The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed a case involving J.K.J., the successor in interest to the deceased Aleah Jenkins, against the City of San Diego and several police officers. The appeal arose from a district court dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations related to Jenkins' treatment during and after her arrest.
Jenkins was arrested during a traffic stop due to a warrant for a prior methamphetamine offense. After she was placed in a police cruiser, she exhibited signs of distress, including vomiting and calling for help. Despite these signs, the responding officers did not seek immediate medical assistance after Jenkins claimed she was pregnant. After being transported to the police station and lying on her side, Jenkins was later found unconscious and subsequently died nine days later.
The appellate panel upheld the district court's decision, stating that it appropriately considered bodycam footage incorporated by the plaintiff and did not give it undue weight. The court found no constitutional violation by the officers, asserting that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a municipal liability claim under Monell, as it indicated that the issues stemmed from the officers’ failure to adhere to their training, rather than a lack of training itself. The conduct of the officers did not violate clearly established law regarding the recognition and response to medical distress. Therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
In dissent, Judge Watford criticized the majority for presenting a simplified narrative that overlooked significant factual allegations made by the plaintiff, which should have been accepted as true at this stage of proceedings.
The complaint referenced a publicly available body camera video that documented significant events related to the case. The plaintiff alleged that Aleah Jenkins, a young African-American woman, died in police custody due to Officer Durbin's inaction during her acute medical emergency. Judge Watford advocated for reversing the district court's dismissal of the claims against Officer Durbin and remanding the case for further proceedings. The legal representatives included Kaveh Navab for the plaintiff and Seetal Tejura for the defendants. The panel granted a petition for panel rehearing, declaring the prior opinion amended, while the petition for rehearing en banc became moot.
Aleah Jenkins was arrested following a traffic stop and fell ill while in custody, ultimately dying nine days later. Her son, J.K.J., filed constitutional claims against the City of San Diego and the involved officers after the district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court concluded that the officers did not violate established law and were thus protected by qualified immunity.
On November 27, 2018, officers stopped a Cadillac with three occupants, including Jenkins. During the stop, the officers, aware of prior drug-related convictions of the male passengers, arrested Jenkins based on an outstanding warrant. After being placed in Officer Durbin's cruiser, Jenkins vomited. Despite her claims of illness and pregnancy, Officer Durbin decided not to call for medical assistance, stating, "Don’t worry about it." After canceling the paramedics, Durbin transported Jenkins to the police station, during which she expressed distress and requested water and a bathroom break.
Jenkins exhibited distress during her interaction with Durbin, alternating between screams for help and periods of silence. After Durbin inquired about her well-being and received no response, he stopped the vehicle to check on her, prompting Jenkins to claim she was sick. Despite her pleas for help, Durbin dismissed her concerns, stating she was "fine," and continued to the police station. Upon arrival, Jenkins was found lying face down in the cruiser, and after further screams and hyperventilation, Durbin removed her to the pavement, noting her reluctance to be taken into custody. After fingerprinting her while she was handcuffed, Jenkins fell unconscious about eleven and a half minutes later. Durbin called for paramedics and attempted CPR, mentioning Jenkins had a narcotics warrant but indicating this was not a narcotics arrest. Despite efforts to revive her, Jenkins fell into a coma and died nine days later, with the complaint referencing her overdose without specifying a cause of death.
In November 2019, J.K.J., represented by his father Jeremy Hillyer, filed a lawsuit which the District Court initially dismissed but allowed for amendment. The amended complaint included three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: denial of medical care against Durbin and Taub, municipal liability against the City under Monell, and deprivation of life without due process against Durbin and Taub. The complaint incorporated a bodycam video of the incident, which the court reviewed and found consistent with the allegations, leading to another dismissal of the case with prejudice. The court determined that written allegations were unnecessary given the video evidence, and it concluded that the first claim for denial of medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment failed, with the Fourth Amendment standard offering no better outcome. Further examination would be needed to address whether Jenkins’ other children were required parties under California survival action laws.
Taub and Durbin were granted qualified immunity by the Court. J.K.J.'s second cause of action was dismissed under Monell due to (1) a failure to allege a plausible violation of Jenkins’ constitutional rights and (2) a lack of identification of any municipal policy or custom causing the alleged violation. The Court also dismissed the third cause of action, related to "Deprivation of Life," as it was duplicative of the medical care denial claim. J.K.J. appealed this decision.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, and the appellate court reviews the final judgment under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The review standard is de novo for dismissals for failure to state a claim, qualified immunity decisions, and municipal liability decisions. Dismissals with prejudice are only appropriate if it is clear that amendments would not improve the complaint. The Court's discretion in incorporating documents by reference is also subject to an abuse of discretion standard.
In addressing J.K.J.’s argument that the District Court improperly relied on a bodycam video incorporated into the amended complaint, the Court found that it did not err. Typically, courts rely solely on the complaint's face for motions to dismiss; however, they can consider documents incorporated by reference without converting the motion. While the Court acknowledged that such documents are assumed true for dismissal purposes, it clarified that if a document contradicts well-pleaded facts, the allegations may be disregarded. The District Court exercised its discretion correctly in reviewing the bodycam video, which J.K.J. had incorporated. The Court did not overemphasize the video, maintaining that it was consistent with J.K.J.’s allegations, and treated those allegations as essential in its analysis.
The District Court did not accept the video as truth solely to contest facts in J.K.J.'s pleadings. Instead, it dismissed J.K.J.'s "conclusory allegations" about the officers' conduct failing to meet constitutional standards, exercising its discretion appropriately. J.K.J.'s appeal centers on the dismissal of his amended complaint for failure to state a claim, specifically a municipal liability claim against the City under Monell. J.K.J. alleged that the City violated Jenkins’ constitutional rights by employing officers with "dangerous propensities," inadequate training, and insufficient medical care for arrestees. To establish a Monell claim, J.K.J. needed to demonstrate that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.
The court found that the amended complaint did not sufficiently allege that any City policy was the "moving force" behind the alleged violations. Although J.K.J. tried to establish a causal link between Jenkins’ death and the City's failure to train its officers, the court noted that the complaint broadly referred to a lack of supervision and training without providing specific facts showing how this deficiency caused the alleged indifference to Jenkins’ medical needs. The officers were reportedly trained to summon medical care in such situations, and any failure to act was contrary to their training, indicating it was not a training issue. J.K.J. failed to identify what additional training was necessary or that any lack of training was the cause of Jenkins’ injuries, leading to the conclusion that he did not adequately state a claim for municipal liability.
The claims against individual officers Taub and Durbin included a survivorship claim for denial of medical care and a claim for deprivation of life without due process, which will be considered next.
J.K.J. claims the District Court erred regarding his denial of medical care, arguing three main points: the court failed to apply a Fourth Amendment standard alongside the Fourteenth Amendment, incorrectly determined that Officer Durbin did not exhibit deliberate indifference to Jenkins’ serious medical needs, and wrongly granted qualified immunity to Officers Taub and Durbin. However, the affirmation of qualified immunity means the court did not address the first two arguments. Qualified immunity protects government officials unless they violated a clearly established federal right. The analysis follows a two-prong test: whether a constitutional right was violated and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. For the second prong, J.K.J. must demonstrate that the officers' conduct was clearly unlawful at the time. Courts consider existing controlling case law or persuasive authority to establish what constitutes a clearly established right, avoiding overly general or excessively narrow interpretations. J.K.J. cites three cases to argue that reasonable officers would be aware of the violation of established law regarding pretrial detainees’ medical needs. However, the court notes that general principles do not suffice to establish clearly defined law unless the situation is an "obvious case."
J.K.J. fails to demonstrate that the cases of Frost, Gibson, or McGuckin share relevant factual similarities to the current case. In Frost, prison officials were aware of the plaintiff's broken leg and need for crutches but denied him access to an accessible shower and assistance with stairs, indicating a clear recognition of medical need. McGuckin involved delays in necessary surgery, not a failure to recognize a medical requirement. Although Gibson involved law enforcement's failure to recognize a detainee's serious mental health needs, it did not establish that the officers' conduct was unlawful. Instead, the court found the deputies were not deliberately indifferent because they could only observe the detainee's behavior, which did not clearly indicate serious illness. In contrast, Jenkins actively engaged with the officers, denying withdrawal or detox and explaining her condition, which complicates claims of obvious medical need. The dissent's assertion that Jenkins' need was "obvious" overlooks the context that she attempted to explain her symptoms. Additionally, references to Sandoval, which found a nurse negligent for ignoring a detainee's medical issues, are not directly applicable as the nurse failed to investigate symptoms, while Officer Durbin made efforts to understand Jenkins' condition. J.K.J. relies on district court decisions to support his argument, but such decisions are generally less authoritative in establishing clearly defined constitutional standards, as emphasized by the Supreme Court.
J.K.J. failed to establish a clear consensus of persuasive authority to support his claims against officers Taub and Durbin, as only four cases were cited, three of which did not align with the current situation. The court concluded that Taub and Durbin were entitled to qualified immunity, leading to the dismissal of J.K.J.'s denial of medical care claim. Regarding J.K.J.'s claim of deprivation of life without due process, the District Court dismissed it as duplicative of the medical care claim. J.K.J. argued this was a separate cause of action concerning his liberty interest in his parent's companionship, but he did not present this argument in the District Court. The defendants had consistently asserted that the deprivation claim was redundant, and J.K.J.’s failure to counter this argument indicated a concession. The appellate court noted that it typically does not entertain arguments not developed in the lower court, leading to a waiver of J.K.J.’s deprivation of life claim. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of J.K.J.’s amended complaint, which was with prejudice and without leave to amend. J.K.J. did not challenge the dismissal's conditions, and thus, the appellate court did not address whether it was warranted. In dissent, Circuit Judge Watford criticized the majority's account as incomplete, arguing it overlooked significant factual allegations made by the plaintiff.
The complaint incorporates a publicly available body camera video that documents critical events surrounding the death of Aleah Jenkins, an African-American woman who died in police custody. The plaintiff, J.K.J., alleges that Officer Lawrence Durbin failed to respond to Jenkins's acute medical emergency during a transport to police headquarters, dismissing her distress as a ruse to avoid jail. The complaint claims that no reasonable officer could have interpreted Jenkins's deteriorating condition as feigned. The resolution of whether J.K.J. can substantiate this claim is a pivotal factual issue for trial, not suitable for dismissal at this stage. If a jury finds in favor of J.K.J., he could prevail against Officer Durbin despite a defense of qualified immunity, as the law clearly mandated immediate medical assistance, which Durbin neglected.
The video, released by the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office, captures the incident, although portions are edited and some audio is muted. Despite these limitations, the video corroborates the allegations in the complaint, which will be assessed as true unless directly contradicted by the footage. The events leading to Jenkins's death began with a traffic stop on November 27, 2018, where she initially appeared alert and responsive. The court suggests that the claims against Officer Jason Taub and the City of San Diego should be upheld, but the claims against Officer Durbin warrant further proceedings.
Ms. Jenkins provided her name and date of birth to Officer Durbin during a traffic stop and exhibited no signs of medical distress. She cooperatively informed officers of her probation status and had an outstanding warrant related to a prior methamphetamine offense. After stepping out of the vehicle on her own, she was searched, removed her bracelet, and was handcuffed without assistance. Officers searched the vehicle, finding empty plastic wrap often used for drugs. Ms. Jenkins walked independently to Officer Durbin's patrol car and sat in the back seat as instructed.
Approximately 45 minutes into the stop, while waiting in the patrol car, Ms. Jenkins began to vomit repeatedly. When questioned, she stated she was sick and denied withdrawing or detoxing, attributing her sickness to her pregnancy. Officer Durbin initially requested paramedics but canceled the call after learning of her pregnancy. Officer Taub, present at the scene, noted her vomiting but did not observe any indications that warranted medical care, leading to the dismissal of claims against him.
Officer Durbin then drove Ms. Jenkins to the police headquarters for fingerprinting due to a previous arrest under her twin sister's warrant. The drive was delayed by heavy traffic, lasting over an hour, during which Ms. Jenkins's condition significantly worsened, although she initially showed no signs of illness during the first part of the journey.
Ms. Jenkins initially remains mostly silent during her transport by Officer Durbin, aside from expressing a desire not to go to jail. About 20 minutes into the drive, she begins to exhibit labored breathing, described as panting, which is corroborated by footage from Officer Durbin’s body camera. She subsequently starts screaming and moaning for over two minutes, and her distress escalates, characterized by louder groaning and pleading for help, indicating severe distress and possible hyperventilation.
Officer Durbin inquires about her condition, asking if she needs water, but after several minutes without a response, he checks on her using a flashlight. Although he notes she is still breathing, he continues to receive no audible response from her. After another five minutes, he pulls over to inspect her again. Upon opening the rear door, Ms. Jenkins’s head falls out, suggesting she may be unconscious or deeply asleep. She is found lying listless with rapid breathing. Although she pleads that she is sick, Officer Durbin's response is dismissive, telling her to “knock it off” and insisting she is fine.
The complaint asserts that by this point, Officer Durbin should have recognized the significant decline in Ms. Jenkins's condition and the urgency of her medical needs. Despite the clear signs of a medical emergency, he failed to call for medical assistance or prepare for medical personnel upon arrival at the station. The complaint argues that a reasonable officer would have understood the high risk involved in not summoning medical help for Ms. Jenkins.
Officer Durbin, after checking on Ms. Jenkins, finds her unconscious in the back of his patrol car at police headquarters. Despite her abnormal breathing, twitching, and signs of distress, he fails to call for medical assistance. Instead, he attempts to fingerprint her, pulling her out of the car despite her limp state, as she screams in distress and mumbles for help. Officer Durbin dismisses her condition, suggesting she doesn't want to go to jail, while Ms. Jenkins continues to show signs of severe distress and incoherence. He and another officer manage to fingerprint her while she lies on the ground, exhibiting a lack of consciousness and control over her limbs. They struggle to lift her back into the patrol car, and Durbin expresses frustration at her inability to cooperate, wrongly accusing her of faking. Later, Ms. Jenkins responds affirmatively when asked if she wants water, indicating some level of awareness.
Ms. Jenkins exhibited severe medical distress while in police custody, requiring Officer Durbin to physically lift her into the patrol car, as she was completely limp and unresponsive. After securing her in the back seat face down and handcuffed, Officer Durbin left her unattended for over 11 minutes without summoning medical assistance. Upon returning, he found her unresponsive and only then called for paramedics, who later attempted resuscitation but were unsuccessful. Ms. Jenkins subsequently fell into a coma and died nine days later.
J.K.J. has filed two claims against Officer Durbin: a survival claim on behalf of Ms. Jenkins for her injuries, governed by the Fourth Amendment due to her custody status, and a separate claim for damages related to his own suffering from her death, which falls under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court noted that both claims involve assessing the reasonableness of Officer Durbin's actions, though they are governed by different constitutional standards based on Ms. Jenkins's status as an arrestee at the time of the incident.
The majority opinion in Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1099, holds that the survival claim on behalf of Ms. Jenkins fails due to qualified immunity, without needing to determine the applicable legal standard. However, the dissent argues that J.K.J. has sufficiently alleged a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, suggesting a robust basis for analysis without separately addressing J.K.J.’s independent claim. The dissent refutes the majority's assertion that J.K.J. waived his claim, noting he actively opposed its dismissal in the district court and on appeal, and correctly argued that the Fourth Amendment governs the survival claim, despite the district court’s misunderstanding.
To establish a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for inadequate medical care, J.K.J. must meet an objective deliberate indifference standard, which requires demonstrating that: (1) the defendant intentionally decided on the conditions of confinement, including medical treatment; (2) those conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (3) the defendant failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate that risk despite recognizing the danger; and (4) the defendant's inaction caused the plaintiff’s injuries. J.K.J. has plausibly alleged facts satisfying these elements, particularly indicating that Officer Durbin intentionally chose not to summon medical assistance prior to Ms. Jenkins’s critical condition.
Officer Durbin observed Ms. Jenkins's deteriorating medical condition during transport to police headquarters but intentionally chose not to act. His inaction does not stem from unintentional circumstances, as established in the Castro case, where an officer's negligence due to unforeseen events was not considered a failure to protect. Despite being aware of Ms. Jenkins's signs of medical distress, including rapid and irregular breathing, intermittent consciousness, and pleas for help, he presumed she was faking her condition to avoid jail. The failure to summon medical care presented a substantial risk of serious harm to Ms. Jenkins, particularly as her condition worsened to the point where she could not sit, stand, or control her limbs upon arrival. Furthermore, the allegations suggest that Officer Durbin did not take reasonable measures to mitigate this risk, which any reasonable officer would have recognized. The evaluation of his actions is objective, indicating that his conduct was unreasonable given the clear signs of distress exhibited by Ms. Jenkins.
Any reasonable officer witnessing Ms. Jenkins's obvious medical distress would have recognized the need for immediate medical assistance. Officer Durbin's failure to summon care could only be deemed objectively reasonable if his belief that she was "faking" her condition was itself reasonable, which the allegations and video evidence suggest it was not. The body camera footage indicates that Ms. Jenkins's behavior did not imply she was feigning her condition, supporting the claim that Officer Durbin’s actions were objectively unreasonable. J.K.J. claims that there was a significant delay—28 minutes before Durbin called paramedics—during which Ms. Jenkins's injuries could have been prevented had he acted sooner. Consequently, J.K.J. has presented a plausible claim that Officer Durbin's actions violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Regarding qualified immunity, the majority opinion's assertion that it shields Officer Durbin is flawed since an officer cannot invoke qualified immunity for an unreasonable mistake of fact. J.K.J. has plausibly alleged that Durbin's belief about Ms. Jenkins's condition was unreasonable. The analysis of qualified immunity involves two steps: first, assessing whether the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, which has been established in this case; second, determining whether that right was clearly established at the time. Legal standards must be sufficiently clear so that a reasonably well-trained officer would recognize their conduct as unlawful. While officers can claim qualified immunity based on reasonable mistakes, this does not apply to unreasonable beliefs, as argued in J.K.J.'s claims against Officer Durbin.
Officer Durbin did not err in understanding the legal constraints governing police conduct during medical emergencies. Ms. Jenkins clearly displayed signs of a serious medical emergency, and it was well-established that a reasonable officer should summon immediate medical care in such situations. Officer Durbin's mistake lay in misjudging Ms. Jenkins's condition as feigned rather than recognizing it as genuine medical distress. This mistake of fact was unreasonable; the objective signs of her medical emergency, including vomiting, rapid breathing, and loss of control of limbs, should have alerted any reasonable officer to the situation's seriousness. Therefore, Officer Durbin cannot claim qualified immunity, as the law regarding his obligation to provide medical assistance was clearly established, and his failure to act violated Ms. Jenkins’s rights. The legitimacy of Officer Durbin's belief that Ms. Jenkins was faking her symptoms is irrelevant; the key issue is whether that belief was reasonable, which it was not. The court emphasized that the analysis does not hinge on the existence of analogous case law but rather on whether the officer acted within the bounds of established legal standards.
Excessive force and probable cause issues create uncertainty regarding the application of legal doctrines to specific factual situations faced by officers. In cases involving mistakes of fact, the critical inquiry is whether the officer's belief was reasonable, a determination reserved for the jury when factual disputes exist. The majority opinion incorrectly suggests that analogous cases are necessary for assessing the legality of an officer's mistaken belief regarding a situation. In reality, the key question is the reasonableness of the officer's mistake under the circumstances, which relies on common sense rather than legal precedent.
Officer Durbin's situation is mischaracterized as a mistake of law concerning his obligation to summon medical care for someone experiencing a non-obvious medical emergency. Evidence indicates that the signs of distress exhibited by Ms. Jenkins were obvious, and Officer Durbin's belief that she was "faking" her condition was incorrect. The resolution of whether his mistake was reasonable cannot occur at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Moreover, even if an analogous case were required, a precedent exists establishing that failing to provide care for clear signs of distress violates constitutional rights. The district court's dismissal of claims against Officer Durbin was erroneous, as J.K.J. sufficiently pleaded both a survival claim under the Fourth Amendment and a personal claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ignoring Ms. Jenkins's severe symptoms would have been recognized by any reasonable officer in November 2018 as a violation of her constitutional rights.
