Thibodeaux v. Asbestos Corp.

Citations: 976 So. 2d 859; 2007 La.App. 4 Cir. 0617; 2008 La. App. LEXIS 253; 2008 WL 484054Docket: No. 2007-CA-0617

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; February 19, 2008; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, dismissing the claims brought by Marie Thibodeaux and her husband, Ken Thibodeaux, regarding Marie’s asbestos-related illness, mesothelioma, which they alleged was caused by exposure to asbestos from various sources, including her husband’s and father’s work clothing. The lawsuit, filed on December 11, 2002, named a total of eighteen defendants, including employers, premises owners, manufacturers, and insurers associated with asbestos products. The Thibodeauxs claimed exposure occurred at multiple locations, including Charity Hospital and Lallie Kemp Hospital, where Eagle Asbestos Packing Company and its insurer, OneBeacon America Insurance Company, were implicated as sellers and installers of asbestos products. 

Eagle and OneBeacon sought summary judgment on the basis that the Thibodeauxs could not prove that Eagle provided or used asbestos at the relevant sites or that Mrs. Thibodeaux’s exposure to their products was a significant factor in her illness. In response, the Thibodeauxs argued they had presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. The district court instructed the plaintiffs to supplement their evidence but, on May 4, 2005, the Thibodeauxs indicated they would not submit additional evidence, asserting that the necessary evidence was already on record.

On May 16, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Eagle and OneBeacon, concluding that the Thibodeauxs failed to provide evidence proving that Marie Thibodeaux was exposed to asbestos-containing materials linked to Eagle, Inc. Following this decision, the Thibodeauxs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment and requested a remand for a trial on the merits. The appellate court conducts a de novo review of summary judgments, applying the same standards as the trial court, which requires a demonstration that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court emphasizes that summary judgments are favored, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the opposing party. The trial court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence during this process. The Thibodeauxs contend that they did present evidence showing potential exposure to Eagle's asbestos products and assert that Eagle and OneBeacon did not adequately counter the recognized link between asbestos exposure and mesothelioma. However, the appellate court finds the Thibodeauxs' reliance on the Torrejon case unpersuasive, as it involved different circumstances that do not support their claims.

The Court upheld the district court's ruling that the mariner's asbestos exposure caused his mesothelioma but clarified that the standard for causation in asbestos cases under the Jones Act differs from other torts. In Torrejon, it was emphasized that simply demonstrating "any" exposure is insufficient for causation claims related to asbestos. The appellants referenced Grant v. American Sugar Refining, Inc. to argue their case regarding sufficient exposure to Eagle’s asbestos products. In Grant, a plaintiff claimed mesothelioma due to asbestos exposure from his father's work clothes, leading to a lawsuit against Eagle, which had supplied asbestos-containing materials. The district court granted summary judgment to Eagle, but upon appeal, the Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's exposure, prompting the reversal of the summary judgment. The Court highlighted the necessity for plaintiffs in asbestos cases to prove exposure to the defendant's products and acknowledged evidence including employment records and a detailed Receiving Report from Amstar Corp. that documented Eagle's involvement in insulation work at the refinery, creating a genuine issue of material fact about the plaintiff's exposure to asbestos.

Eagle argues that the Receiving Report fails to prove William Grant’s exposure to asbestos since it mentions “insulation” without explicitly referencing asbestos. However, circumstantial evidence suggests a genuine issue of material fact regarding Grant's exposure to asbestos-containing products. Eagle has not presented evidence to negate the possibility of exposure and has not denied that asbestos-containing materials were present at Domino Sugar Refinery.

Key testimonies support the plaintiff's claims. Fred Schuber, Eagle's President, identified Leo Santana, who confirmed that Eagle had contracts with Domino Sugar and utilized asbestos-containing Garlock sheet gaskets. Santana also stated that Eagle performed insulation work at the refinery during the 1940s to 1960s. 

James Donald Roussel, an engineer at the refinery, testified that Eagle was the only contractor performing insulation work, recalling that they conducted 90% of such work at the facility. Kenneth Joseph Dufour, who worked at the refinery from 1965 to 2001, also affirmed that Eagle was the sole contractor for insulation work and testified to the presence of asbestos throughout his employment, including Eagle's involvement in stenciling pipes and removing asbestos from the Pan House.

Pete Maraia, a staff engineer, noted that Eagle inspected insulation as necessary and marked asbestos presence on the insulation. Additionally, the plaintiff stated he washed his father's work clothes while employed at the refinery, supporting the connection to asbestos exposure.

The court distinguishes this case from the precedent set in Grant, where detailed employment records directly linked the plaintiff's father to the sugar refinery and Eagle's activities, highlighting the stronger evidentiary foundation in the current case.

Mr. Grant's allegations are supported by multiple affidavits confirming that Eagle had contracts with the sugar refinery and conducted significant insulation work using asbestos-containing materials, including stenciling pipes to indicate asbestos presence. In his deposition, Mr. Grant testified to washing his father's work clothes from the refinery. However, Eagle and OneBeacon argue that the Thibodeauxs failed to provide adequate evidence linking Mrs. Thibodeaux’s asbestos exposure to Eagle’s products at Charity Hospital, noting that the strongest evidence was a mere suggestion of possible product use between 1959 and 1984. They highlight a lack of evidence for product supply during the specific years when Mrs. Thibodeaux worked there (1963-1966), and assert there is no proof of her actual exposure to any Eagle-supplied products. They reference the case Vodanovich v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc., where summary judgment was granted due to insufficient evidence connecting a longshoreman's asbestos exposure to the defendants' actions. The court emphasized that a plaintiff must demonstrate a causal link between exposure to a defendant's products and the resulting injury, adhering to traditional tort liability theories, which require proof of causation. Asbestos cases often involve multiple defendants and are analyzed under concurrent causation principles, recognizing that several parties may contribute substantially to a plaintiff's harm.

The Thibodeauxs presented insufficient evidence to support their claim of asbestos exposure from Eagle at Charity Hospital between 1959 and 1984. They did not demonstrate that Mrs. Thibodeaux was exposed to asbestos-containing products from Eagle during her employment, which lasted from 1963 to 1966. Witness Mr. Charles Cline, an insulator at the hospital, confirmed that multiple suppliers, including Eagle, provided insulation materials but could not specify any orders from Eagle within the relevant timeframe. He recalled only one contract with Eagle occurring long after Mrs. Thibodeaux's employment, during which Eagle did not use asbestos. 

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants due to the lack of evidence linking Mrs. Thibodeaux's exposure to Eagle’s products. The court had allowed the plaintiffs additional time to submit a memorandum to establish this connection, but the Thibodeauxs did not comply. According to Louisiana law, plaintiffs must prove that a defendant's asbestos-containing product significantly contributed to their alleged disease, and mere presence of such material is insufficient for liability. The court found that the defendants had adequately shown a lack of factual support for the Thibodeauxs' claims, affirming the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Eagle, Inc., and OneBeacon. The court also noted the jurisdictional aspects of the case, affirming that the district court had concurrent jurisdiction with maritime claims.