Daniel P. Kiely v. Heartland Rehabilitation Services, Inc., and Health Care and Retirement Corporation, D/B/A Georgian Bloomfield
Docket: 02-2054
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; February 26, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Daniel P. Kiely v. Heartland Rehabilitation Services, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed a disability discrimination claim under Michigan law. The court evaluated whether Kiely's prior statements in a Social Security disability application, where he declared himself "disabled" and "unable to work," legally prevented him from demonstrating his capability to perform essential job functions. The court concluded that these statements were not necessarily inconsistent with his claim of job competency and that Kiely provided a satisfactory explanation for the apparent contradiction.
The district court had previously granted summary judgment for the defendants based on an estoppel theory, which the appellate court found unconvincing. Kiely, who suffers from severe vision impairment due to a degenerative eye disease and has been legally blind since the late 1970s, had worked effectively as a physical therapy assistant since his hiring in April 1995. Performance evaluations over the years rated his work as average to above average, indicating no significant issues related to his impairment.
However, in July 1998, concerns arose from a co-worker regarding Kiely's ability to perform safely, citing incidents of him colliding with people and objects and failing to notice key details about patients. Subsequently, Heartland terminated Kiely’s employment, citing safety concerns and previous accommodations made for his visual impairment. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, implying that Kiely's ability to perform his job merits further examination despite his disability claim.
Mr. Kiely, after receiving unemployment compensation for a year, applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), claiming disability effective July 7, 1998, and subsequently began receiving benefits in 1999. On May 17, 2001, he filed a disability discrimination lawsuit against Heartland in Michigan state court under the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act and Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Heartland removed to federal court. Heartland sought summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Kiely's SSDI application, where he declared himself "disabled," precluded him from claiming he could perform his job's essential functions. Mr. Kiely countered that his blindness qualified as a "listed" condition under the Social Security Act, entitling him to benefits regardless of his job capability.
The district court granted Heartland's summary judgment, ruling that Title VII does not cover disability discrimination and that Mr. Kiely failed to reconcile the conflict between his SSDI application and his claim. Mr. Kiely did not appeal the Title VII ruling but contested whether his SSDI statements barred his Michigan disability discrimination claim. The court noted that under Michigan law, SSDI declarations do not automatically prevent a disability discrimination claim; the definition of "disability" in the Social Security context does not imply a complete inability to work, especially considering possible accommodations. Furthermore, SSDI benefits can be awarded based on specific impairments regardless of an applicant's actual work capability. Thus, a declaration of disability is often a legal conclusion relevant to the Social Security Act rather than a factual assertion of inability to perform job functions.
A plaintiff alleging disability discrimination must address any contradictions arising from previous claims of disability, as established by case law. Under Michigan law, a plausible explanation is required to reconcile these contradictions to avoid summary judgment. In this context, Mr. Kiely argued that his SSDI application statements regarding his statutory blindness did not conflict with his ability to perform his job as a Physical Therapist Assistant (PTA). He referenced a Seventh Circuit ruling indicating that a finding of disability can coexist with a claim of being qualified for employment. Kiely contended that his SSDI application was based on legal blindness, not on an inability to work. This interpretation allows for the possibility that a reasonable juror could conclude his statements in the SSDI application were meant to assert entitlement to benefits rather than an inability to work. The application process often limits an applicant's ability to provide detailed explanations, which can affect the interpretation of their statements concerning their medical condition and work capability.
The case record does not clarify if Mr. Kiely’s application forms allowed him to indicate that a listed impairment, specifically legal blindness, rather than an inability to work, justified his eligibility for benefits. A reasonable juror could conclude that Kiely expected benefits based on his past experience with blindness and the degenerative nature of his condition, thus not needing to claim total disability. He explicitly stated in his deposition that he did not apply for benefits claiming to be totally disabled but rather due to blindness. The SSDI application’s declarations can be regarded as context-related legal conclusions, which do not negate the possibility that Kiely can perform his job's essential functions. The district court made an error in its contrary ruling.
Heartland argues for affirmation of the summary judgment based on Kiely’s inability to perform his job safely, but this was not evaluated by the district court. The court did not consider the entire record to identify genuine material fact issues regarding Kiely's claim. The judgment granting Heartland's summary judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Judge Ronald Lee Gilman concurs with the majority on Kiely’s ability to pursue his discrimination claim but dissents regarding the evaluation of the record for genuine material fact issues about his job performance. He asserts that even if the district court ruled against Kiely on the merits, the record suggests sufficient evidence to vacate the summary judgment. Heartland recognized Kiely’s statutory blindness when hiring him and rated his job performance positively. Kiely testified he could perform his job tasks without difficulty, indicating a genuine issue of material fact exists. Gilman argues that remanding for further evaluation would unnecessarily delay the trial and urges for a trial on the merits instead.
