William Lincoln, Jr. v. Reksten Management, and New Orleans Cold Storage Green Tundra, Her Engines, Appurtenances, Cargo, Apparel, Electronics, Etc., in Rem
Docket: 99-1681
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; December 28, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
William Lincoln, Jr. appeals the district court's summary judgment favoring Reksten Management A.S. following an injury he sustained while loading the M/V GREEN TUNDRA with frozen chicken. Lincoln's negligence claim, filed under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, asserts that Reksten breached its turnover duty and owed him, as a third-party beneficiary of the charter party contract, a heightened duty to supervise and inspect the stevedore's activities. The district court's decision was based on Lincoln's employment with Stevens Shipping and Terminal Company, which was contracted to load the ship under a charter agreement stipulating that Reksten would provide a suitable vessel.
During the loading operation, Lincoln was injured on deck B of the ship, which had wooden boards that could allow objects to fall to the lower deck if broken. Prior to the loading, the ship's crew had prepared the holds by cooling them and conducting inspections for safety. The court affirmed part of the district court's decision but vacated other aspects and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Evidence regarding whether the ship's condition or Lincoln's accident was reported prior to the filing of Lincoln's lawsuit is conflicting. On July 22, 1996, Lincoln fell through deck boards while on deck B, resulting in injuries to his wrist, back, neck, and knee. Fellow longshoremen assisted him, and he subsequently reported the incident to Lawrence Mixson, a stevedore, who claimed to have notified the vessel and advised Lincoln to seek medical attention. Two accident reports were completed by safety director David LeBlanc, one dated July 29, 1996, and the other undated.
Lincoln filed a suit against Reksten on March 11, 1998, under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), allowing injured parties to sue vessels for negligence. Reksten moved for summary judgment, asserting it had not breached its duties to Lincoln. The district court granted this motion, concluding that Lincoln did not provide sufficient evidence of a breach of the turnover duty and that Reksten was not obligated to supervise or inspect the hold under OSHA regulations or its contract with Hudson Foods. Lincoln appealed, arguing that material issues of fact existed regarding Reksten's breach of duty and that he was a third-party beneficiary of a heightened duty of care under the charter party contract.
The court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo, allowing it only if the facts favor the non-moving party. Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), Congress established a cause of action for negligence against shipowners while leaving the definition of their duties to the courts. The Supreme Court in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos outlined three key duties owed by shipowners to longshoremen: the turnover duty, the duty of reasonable care during stevedoring operations, and the duty to intervene in cargo operations. The appeal primarily focuses on whether Reksten failed to fulfill its turnover duty to Lincoln.
The turnover duty for shipowners comprises two main components. First, shipowners must ensure that the ship's gear, equipment, tools, and workspace are maintained in a condition that allows experienced stevedores to conduct cargo operations safely. This requires exercising ordinary care to prevent hazards. Second, they are obligated to warn stevedores of any latent hazards known or should be known to them, which could pose risks during cargo operations. The duty to warn applies specifically to latent hazards, where the shipowner must inspect to discover such risks if they exercise reasonable care. If a defect is obvious, the shipowner is not liable for failing to warn.
In the case at hand, evidence suggests that a hole in the deck, through which an individual named Lincoln fell, was a latent defect not known to either Lincoln or the stevedore. The shipowner, Reksten, breached the duty to warn by not adequately inspecting the ship or informing the stevedore of the hazardous condition. To avoid summary judgment, Lincoln must demonstrate that the defect was latent, that the shipowner knew or should have known of it, and that the duty to warn was breached. The description of the hole indicates it was significantly larger than expected, and testimony from Captain Helgesen highlighted neglect in the ship's maintenance, including unaddressed rot and damage. This lack of reasonable care in upkeep contributed to the hazardous condition of the deck, which should have been inspected before freezing conditions compromised its integrity.
Lawrence Mixson, a stevedore employee overseeing the ship's loading, testified that a reduced crew size hindered regular maintenance and inspection of the ship's holds, leading to difficulties in managing damage. He reported an accident involving an individual named Lincoln but did not receive any response regarding it. A longshoreman mentioned that the hole Lincoln fell into was later concealed with boxes. Although the facts can be interpreted favorably for Lincoln, he is not responsible for addressing inconsistencies in the record; the burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment. An affidavit from Captain Tipnis, a marine surveyor, argued that expecting the crew to perform detailed inspections was impractical, while the ship's bosun claimed all necessary repairs were completed before loading, despite not recalling specifics.
The evidence suggests that the vessel may have been negligent in its maintenance and inspection duties, potentially allowing a defect to exist that could have been discovered. Consequently, the district court's summary judgment in favor of the vessel must be overturned. Lincoln also contends that the district court incorrectly determined that charter party provisions did not benefit him, which would impose additional responsibilities beyond those defined in Scindia Steam. The provisions he cites indicate that the vessel's holds should be clean and fit for cargo and that gratings should be suitable for forklifts. Lincoln's argument asserts that the presence of a hole in the grating contradicts the requirements of being fully fitted and in a condition suitable for loading. Additionally, a precedent from Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc. established that a longshoreman is not considered a third-party beneficiary of a charter party agreement, as it does not create contractual obligations toward them.
In Spence v. Mariehamns R/S, the court ruled that a longshoreman injured due to the stevedore’s negligence could not recover from the vessel under a charter party provision that stated the charterers were responsible for loading, stowing, and discharging cargo under the Captain's supervision. The court found that the language did not imply the vessel's crew had a direct responsibility for overseeing cargo discharge or the safety of longshoremen, as no evidence was presented to support such a duty. Similarly, in Carpenter v. Universal Star Shipping, the court held that provisions stating stevedores would be hired and paid by charterers and that charterers would handle cargo without risk to owners did not extend liability to injured longshoremen. The court emphasized that the charter party was a contract between the charterer and the ship owner, with no duty created for the ship owner to ensure longshoremen's safety during cargo operations. The court noted that claims for longshoremen's safety should consider the specific provisions of contracts between stevedores and shipowners, which were not part of the record. Furthermore, any interpretation of the charter party that would allow Lincoln to sue the owner for injury would equate to a claim of unseaworthiness, which is barred by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1972. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision that the charter party provisions did not support Lincoln's cause of action and remanded the case for further action consistent with its opinion. The findings also included conflicting evidence regarding Lincoln's location during the incident and the qualifications of expert witnesses.
