State v. Wentz

Citation: Not availableDocket: 22-125

Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; August 2, 2022; North Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Rodney Randell Wentz appeals a trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the imposed sentence was inconsistent with his plea agreement. The case stems from multiple break-ins and thefts committed by Wentz and his daughter in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, leading to several indictments for various felonies, including breaking and entering and possession of stolen firearms. Wentz entered an Alford plea on September 5, 2019, agreeing to plead guilty to specific charges in exchange for the dismissal of others and a sentence in the presumptive range of 77 to 105 months. However, during sentencing, the trial court indicated it would not consolidate the offenses as outlined in the plea agreement, which led Wentz to seek to withdraw his plea based on his expectation of the sentence. The trial court rejected this motion, stating that the plea agreement did not support Wentz's understanding. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case and vacated the trial court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings.

The trial court ruled that if the judge imposes a sentence different from that in the negotiated plea agreement, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw their plea. Despite this, the court denied the defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him to 77 to 105 months for possession of a firearm by a felon, followed by 67 to 93 months for three breaking and entering convictions, giving the defendant 188 days of credit for time served. The defendant subsequently filed an oral notice of appeal.

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1444(e) and the precedent set in State v. Dickens, the defendant has a right to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his Alford plea. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence inconsistent with the plea agreement without allowing him to withdraw his plea. The court agrees, affirming that the trial court is obligated to adhere to statutory provisions that permit a defendant to withdraw their plea if the imposed sentence differs from the plea agreement, as outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1024. This statutory right emphasizes the contractual nature of plea agreements, which require strict adherence to ensure that the defendant receives the promised benefits, including the right to withdraw the plea when the sentence changes. The court reiterated that while a plea agreement is binding, it must be honored by the court, particularly when substantial promises are involved.

A trial court imposing a different sentence than that outlined in a plea agreement must inform the defendant of the change, advise them of their right to withdraw their plea, and allow for a continuance if they choose to withdraw. If the court fails to do so, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for re-sentencing. The precedent established in State v. Rhodes emphasizes the necessity of this procedure. The State argues that the trial court's sentence was consistent with the plea agreement, asserting that the agreement's language does not mandate the consolidation of offenses for sentencing. The State draws parallels to State v. Blount, where it was determined that the lack of an agreed-upon sentence between the defendant and the State meant the trial court had no sentence to reject. However, the plea agreement in this case includes a specific active sentence within the presumptive range of 77-105 months, which the defendant interpreted as a promise from the State in exchange for his Alford plea. This specificity in the plea agreement necessitates strict adherence to its terms, holding the State to a greater responsibility for any ambiguities. If the State fails to fulfill its promises, the defendant's constitutional rights are violated, warranting relief. Thus, the plea agreement clearly established an agreed-upon sentence that the trial court was obligated to either accept or reject.

The State argued that the plea agreement's wording indicated that consolidation of the Defendant's convictions was not guaranteed, thereby justifying the trial court's discretion in sentencing. However, ambiguities in the plea agreement should be interpreted against the State, as it drafted the agreement. The Defendant reasonably relied on the expectation of consolidated sentencing as part of the plea inducement. The trial court, while imposing a sentence of 77 to 105 months for one charge, also issued a consecutive sentence of 67 to 93 months for other convictions, which deviated from the plea agreement and its inducements.

Citing precedent, including State v. Carriker, the court noted that imposing a sentence beyond what was agreed upon in the plea agreement necessitates informing the Defendant of the right to withdraw the plea. The trial court failed to provide this information and denied the Defendant's request to withdraw the plea. The two separate sentences were found to be inconsistent with the original plea agreement, which was treated as a contractual arrangement. Consequently, the court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that the Defendant was no longer bound by the plea agreement due to the trial court's failure to adhere to statutory requirements regarding plea withdrawals.