Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 10, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Oscar Acosta Delgado appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The case originated from a search warrant executed on January 15, 2002, at Jeffrey Shauers' residence, where law enforcement seized significant amounts of drugs and cash. Following his arrest, Shauers cooperated with authorities, revealing that he had sold approximately 25 to 30 pounds of methamphetamine over the past eight months, primarily sourced from Delgado, identified as "Jose," and his associate Juan Vasquez-Santiago, known as "Pedichinny."
During the trial, Shauers testified about multiple drug transactions with Delgado and Vasquez-Santiago, discussing their dealings openly and using drugs together. On January 16, under police supervision, Shauers made recorded calls to Vasquez-Santiago regarding drug supplies, during which Vasquez-Santiago mentioned needing to check with Delgado about quantities. This led to a scheduled drug deal at Shauers' home, where law enforcement set up video surveillance.
Delgado arrived at the scene in a blue Chevy Blazer, initially passing the driveway before turning around. He was seen standing by the vehicle while Vasquez-Santiago entered Shauers' garage. After a brief interaction, Delgado approached the garage, retrieved a tightly wrapped Wal-Mart bag from the Blazer, and was arrested shortly thereafter. Police found evidence linking Delgado to the drug transactions, including a vehicle registration in his name, electrical tape in the car, and indications of a concealed compartment that emitted chemical odors.
Vasquez-Santiago testified that he coincidentally encountered Delgado in a store on January 16, after his car broke down. He requested to borrow Delgado's car, which Delgado permitted. Vasquez-Santiago then used the vehicle to pick up drugs from a third party, hiding them in a hidden compartment. He later met Delgado again and asked for a ride to a friend's house, which Delgado agreed to without knowledge of the drugs involved. Delgado corroborated Vasquez-Santiago's account, stating he had no prior plan to meet him and was unaware of the bag's contents, only handing it to Vasquez-Santiago when asked. Although Delgado admitted to suspecting wrongdoing at Shauers' residence, he maintained he had never participated in drug transactions and had only met Shauers that night.
Vasquez-Santiago pled guilty, while Delgado was tried for possession and conspiracy. After two days, the jury found him guilty on both counts, leading to this appeal. Delgado challenges the district court's jury instruction defining "knowingly," arguing it improperly relieved the Government of its obligation to prove he knew his actions were unlawful. As Delgado did not object to the jury instructions, the review is for plain error, which requires identification of an error, its clear nature, its impact on substantial rights, and whether it significantly undermines the judicial proceedings' integrity.
Delgado was charged with violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. To secure a conviction under § 841(a)(1), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Delgado knowingly possessed an illegal drug with the intent to distribute it. Possession can be actual or constructive, where constructive possession involves the ability to control the narcotics or participation in a joint venture to possess them.
Additionally, a defendant can be convicted for aiding and abetting another in committing a crime if the Government proves four elements: (1) specific intent to facilitate the crime, (2) intent for the underlying offense, (3) assistance in the commission of the offense, and (4) that the underlying offense was committed. Aiding and abetting requires showing intentional assistance to the illegal purpose.
Under § 846, an individual who attempts or conspires to commit an offense is subject to the same penalties as if they had committed the offense. A conspiracy is defined as an agreement to achieve an illegal objective, including overt acts in furtherance of that goal. Evidence of even slight connections to a conspiracy can suffice for a conviction.
At the end of Delgado's trial, the district court provided jury instructions, including a challenge to Instruction Number 9, which defined "knowingly." The instruction indicated that an act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of it, without needing to prove knowledge of its unlawfulness, allowing the jury to consider all evidence in determining whether Delgado acted knowingly.
Model Instruction 5.6 clarifies that a specific emphasized sentence should not be given if an offense element requires the government to prove the defendant knew their actions were unlawful. In the context of the Lacey Act, defendants must know that importing wildlife is illegal, while the money laundering statute requires knowledge that transactions involve criminally derived property, but not that money laundering itself is illegal. This forms the basis of Delgado's error claim.
The jury received detailed instructions on the conspiracy charge, requiring proof of an agreement to commit possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, with Delgado needing to know of at least one objective of the conspiracy. For possession with intent to distribute, the court instructed that the government must prove Delgado knowingly possessed methamphetamine, without needing to establish that he knew the substance specifically was methamphetamine, only that it was a prohibited drug. Additionally, Delgado could be found guilty if he aided and abetted the commission of the offense.
Delgado contends that the charged crimes require proof that he knew his actions were unlawful and that Instruction Number 9 improperly relieved the government of this burden, violating the Due Process Clause. He argues that to secure a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the government must demonstrate his awareness of possessing a controlled substance, a claim he believes conflicts with the emphasized text in Instruction Number 9. This issue was previously addressed in United States v. Cain, where it was determined that knowledge of distributing an illegal substance sufficed for conviction without needing to establish knowledge of the specific substance.
The court provided an ignorance-of-the-law instruction, clarifying that the government does not need to prove the defendant's awareness of the illegality of his actions, only that he knew he possessed controlled substances. This principle was affirmed in the case of Delgado, where it was established that while he needed to be aware he was assisting in a criminal act, he did not have to recognize that this assistance constituted a crime. The court also addressed Delgado's argument regarding conspiracy, stating that he needed to know at least one objective of the conspiracy involved illegal activity but did not need to understand that making the agreement itself was unlawful. The court concluded that the instructions given were correct and free from error.
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, Delgado asserted that there was not enough evidence to support his convictions. Since he did not move for acquittal during the trial, the review standard was deferential, requiring reversal only for plain error or manifest injustice. The court emphasized that the evidence must be viewed favorably for the prosecution, and that a rational jury could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If there were both innocent and wrongful interpretations of Delgado's behavior, it was the government's responsibility to provide evidence supporting the latter. Lastly, witness credibility was deemed a jury issue and not subject to appellate review.
Vasquez-Santiago and Delgado denied Delgado's involvement in drug transactions, but Shauers contradicted their claims, testifying that he identified Delgado as "Jose" and had engaged in multiple drug deals with both men. He recounted paying $5,500 per pound for at least two pounds each time and stated that discussions about drugs frequently included Delgado, who actively participated in negotiations. A specific transaction was described where Delgado drove to a logging road, instructed Vasquez-Santiago on where to go, and facilitated the retrieval of drugs. Shauers also mentioned occasions where they used drugs together. The jury had to determine the credibility of witnesses, and their conviction suggests they favored Shauers' testimony over that of Delgado and Vasquez-Santiago.
Delgado referenced several cases where convictions were overturned due to insufficient evidence, arguing that his situation was similar. However, the evidence against him was deemed significantly stronger than in those cases. For instance, in Bautista-Avila, the evidence was largely circumstantial and failed to demonstrate direct involvement in drug transactions. In Lopez, while the defendant was near a drug sale, there was no evidence of past participation in drug activities. The court concluded that unlike these cases, the government provided ample direct evidence against Delgado, primarily through Shauers' testimony, countering Delgado’s claim of being an uninvolved bystander.
Evidence presented at trial supported a jury's conclusion that Delgado and Vasquez-Santiago conspired to conduct a drug transaction on January 16, with Delgado having dominion and control over the drugs involved. Testimony from Shauers indicated prior drug dealings involving Delgado, reinforcing the existence of a conspiracy. This undermined Delgado's assertion of lacking control over the drugs during the transaction. The jury could reasonably infer Delgado's authority based on past behavior as testified by Shauers.
During the trial, the Government introduced audio recordings of phone calls between Shauers and Vasquez-Santiago, along with a video of the drug transaction. Transcripts of these recordings were provided to assist jurors in understanding the audio, but the court emphasized that only the recordings constituted evidence. Delgado argued against the admission of the transcripts and their access during deliberations, yet the court did not admit them into evidence nor permit jury access at that stage. Instead, the judge instructed that any further listening to the recordings must occur in court with all parties present, confirming that the jury's requests for transcripts were not granted.
Transcripts can be utilized as listening aids during tape recording reviews, subject to an abuse of discretion standard. The court must ensure the transcripts' accuracy through several measures: verifying the transcript, allowing defense counsel to dispute inaccuracies, instructing the jury that the tape is the primary evidence, and permitting the jury to compare the transcript with the tape. In this case, the court did not verify the transcripts but allowed the defense to argue inaccuracies, instructed the jury accordingly, and the federal agent testified to the transcripts' accuracy. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the transcripts.
Regarding sentencing, Delgado argued that the district court erred by imposing a high-end sentence without providing the required reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Although the Government cited a "Statement of Reasons" that was later struck from the record, the court provided no other justifications for the 188-month sentence. Under § 3553(c), the court must state reasons for the specific sentence in open court, discussing factors such as the defendant's background and conduct. Prior cases established that generic justifications are insufficient.
The district court failed to articulate reasons for Delgado's sentence, prompting the conclusion to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing with explicit consideration of the required factors. Despite this, Delgado's conviction was affirmed as there were no reversible errors during the trial, supported by substantial evidence.
