United States v. Elliot Cartwright A/K/A Daryl Atkins Elliot Cartwright

Citations: 359 F.3d 281; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3904; 2004 WL 370015Docket: 03-1466

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; February 29, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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Elliot Cartwright appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, aiding and abetting cocaine distribution, and possession of a firearm related to drug trafficking. The core issue in the appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Cartwright knew he was involved in a drug transaction. The court found that the evidence presented at trial did not support an inference of Cartwright's knowledge of participating in a controlled substance transaction, which is necessary for such convictions. Consequently, the judgment was reversed. 

The case's background includes a drug dealer, Prince Muhammed El, who coordinated a controlled cocaine purchase with law enforcement. El, using a text messaging device, arranged to buy three kilograms of cocaine for $90,000. The location for the transaction was moved to a shopping center parking lot after initial discussions. Prior to the sale, El, accompanied by an undercover agent posing as his bodyguard, met with Rashine Ellis, who was involved in the transaction. The operation was under surveillance when Ellis contacted her supplier, Osiris Jackson, and law enforcement observed Jackson approaching Ellis's vehicle as part of the ongoing drug deal.

Muhammed El indicated to Jackson that he had the money for a drug deal, and Jackson confirmed he had cocaine, prompting Ellis to declare the deal was acceptable. Jackson exited the SUV and moved through a breezeway to an unsupervised rear parking lot. He returned carrying a shopping bag labeled "Mr. Denim" and was seen conversing with Defendant Elliot Cartwright. After parting ways, Jackson entered the SUV, drew a loaded firearm from his waistband, and displayed three bricks of cocaine to El, who then signaled law enforcement. Agents seized Jackson’s firearm, the shopping bag with cocaine, a text messaging device, and car keys linked to a vehicle registered to Jackson's father. Meanwhile, Agent Bellis observed Cartwright quickly enter the Foot Locker after Jackson entered the SUV. Agents apprehended Cartwright inside the store, recovering a loaded firearm, a cell phone, and cash. Expert testimony indicated the use of lookouts in drug deals, while the defense presented a store manager who described Cartwright's benign behavior in the store. Cartwright's motions for acquittal were denied, and he was convicted on all counts, receiving a 140-month prison sentence, supervised release, a fine, and a special assessment. Cartwright subsequently filed an appeal.

The District Court had jurisdiction over Cartwright's case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 due to charges related to U.S. law, and the appellate court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the District Court's judgment was a final decision. Cartwright contested the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, asserting that the government did not establish he was a "lookout" for Osiris Jackson and that the evidence was consistent with his innocence. Alternatively, he argued that even if a lookout inference was valid, the government failed to prove he knew the transaction involved a controlled substance.

In reviewing the evidence, a "particularly deferential" standard was applied, requiring that the verdict be sustained if there was substantial evidence. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence indicating Cartwright acted as a lookout and was aware of his involvement in an illicit transaction. Key evidence included a conversation between Cartwright and Jackson, Cartwright's position near a Foot Locker while armed, and both possessing two-way messaging devices. Expert testimony indicated that lookouts are typical in drug transactions.

However, the court noted that merely acting as a lookout does not suffice for a conspiracy or aiding and abetting conviction related to drug distribution. While the evidence indicated Cartwright knew he was participating in an illegal transaction, it was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware the transaction involved drugs.

The elements of conspiracy can be established through circumstantial evidence, but each must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A key element is the alleged conspirators' 'unity of purpose,' indicating a joint intent to pursue a common illegal goal. For a conspiracy conviction, the government must demonstrate that the defendant entered into an agreement with knowledge of its specific unlawful objective. Even if a defendant is aware of engaging in illicit activities, the government must still prove that the defendant knew the particular illegal aim of the conspiracy. The court has previously overturned conspiracy convictions related to drug possession and distribution due to insufficient evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the drugs involved.

Similarly, aiding and abetting convictions require proof that the defendant was aware of the commission of the substantive offense and intended to facilitate it. Aiding and abetting necessitates that the defendant had knowledge of the criminal activity and purposefully aimed to assist in its execution. The court has ruled that a conviction cannot stand where the government fails to establish that the defendant knew about the drugs or intended to aid in their distribution.

In the case at hand, the crucial question is whether there was sufficient evidence that Cartwright knew the transaction involved a controlled substance. The government did not provide direct evidence of Cartwright's knowledge of a drug transaction. While inferences from established facts can serve as proof in the absence of direct evidence, they must logically connect to the conclusion drawn; mere speculation is insufficient for upholding a conviction.

A conspiracy involving Rashine Ellis and Osiris Jackson to distribute cocaine is evident, and an actual distribution occurred. However, the government’s evidence connecting Cartwright to the drug distribution is insufficient. The facts presented include Cartwright being in proximity to Jackson when he was carrying cocaine, their interaction, Cartwright having a firearm, cash, and a two-way text messaging device, and not possessing vehicle keys. There is no logical connection between these facts and the inference of Cartwright's knowledge of drug distribution, as the inference relies solely on speculation regarding his prior relationship with Jackson and his activities before their sighting, for which no evidence exists.

The court's conclusion aligns with precedents set in Thomas and Idowu. In Thomas, although the defendant was involved in a drug transaction and had suspicious items, the evidence did not definitively prove knowledge of the cocaine's presence, leading to a reversal of his conspiracy conviction. Similarly, in Idowu, while the defendant was present during a drug negotiation and handled a substantial amount of cash, the terminology used during the interaction did not clearly indicate an understanding of drug involvement. Thus, both cases highlight that mere presence and circumstantial evidence are insufficient to prove knowledge of drug-related activities.

Khaliq informed Idowu that he needed to take a bag containing personal documents. After retrieving a brown leather bag, Khaliq removed a black suitcase from his car, which was designed to conceal heroin. Idowu opened the suitcase and found it empty, prompting Ajao to instruct him to press it, while Khaliq claimed something was hidden within its frame. Subsequently, both Idowu and Ajao were arrested by DEA agents. The analysis concluded that Idowu had a prior relationship with Ajao and was aware of an illicit transaction; however, there was insufficient evidence to prove that he knew drugs were involved, thereby preventing the jury from inferring his knowledge based solely on Ajao's comfort in discussing the transaction in his presence. The document also referenced that individuals in clandestine operations often keep their associates uninformed to avoid implicating each other.

In comparison to previous cases, such as Thomas, where possession of items like firearms and communication devices did not suffice to infer knowledge of drug transactions, the situation with Idowu and Ajao similarly lacked direct evidence of knowledge. The government acknowledged that precedents did not support its inferences regarding Cartwright’s knowledge, suggesting reliance on United States v. Iafelice instead. In Iafelice, the defendant was seen in a suspicious manner while driving with conspirators, and a bag containing heroin was found in the trunk, alongside communication evidence indicating involvement in a drug transaction.

The evidence indicated that Iafelice had knowledge of the heroin in the camera bag, primarily based on his ownership and operation of the vehicle used for transport. The court determined that a reasonable jury could infer Iafelice's constructive possession and awareness of the drug transaction due to common sense principles regarding vehicle ownership. The government attempted to apply a similar rationale to Cartwright's involvement, suggesting a series of inferences based on his presence during the transaction and his role as a lookout. However, the court found these inferences speculative and unsupported by concrete evidence, noting that there was no surveillance of the rear parking lot, and no evidence of Cartwright's possession or any direct connection to the cocaine. The lack of physical evidence, such as fingerprints, communication records, or a prior relationship with Jackson, further undermined the government's claims, making it unreasonable to conclude that Cartwright had actual or constructive possession of the cocaine. The court emphasized that convictions cannot be based on conjecture.

The government's argument was deemed speculative and lacking a logical connection to established facts, leading to the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support Cartwright's conviction for conspiring to distribute or aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine. Additionally, since a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires evidence of engagement in a drug trafficking crime, Cartwright's conviction on that count was also found to be based on insufficient evidence. Consequently, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and instructions are given to enter a judgment of acquittal. In dissent, Circuit Judge Nygaard argues that the totality of evidence supports the inference that Cartwright was aware of his involvement in a drug transaction, citing his proximity to the drugs, a significant conversation with Jackson (who possessed the drugs), and his lookout position during the drug transaction. Nygaard believes this sequence establishes a logical connection justifying the conviction and would affirm the District Court's judgment.