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Steve Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass, Gmbh
Citations: 359 F.3d 950; 9 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 711; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4347; 84 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,616Docket: 03-1382
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; March 8, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Steve Aubuchon filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Knauf Fiberglass, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). He appealed after the court granted summary judgment in favor of Knauf. Under the FMLA, employees are entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a spouse’s "serious health condition." The Act defines a "serious health condition" to include incapacities due to pregnancy and prenatal care. Employees must provide 30 days’ notice for foreseeable leave; if that’s not practicable, they must notify the employer as soon as possible. If notice is not given, the employer can deny the leave request regardless of whether a serious health condition exists. In this case, Aubuchon’s wife’s due date was August 19, 2000, but she experienced false labor shortly before delivering on September 2. Aubuchon informed his employer of his leave request on August 21, without mentioning any serious health condition or complications. The court found that simply being pregnant does not qualify as a "serious health condition" under FMLA regulations. Thus, Aubuchon did not meet the legal criteria for FMLA leave, leading to the dismissal of his case. An employee’s inability to report to work due to severe morning sickness during pregnancy is acknowledged as a valid reason for absence. However, wanting to stay home to support a pregnant spouse is not equivalent to caring for a spouse with a serious health condition under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The employee must provide timely notice to the employer regarding the serious health condition to justify the leave request. In the case of Aubuchon, although he submitted a doctor's note regarding his wife's complications after his FMLA request was denied, he failed to communicate these complications to his employer beforehand. His absence from work prior to the leave request exceeded the company's attendance policy limits, resulting in his termination. Although he was initially reinstated after a grievance by his union, he was later fired again for falsifying his employment application by not disclosing prior terminations due to absenteeism. The court emphasized that employees should not delay providing sufficient grounds for FMLA leave until after their requests are denied, as this undermines the notification requirement. Aubuchon argues that insufficient grounds for requesting FMLA leave indicate an employee's misunderstanding of the notice requirements. He contends that merely informing the employer of the need for leave due to his wife's complicated pregnancy should be adequate, without providing specific reasons. However, regulations indicate that an employee must provide enough information to trigger the employer's duty to assess the leave's FMLA coverage. Case law, including Collins, Stoops, Satterfield, and Gay v. Gilman Paper Co., supports that employees must communicate the basis for their FMLA leave request unless the employer is already aware of an FMLA-qualifying reason. Aubuchon's duty is to notify the employer of a probable basis for leave, not to establish a legal entitlement. A note from his wife's doctor indicating complications would have sufficed had it been presented before the leave request was processed. Knauf, the employer, did not deny Aubuchon's leave based on a lack of reasons but required him to complete a form specifying the medical condition, which he failed to do without justification. Regarding Aubuchon's claim of retaliatory firing under the FMLA, he admitted to falsifying his job application, a clear ground for discharge under company policy. There is no evidence that the discharge was motivated by retaliation for invoking FMLA rights or that the policy was enforced more stringently against employees with legal claims. Consequently, Aubuchon was not terminated for an improper reason. The court affirmed the decision.