Corus Group Plc, Corus Uk Ltd, Corus Staal Bv, Corus Packaging Plus Norway As, Corus Steel USA Inc., and Corus America Inc. v. International Trade Commission, and George W. Bush, President of the United States, and Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner, United States Customs Service, and Weirton Steel Corporation, and Bethlehem Steel Corporation, National Steel Corporation, and United States Steel Corporation
Docket: 03-1040
Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; December 10, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Corus Group PLC and its affiliates (collectively, the appellants) appealed a summary judgment from the United States Court of International Trade that upheld the imposition of an ad valorem duty on imported tin mill products by President George W. Bush. The case involved defendants including the President, the Commissioner of the United States Customs Service, and the United States International Trade Commission (ITC). The appellants contended that the President exceeded his authority because the ITC's vote was not decisive, and the plurality did not sufficiently justify its decision as mandated by the Trade Act of 1974.
The court found the following: 1) the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction and the appellants had standing; 2) the President should be dismissed as a party since 28 U.S.C. 1581(i) does not allow actions against him; 3) the ITC’s decision was effectively a tie; and 4) the plurality adequately justified its findings of serious injury to the domestic tin mill market. Consequently, the appeal against the President was dismissed, and the Court of International Trade's judgment was affirmed in all other aspects. The Trade Act of 1974 confers broad powers to the President related to trade agreements and the adjustment of import duties.
The Act contains an "escape clause" allowing the President to grant "temporary relief" to domestic industries affected by trade agreements, facilitating their adjustment to increased international competition. The provision mandates the Commission to investigate petitions regarding significant increases in imports that may cause serious injury to domestic industries. If the Commission affirms injury, the President can take various actions deemed appropriate and feasible to aid the industry, including imposing duties on imports. The Commission's recommendation is one of several factors influencing the President's decision. The Commission consists of six commissioners, and if they are evenly split on an injury determination, either group's decision can be presented to the President. Upon reaching a determination, the Commission must submit a report with the rationale. A request for an investigation into increased imports of steel products was made by the United States Trade Representative and the Senate Finance Committee in 2001. The investigation defined the domestic industry and concluded that tin mill products should be analyzed separately from other carbon and alloy products due to their distinct characteristics. A majority of four commissioners found that increased imports of certain carbon flat-rolled steel caused serious injury to the domestic market, while tin mill products were treated as a separate market.
Three of the four commissioners who classified "certain carbon flat-rolled steel" separately from tin mill steel (Koplan, Okun, and Hillman) concluded that increased imports of tin mill products did not inflict serious injury on the domestic tin mill industry. Commissioner Miller, while agreeing with the separate categorization, found that these imports were a significant cause of serious injury to the industry. In contrast, Commissioners Bragg and Devaney opted to analyze all carbon and alloy flat products, including tin mill products, collectively, affirming that the rise in imports caused serious injury to the domestic industry. Despite differing views on tin mill products, Bragg and Devaney affirmed at a public hearing that serious injury occurred within both the narrower and broader definitions of the industry. The Commission reported a split decision on the injury caused by tin mill imports, with three commissioners finding no substantial injury while three others affirmed injury. On March 5, 2002, the President issued the "Steel Products Proclamation" under 19 U.S.C. 2253, acknowledging the Commission's division on the injury determination for tin mill products and deciding to adopt the affirmative findings. Consequently, duties on certain flat steel, including tin mill products, were imposed for three years, with specified rates decreasing annually: 30% for the first year, 24% for the second, and 18% for the third.
The President imposed duties on tin mill products without differentiating them from carbon and alloy flat products. The appellants challenged this on March 22, 2002, in the Court of International Trade, arguing that the Commission improperly counted votes related to their injury determination as a tie and that two commissioners did not provide specific analyses for tin mill products. On August 9, 2002, the court granted summary judgment to the government, applying a review standard from Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, which requires a clear misconstruction of the statute, a significant procedural violation, or action beyond delegated authority for judicial intervention. The court found no such violations, noting the absence of specific voting procedures and that the two commissioners had adequately addressed their votes regarding tin mill products within the broader category. Consequently, the court denied a preliminary injunction against the duty increase on tin mill products, granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, and entered final judgment for the government on September 5, 2002. The appellants filed a timely appeal, and the appellate court acknowledged the necessity to assess jurisdiction and standing, despite no prior discussion on these matters by the lower court.
Appellants argue that the Court of International Trade has statutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), which grants exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States concerning tariffs and duties that do not primarily aim to raise revenue. The absence of a specific statute limiting the court’s jurisdiction over duties imposed under the escape clause provision supports their claim. However, a second jurisdictional issue arises regarding the review of the Commission's decision on tin mill products and the President's reliance on that decision to impose a duty under 19 U.S.C. 2253. The discretionary nature of the President's actions raises questions about their amenability to judicial review, a topic not previously addressed in related cases. The Supreme Court has ruled that if the President has complete discretion in taking action, judicial review of agency recommendations is not permitted, as established in Dalton v. Specter and Franklin v. Massachusetts. Conversely, an agency recommendation can be subject to judicial review if it constitutes the final decision-making process that determines rights or obligations, as clarified in Bennett v. Spear. The principles from these cases, rooted in the Administrative Procedure Act, are deemed applicable under 28 U.S.C. 1581, which may have a less stringent finality requirement. The Court of International Trade typically refrains from intervening until an agency has completed its action or has exceeded its jurisdiction.
The case is primarily governed by the precedent set in *Bennett*, which asserts that the President lacks complete discretion under the relevant statute. The statute permits the President to impose duties only if the Commission finds "serious injury." Thus, for the President's actions to be lawful, the Commission must have been evenly divided; a negative determination by the Commission would mean the President exceeded his authority and could invalidate his proclamation. The Commission's actions are reviewable under *Bennett*.
Regarding jurisdiction, although the President's actions can be subject to judicial review, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not allow claims for relief to be brought directly against the President. The Supreme Court has ruled in *Franklin v. Massachusetts* and *Dalton v. Specter* that the President does not qualify as an "agency" under the APA. This interpretation extends to actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), which does not explicitly mention the President. Consequently, claims based solely on this section should not include the President as a party.
The action can still proceed against Robert C. Bonner, the then-Commissioner of the United States Customs Service, who could be prevented from enforcing duties deemed beyond the President's authority. The Court of International Trade has jurisdiction over the case, except regarding the President, allowing the merits of the appeal to be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). The Court will apply the same standard of review as the Court of International Trade did in its summary judgment, following the precedent established in *Maple Leaf*.
The appellants argue that the Commission incorrectly reported a 3-3 tie regarding the import of tin-mill products. The Commission's findings indicated that three commissioners (Koplan, Okun, and Hillman) determined that imports were not causing serious injury, while three others (Bragg, Miller, and Devaney) made an affirmative determination. According to 19 U.S.C. 1330(d), if the vote is divided, either group's determination can be considered valid. The appellants claim that Bragg and Devaney’s votes should not count as affirmative for tin mill products since they did not analyze them as a distinct category, suggesting a corrected tally of 3-1 against serious injury. However, both commissioners explicitly included tin mill products in their affirmative votes and did not contest the tally. Thus, their votes were properly counted, confirming a 3-3 tie. The excerpt underscores that the intention behind their votes does not require further scrutiny. The primary concern now is whether the Commission adequately justified the decision of the three commissioners who recognized serious injury concerning tin mill products.
The statutory standard for judicial review in this context deviates from the traditional Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standard. Under the escape clause of the Trade Act of 1974, judicial intervention requires evidence of a clear misconstruction of the statute, significant procedural violations, or actions outside the delegated authority. The President's factual findings and motivations are not subject to judicial review.
The statute mandates that the Commission submit a detailed report to the President for each investigation, which must include an explanation for each recommendation and findings as specified in subsection 2252(c)(2). This subsection requires an assessment of the domestic industry's condition and an analysis of non-import factors contributing to serious injury. Additionally, the report must describe the short- and long-term effects of both implementing and not implementing the recommended actions.
The majority opinion in Maple Leaf did not address these statutory requirements, nor did it clarify the necessary explanations the Commission must provide. The government contends that the statute imposes no obligation on the Commission to offer rational explanations, asserting that once the Commission votes, the inquiry concludes, regardless of the report's coherence. However, the court disagrees, emphasizing that the statute is not intended to exempt the Commission from standard administrative law requirements.
Judge Cowen's concurring opinion in Maple Leaf supports the view that the Commission's report must adequately inform the President and the public of the reasoning behind its recommendations. The court affirms that the statute indeed requires the Commission to provide a consistent explanation in its report, a requirement substantiated by legislative history indicating the need for clarity in the Commission's findings. Furthermore, judicial review applies to each individual opinion within a majority decision from the Commission, ensuring that all separate opinions are scrutinized under the relevant statutory standard.
The decision must be set aside if any opinion crucial to the majority or plurality fails to meet statutory standards. In the case of United States Steel Group, the court excluded opinions from two commissioners due to erroneous findings, impacting the assessment of whether their conclusions were based on substantial evidence. The court clarified that a majority's separate opinions do not need to share identical reasoning to support a single result. The appellants argued that differing methodologies employed by commissioners in assessing material injury undermined the Commission's determination regarding domestic injury from imported steel. The court found no requirement for a uniform methodology under the statute, emphasizing the complexity of factors involved in such determinations.
In a specific case, three commissioners agreed on the serious injury caused by carbon and alloy products and tin mill products, although their approaches differed. Commissioner Miller analyzed the categories separately, while Commissioners Bragg and Devaney treated them together. This inconsistency was not grounds for dismissal. However, the appellants contended that Bragg and Devaney's reasoning was inconsistent with their votes concerning tin mill products. They highlighted that tin mill products constituted a small fraction of the overall market, questioning the direct impact of their importation. The court deemed the claimed inconsistency more theoretical, noting that the commissioners viewed their votes as affirming their position on categorization rather than contradicting it. Thus, the distinction between the combined and separate evaluations of articles did not fundamentally alter the conclusion of serious injury.
Different consequences may arise from a combined finding of serious injury regarding carbon and alloy products, including tin mill products, compared to separate findings for these products. However, the appellants did not present this argument, and speculation about its potential to invalidate the President's order is declined. The appellants failed to demonstrate that the opinions of Commissioners Bragg and Devaney lack adequate explanation or are inconsistent. Consequently, the appeal regarding the President is dismissed, while the Court of International Trade's decision is affirmed in other respects. No costs are awarded.
The President has various authority options for taking action regarding imports, including imposing duties, tariff-rate quotas, and negotiating agreements. The appellants previously raised two additional grounds against the duty, questioning Commissioner Devaney's appointment, but did not pursue these on appeal. The government's summary judgment on these counts was granted by the Court of International Trade. The President's rescission of the Steel Products Proclamation was made prospectively, thus not rendering the case moot.
Furthermore, the dissent references a prior decision regarding the government's sovereign immunity, but this case does not address the applicability of certain statutes to the President individually. Lastly, it is unnecessary to determine if the President could be subject to non-statutory review based on historical Supreme Court decisions.
The excerpt addresses a legal analysis surrounding the importation of tin mill steel and the resulting investigation initiated by the United States Special Trade Representative regarding potential injury to the domestic industry. The government and private interveners argue that a particular issue was not raised in the Court of International Trade, invoking precedent from *Novosteel SA v. United States*, which states that failure to properly raise an issue precludes review. However, the conclusion is that the issue was indeed raised in the appellants' complaint and their opposition to the government's motion to dismiss.
The excerpt highlights that two Commissioners failed to provide a specific injury or causation analysis related to tin mill products. It emphasizes that decisions made on broader product categories do not fulfill the requirements for assessing serious injury to the U.S. tin mill products industry. Furthermore, it recounts an exchange during oral arguments regarding the sufficiency of commissioners' votes under the *Maple Leaf* standard, with a suggestion that a vote alone may not meet statutory requirements without adequate explanation.
The investigation led to reports and recommendations by the International Trade Commission to the President, who is mandated by statute to take appropriate actions to assist the domestic industry against import competition. The President has the authority to implement various measures, including increased customs duties. Corus, a group affected by these measures, challenges the actions taken by the President, contending that he exceeded his statutory authority. The panel’s assertion that the President cannot be named as a defendant is contested, as the President's involvement is characterized as a statutory role rather than one protected by executive privilege.
The President is subject to judicial process like any other executive, as affirmed by the absence of arguments against this notion from the President or other involved parties. The court's ruling, which suggested that the President should be dismissed from the action, is viewed as extraordinary and incorrect. Long-standing legal precedent differentiates between the President's policy discretion and his ministerial actions that are governed by statute. The Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison clarified that the nature of the President's act determines whether it is subject to judicial review. When the President acts within political discretion, accountability is limited to political and ethical standards; however, when performing duties mandated by law that affect individual rights, he is accountable like any other official. The text emphasizes that the principle of the Executive being under the law is foundational to preserving free government. The majority's stance that the President cannot be sued diverges from established precedent, while the current case does not involve political questions or issues of national security, making it straightforward.
Statutory assignment imposes a substantive duty on the President, specifically regarding decisions affecting the appellant's property and trade under the Trade Act of 1974. The President has acknowledged his amenability to judicial review, and the panel majority's ruling that he is outside the court's jurisdiction contradicts established legal precedents and constitutional principles. The President must make significant commercial decisions, and the critical issue for review is whether his actions, particularly in issuing Proclamation 4941, fell within his delegated authority. Judicial review is permissible to ascertain if the President adhered to statutory limits and properly construed the statute, as established in Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States and further clarified in Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States. The panel's error lies in suggesting that only the implementing agency can face judicial scrutiny regarding presidential actions. Other circuit courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have affirmed that courts can assess whether the President has exceeded his statutory authority, as highlighted in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush, and that jurisdiction exists to challenge the President's actions directly, as seen in Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter and the case involving the National Treasury Employees Union against President Nixon.
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, the court determined that constitutional principles established in Marbury v. Madison apply to the President, allowing for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1361 to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the President to implement a pay raise effective October 1972. The court noted that previous cases involving the President in the Court of International Trade had been decided without jurisdictional issues, countering the panel majority's view. In Humane Society of the United States v. Clinton, the court affirmed that while it had jurisdiction over the President, the discretionary powers granted to him under the relevant statute prevented the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Similarly, in Arjay Associates Inc. v. Reagan, the court dismissed a suit against the President not for lack of jurisdiction but due to the plaintiffs' lack of standing. The panel majority's assertion that the President should be dismissed as a party contradicts existing case law, including Franklin v. Massachusetts and Dalton v. Specter, which indicated actions of the President are not reviewable under the APA but are subject to litigation under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i). The excerpt reinforces that the President, while not an agency under the APA, remains an officer of the United States and can be sued in this context.
The Federal Circuit in Humane Society v. Clinton addressed the issue of whether the President can be subject to judicial review concerning actions taken under statutory authority, specifically referencing 19 U.S.C. 2253. The court noted that the government did not argue that sovereign immunity applied and did not raise standing issues independently of the APA. It clarified that the matters at hand relate to statutory authority rather than executive privilege. The President is granted the authority to select remedies to assist the domestic industry against import competition, and individuals aggrieved by presidential decisions have the right to seek judicial relief.
The court emphasized the President's obligation to defend decisions in court and acknowledged that enforcement actions are carried out by Customs officials. It asserted that neither precedent nor statute suggests that the President is immune from judicial review when acting within official duties. The court referenced the principle established in Marbury v. Madison, underscoring the right of individuals to seek legal protection for injuries.
The petitioner claimed that the President made a legal error in exercising his statutory authority, particularly arguing that the President lacked the authority to act without a majority decision from the Commission. The appellants sought to invalidate the President's interpretation of the ITC's vote and the imposition of a 30 percent tariff on tin mill products. The court concluded that the President is not exempt from judicial review in such matters, dissenting against any notion of new presidential immunity that distorts the structure of government.
