James W. Wilson v. Jon E. Ozmint, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections (Ca-02-2030-0-10bd) Henry Dargan McMaster Attorney General, State of South Carolina
Docket: 03-3
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; February 16, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
A motion by petitioner-appellee James W. Wilson for leave to file a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which also dismissed the petition as untimely. The court amended Part VI of its previous opinion dated December 17, 2003, acknowledging that Wilson had been precluded from raising claims related to a report from the Quality Care Review Board (QCRB) in federal court due to procedural barring or failure to exhaust those claims in state court.
Wilson argued that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s order allowing him to defer his claims authorized their pursuit in post-conviction relief, a point he inadequately presented in his earlier brief and did not address during oral arguments. The court found that the deferral allowed Wilson to raise claims later before the state Supreme Court, but did not permit him to present them in post-conviction relief proceedings.
In his rehearing petition, Wilson elaborated on the argument that the state post-conviction relief (PCR) court erred in its procedural default findings, citing his original motion to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which had not been referenced in the prior opinions. The court acknowledged this new information, which highlighted that Wilson's motion sought not just review of reports and testimony but also to defer certain issues to later collateral proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedures Act. Consequently, the court amended its opinion to better reflect the specific requests made in Wilson’s motion, indicating a shift in their analysis regarding the impact of Wilson’s procedural default on the review of his federal claims.
The court has not yet issued its mandate, allowing for amendments to prior decisions without the need for 'grave, unforeseen contingencies' typically required for recalling an issued mandate. After reviewing the motion and arguments, it was determined that Wilson is not barred from raising claims in federal court, but he is barred from challenging the trial court's in camera review of the QCRB report due to having defaulted that claim in state court. Wilson's counsel had invited the review, leading to the trial court quashing his subpoena for the report. The state PCR court's decision to affirm this quashing was found not 'objectively unreasonable' under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and was considered harmless under the Brecht standard. Consequently, the previous judgment is affirmed, vacating the district court's habeas corpus grant, with amendments made to Part VI of the panel opinion. The QCRB report, which investigated Wilson's treatment in the South Carolina mental health system following a shooting spree, was deemed irrelevant by the state trial court after an in camera review, a conclusion supported by Wilson's counsel. Wilson's subsequent attempts to raise claims regarding the QCRB report in the state PCR court were rejected as they could not be presented in post-conviction relief proceedings, given that they could have been addressed in earlier stages.
Wilson is barred from challenging the trial court's in camera review of the QCRB report due to his counsel's invitation for the court to take such action. The state PCR court affirmed the trial court's decision to quash the subpoena, stating it lacked exculpatory or mitigating evidence not already disclosed. Additionally, the PCR court found that the trial judge did not improperly consider the QCRB report when sentencing Wilson, indicating the sealed document was not used for either the acceptance of Wilson's guilty plea or the sentence imposed. The appellate panel initially held that Wilson's claims were procedurally defaulted or unexhausted under 28 U.S.C. 2254(b). However, upon reconsideration, they noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court had granted Wilson’s motion to defer consideration of these issues to post-conviction proceedings, which complicates the application of the procedural rule barring his claims. They concluded that the unique circumstances of Wilson's case indicate that the procedural ground cited by the state PCR court, while generally sound, is inadequate to preclude federal review. Nevertheless, Wilson cannot obtain relief on his claim regarding the QCRB report because he invited the trial court's review of it.
Under South Carolina law, failing to object during lower court proceedings waives the ability to present those issues on appeal or in post-conviction, unless there is an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. The doctrine of invited error further exacerbates this waiver, as established in State v. Robinson, which states that counsel cannot complain about issues they both failed to object to and actively solicited. This long-standing procedural rule has been consistently applied in South Carolina and the Fourth Circuit. Consequently, this serves as a valid basis for the state PCR court to reject Wilson's claim.
Wilson's request for the South Carolina Supreme Court to defer consideration of his claim did not rectify the waiver’s preclusive effect. As a result, the district court's grant of relief on Wilson's claim is vacated. Furthermore, the rejection of Wilson's claim regarding the unconstitutional quashing of his subpoena for the QCRB report is reviewed on its merits. The court clarifies that a writ of habeas corpus can only be granted if the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, or if it was based on an unreasonable factual determination.
The state PCR court's decision was not contrary to federal law, despite not citing federal cases, because it did not contradict the principles established in those precedents. The court properly determined that the QCRB report did not contain exculpatory or mitigating evidence beyond what was already disclosed. Wilson's argument about inadequate communication between institutions regarding his care was deemed insufficient, as the report only documented two minor instances of miscommunication.
In May 1983, the Probate Court initiated Wilson's emergency admission to the South Carolina State Hospital due to suicidal and homicidal remarks, but his certifying psychiatrist redirected him to Self Memorial for private psychiatric care. The Beckman Center, where Wilson did not receive treatment until June 1986, was unaware of this change until revealed by the QCRB's investigation. The state PCR court found that these miscommunications did not constitute mitigating evidence, reasoning that they indicated a lack of perfect monitoring rather than any mistreatment or mismanagement by the state, and there was no evidence that Wilson was deprived of necessary care or that these incidents affected his treatment.
The QCRB report noted a lack of documentation showing that Wilson's family participated in his counseling or treatment, which the state PCR court acknowledged as potentially mitigating but concluded did not prevent Wilson from presenting this information to the sentencing court. The court asserted that the defense had access to the QCRB materials, suggesting that Wilson could have summarized the evidence similarly. The court determined that the absence of the QCRB's conclusions did not have a substantial impact on the sentencing decision.
While the QCRB's findings might carry more weight than Wilson's expert testimony, the state PCR court deemed it reasonable that, in this case, the evidence was equally accessible. Even if the state court's conclusion was questionable, Wilson's inability to present this mitigating information did not significantly influence the death sentence outcome. The evidence regarding Wilson's family involvement in his treatment was complex, and despite their limited participation at the Beckman Center, testimony indicated they remained concerned for his well-being. Weighing this against Wilson's severe mental illness and history of abuse, alongside the gravity of his crimes, it was unlikely that family involvement would have substantially affected the sentencing decision. Consequently, the state PCR court's conclusions were deemed not objectively unreasonable, and any potential error was considered harmless under Brecht.
