Father, A.T., appealed a judgment from the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, which denied his motion for an extension and did not consider his late objections to a magistrate’s decision regarding the adoption of his minor child, A.J.T. The magistrate had determined that Father's consent was unnecessary for the adoption because he had not maintained contact with A.J.T. for over a year, as stipulated under R.C. 3107.07(A).
Stepfather, who is married to A.J.T.'s mother, B.W., filed the adoption petition claiming Father's consent was not required due to his lack of contact and failure to provide financial support. Father contested this, citing a domestic relations civil protection order that restricted his contact with Mother and A.J.T.
At a hearing, the magistrate concluded that Father's consent was not needed due to his failure to provide maintenance and support. The trial court adopted this decision shortly after, and Father subsequently filed objections and a motion for an extension of time to file those objections, claiming his attorney received the magistrate’s decision late.
Stepfather moved to strike Father’s objections, arguing they were untimely because the 14-day window for objections had passed. The trial court ultimately agreed, striking the objections and denying the extension request, leading to Father’s appeal. Father raised two assignments of error, one of which contended that the trial court was obligated to extend the time for objections under Civ.R. 53(D)(5).
Father's first assignment of error argues that the trial court improperly struck his objections to the magistrate's decision instead of granting his motion for an extension to file those objections. According to Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i), parties have fourteen days to file written objections after the magistrate’s decision is issued. Father relies on Civ.R. 53(D)(5), which mandates that the trial court "shall allow a reasonable extension of time for a party to file objections... for good cause shown."
For his appeal to succeed, Father must prove both good cause for the extension and that his request, made after the objection period expired and after the court had entered judgment, aligns with Civ. R. 53 and Ohio law. The court emphasizes that the burden is on the appellant to substantiate their arguments with factual and legal citations.
Father claims good cause based on the delayed receipt of the magistrate's decision by his attorney, which he equates to untimely service by the clerk. However, he fails to provide any legal authority to support this claim and does not dispute that the clerk mailed the decision in a timely manner per Civ. R. 5(B)(2)(c). Furthermore, Father does not explain why he could not have filed his preliminary objections within the seven days available after receiving the decision.
Additionally, Father’s request for an extension was denied because it was submitted six days past the fourteen-day window, which had already expired by the time the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision. Civ. R. 53(D)(4)(d) stipulates that the trial court must consider only timely objections, and Civ. R. 53(D)(4)(c) allows the court to adopt a magistrate's decision if no timely objections are filed, barring evident legal errors. Thus, Father has not established grounds for either a good cause extension or an error in the trial court's denial of his late request.
On September 13, 2021, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision regarding the adoption of A.J.T., concluding that Father's consent was unnecessary due to the lack of timely objections. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c) allowed this adoption as no objections were filed within the specified timeframe. Although Father sought to file objections on September 14, 2021, his request was deemed untimely since it was submitted after the objection period had ended and after the court had already entered its decision. Father's argument centered on his attorney's delayed notice of the magistrate's decision but failed to provide legal justification for extending the objection period post-expiration. Previous cases indicate that courts lack authority to grant extensions for late requests. Consequently, Father's first assignment of error was overruled.
In his second assignment of error, Father challenged the merits of the trial court’s September 13 decision but did not file a timely appeal within the required 30 days, rendering the court without jurisdiction to address this claim. His notice of appeal was filed 73 days after the decision. As a result, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, issued a special mandate for execution, and noted that costs would be taxed to the appellant. The judgment entry is to be filed and notified to the parties accordingly.
Father's first assignment of error is sustained due to the termination of his parental rights. His trial counsel filed a motion and objections one day after the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision, citing late receipt of the decision and lack of communication with Father as reasons for the delay. Although not labeled as a post-judgment motion, the trial court could interpret it as a motion to vacate under Civ.R. 60(B). This rule encourages liberal interpretation to balance the finality of litigation and the pursuit of justice. The trial court had the discretion to assess whether the delay constituted excusable neglect under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and whether the other conditions of the rule were met.
The Ohio Supreme Court recognizes that adoption leads to involuntary termination of parental rights and, while the Ohio Revised Code lacks provisions for appointed counsel in adoption cases, it mandates that parents contesting adoption or termination of rights be afforded counsel under equal protection principles. The Supreme Court has also emphasized that the language of R.C. 3107.07(A) should be construed to favor parental rights retention.
The majority's ruling leaves Father without a means to contest the magistrate’s determination regarding his consent to the adoption, as his counsel's late filing of objections eliminates procedural options to challenge the decision. Although Father had representation, he lacks avenues to address the late objections, pursue a delayed appeal, or claim ineffective assistance of counsel, raising concerns about the adequacy of due process protections in such cases. The only post-judgment remedy available is under Civ.R. 60(B), which the trial court should have considered to protect Father’s fundamental parental rights. The dissent emphasizes the inadequate protections afforded to Father in this situation.
