrectly found Blasnik not guilty of forcible detainer, and failed to uphold a prior justice court judgment. The lease agreement, established on June 28, 2018, allowed the landlords to apply tenant payments to non-rent obligations, including repairs, and stipulated that repair requests had to be in writing. If rent was overdue, the landlords were not obligated to make repairs. Notably, paragraph 18(D) outlined the landlord's responsibilities for repairs, specifying conditions under which they would not cover repair costs unless due to their negligence. After the Feldhendlers repaired a broken window and charged Blasnik $450, they deducted this amount from her rent when she did not pay. This led to their petition for forcible detainer, asserting that her rent was insufficient due to the deduction. The court ultimately ruled in favor of Blasnik, affirming the judgment against the Feldhendlers.

The justice court awarded the Feldhendlers $450 in back rent and $121 in court costs but did not grant them possession of the property. Blasnik appealed this decision to Collin County Court at Law. During the October 2019 trial, Moshe Feldhendler testified that a window was intact when Blasnik moved in and was not noted as broken on the inventory form. He claimed Blasnik did not request its repair, and the city mandated its replacement after it broke. Feldhendler referenced a lease provision that exempted the landlord from repairing items unless damage was caused by the landlord's negligence. Blasnik indicated the window break was high up and obscured by curtains and blinds provided by the landlord, which were in place during her completion of the inventory form. She noted having experienced storms that damaged her car but did not indicate any negligence regarding the window break.

The trial judge ruled in favor of Blasnik, awarding her attorney’s fees. Following a hearing on the Feldhendlers’ motion for reconsideration, the trial court clarified that its ruling was not solely based on property code section 94.206. The Feldhendlers' counsel argued that the lease aligned with property code section 92.006, shifting repair costs to the tenant. However, Blasnik's counsel countered that the lease did not obligate her to pay for repairs not caused by her actions. On November 21, 2019, the trial court issued a judgment favoring Blasnik, affirming her right to remain in the property and awarding her $5,892.50 in attorney’s fees. The court found that Blasnik had not requested window repairs and that the lease did not require her to pay for repairs not caused by her negligence. The Feldhendlers appealed, arguing the lease held Blasnik responsible for the window repairs and claiming the trial court’s judgment rendered property code section 92.006(f) and lease provisions meaningless. The appellate court will review the sufficiency of the findings of fact and legal conclusions de novo to determine their correctness.

In BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, the Texas Supreme Court noted that Section 92.006(f) of the property code allows for the contractual transfer of repair costs from landlord to tenant, regardless of tenant-caused damages. The Feldhendlers argued that Blasnik was responsible for window repairs under paragraph 18(D) of the lease, citing Churchill Forge and Philadelphia Indemnity cases. However, those leases contained explicit language requiring tenants to pay for certain damages, which was absent in Blasnik's lease. The lease only stated that the landlord would not cover repairs to doors, windows, or screens, without imposing a payment obligation on Blasnik. Additionally, Blasnik did not request the window repair, nor was there evidence she knew of the damage, which was mandated by a city requirement unrelated to her actions. The court upheld the trial court's conclusion that Blasnik was not liable for the window repair costs, as the Feldhendlers did not satisfy the requirements of the property code or establish tenant responsibility for repairs not initiated by her. The judgment favoring Blasnik was affirmed, with costs ordered to be recovered from the Feldhendlers.