James W. Wilson v. Jon E. Ozmint, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections Henry Dargan McMaster Attorney General, State of South Carolina
Docket: 03-3
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; February 17, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded a district court's order granting James W. Wilson a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, determining that the district court did not apply the appropriate federal habeas review standards as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It was acknowledged by Wilson's counsel that the review of state court proceedings was inadequate. The court ordered the dismissal of Wilson's habeas petition.
Wilson's criminal acts, which led to his conviction, involved a shooting at Oakland Elementary School on September 26, 1988. He stole a revolver from his grandmother, purchased hollow-point ammunition, and then opened fire in the school cafeteria during lunchtime. Witnesses reported his expression of hatred as he randomly targeted children and adults, firing until the gun was empty, reloading, and continuing the attack in a classroom. The incident resulted in multiple injuries, including severe wounds to a teacher and the deaths of two eight-year-old girls, causing widespread shock and terror.
Wilson was indicted for two counts of murder, nine counts of assault and battery with intent to kill, and one count of illegally carrying a firearm. He sought to plead 'guilty but mentally ill' (GBMI), which required him to demonstrate that he lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the law due to a mental disease or defect, as per S.C.Code 17-24-20(A). A three-day hearing was held, during which twenty-four witnesses testified. Represented by attorneys William Nicholson and David Belser, Wilson successfully met the statutory standard for GBMI, and the trial court permitted the plea despite state opposition.
After a brief deliberation, Wilson's counsel opted to proceed with sentencing the same day, incorporating all evidence presented during the hearing. On May 9, 1989, the trial court sentenced Wilson to death. He appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, challenging the application of the death penalty under GBMI and its constitutionality, but both challenges were rejected.
Wilson later filed for post-conviction relief in state court, which was denied after an extensive eighty-eight-page opinion. On June 13, 2002, Wilson petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The magistrate judge's report dismissed his claims, citing insufficient grounds under section 2254(d). However, the district court reversed the South Carolina courts' findings and granted the writ, identifying eight constitutional errors in Wilson's guilty plea and sentencing. The State of South Carolina appealed this decision, while Wilson also appealed, arguing that imposing the death penalty on someone unable to conform their conduct to the law violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus to Wilson was flawed as it failed to review the South Carolina state court judgments according to the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This oversight constitutes a clear error, as acknowledged by the petitioner's counsel, and undermines the district court's decision. Under § 2254(d), a federal court can only grant a writ if the state court's adjudication either contradicts clearly established federal law or is based on unreasonable factual determinations. The district court did not assess whether the state court's handling of Wilson's claim met these criteria, rendering its opinion largely irrelevant to the resolution of the case.
Furthermore, for a federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must demonstrate that any constitutional errors had a significant impact on the jury's verdict. The state contends that the district court incorrectly determined that Wilson's guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The state court had previously ruled that Wilson's plea was indeed made with adequate understanding of the consequences, and this finding was not "objectively unreasonable." Consequently, the district court erred in granting the writ based on the voluntariness of Wilson's guilty plea.
The state trial court adequately informed Wilson about the implications of his guilty plea, including the possibility of the death penalty, which Wilson acknowledged understanding multiple times. The court clarified that it, rather than a jury, would determine Wilson's sentence based on aggravating and mitigating evidence. Wilson contended that the plea colloquy was ineffective due to uncertainty regarding the death penalty's applicability for someone deemed "guilty but mentally ill." However, the state PCR court rejected this claim, supported by testimony from Wilson's attorneys confirming their understanding that the trial court could impose the death penalty.
Additionally, the state challenged the district court's finding of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning David Belser, who allegedly failed to inform Wilson that Dr. Donald Morgan, a psychiatrist who testified in Wilson's favor, had changed his opinion to believe Wilson was legally insane at the time of the crime. Despite Wilson's argument that Morgan's change in opinion was not communicated to him or presented in court, the review of the state PCR court's decision concluded that both the rejection of this ineffective assistance claim and the underlying factual findings were reasonable. Dr. Morgan had previously testified that Wilson met the criteria for "guilty but mentally ill" but not for legal insanity, and the court found no unreasonable error in the proceedings regarding Wilson's plea.
The state PCR court rejected Wilson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that Dr. Morgan did not change his opinion during the guilty plea hearing and did not communicate any change to Belser. The court found no evidence supporting a change of opinion and noted that Morgan could not convincingly explain any sudden shift. Additionally, the court deemed Morgan's testimony at the PCR hearing unreliable due to his personal biases against Wilson's death sentence and animosity toward the state's expert witness, Dr. Dietz, as well as his subsequent involvement with Wilson's defense team.
Wilson's habeas relief claim argues that the PCR court's factual determinations were 'objectively unreasonable' and contradicted by 'clear and convincing evidence.' However, credibility determinations made by the PCR court are presumed correct unless rebutted by substantial evidence. Wilson failed to provide such evidence, particularly regarding Belser's testimony, which did not confirm that Morgan had informed him of any change in opinion about Wilson's mental state.
The court concluded that the factual findings supporting the PCR court's determination of Morgan's credibility were not 'objectively unreasonable.' Throughout the proceedings, Dr. Morgan and other medical experts consistently maintained that Wilson did not meet the legal standard for insanity, and Morgan did not inform his colleague, Dr. McKee, of any change in his opinion even after the plea hearing.
Dr. Morgan did not provide a convincing rationale for his change of opinion regarding Wilson's sanity during the guilty plea hearing, despite having reviewed the eye-witness testimony beforehand. The state PCR court noted that differences between the witnesses' live and written testimonies clarified rather than undermined the conclusion that Wilson was not insane. Morgan's sole explanation for his shift in stance was that hearing the live testimony led him to reassess its significance. Additionally, Morgan's sympathies for Wilson, coupled with his ongoing support for Wilson's post-conviction defense, may have influenced his testimony. The findings do not necessitate a credibility determination by the state court but do substantiate the court's ruling under section 2254(d)(2). Consequently, the state PCR court's dismissal of Wilson's ineffective assistance claims concerning Dr. Morgan was not "objectively unreasonable," and Belser’s failure to address Morgan's revised opinion was justified since he was unaware of the change.
Furthermore, the state contended that the district court incorrectly granted a writ based on Wilson's claims of ineffective assistance due to counsel's failure to present additional mitigating evidence and to investigate his background by hiring a social worker. The district court's assessment that counsel's shortcomings undermined Wilson's fair trial was based on a de novo review of the state PCR court's decision, which should instead have adhered to AEDPA standards. Under those standards, the state PCR court's rejection of Wilson's claims was deemed "not objectively unreasonable," leading to the vacating of the district court's order. The state PCR court appropriately referenced the Strickland v. Washington standard, which necessitates proof of counsel's deficient performance and resultant prejudice to the defense. The assessment of counsel's competence hinges on whether their decisions were reasonable given the circumstances, particularly regarding the thoroughness of the investigation into the defendant's background before deciding against presenting mitigating evidence.
The level of deference granted to counsel's strategic decisions hinges on the thoroughness of the investigations backing those choices. According to the Strickland standard, strategic decisions after comprehensive investigation are largely unassailable, while choices made following incomplete investigations are deemed reasonable only if supported by sound professional judgment. Counsel has an obligation to conduct reasonable investigations or justify decisions that render further investigation unnecessary.
In evaluating the decisions by Belser and Nicholson not to present additional mitigation evidence beyond that introduced during the guilty plea hearing, the court assessed whether the state PCR court's conclusion—that these decisions fell within the range of competent assistance—was objectively unreasonable. The court determined it was not, acknowledging the extensive investigation conducted by counsel and the substantial evidence already presented.
Wilson argued that counsel's failure to introduce further testimony from six witnesses about his troubled upbringing stemmed from neglect rather than a strategic choice, and thus should receive little deference under Strickland. However, the record refuted this claim. During the state PCR hearing, Nicholson clarified that the decision was strategic, based on the belief that the mental illness evidence was the strongest mitigation argument, which the trial court recognized by accepting Wilson’s plea of "guilty but mentally ill." The defense team felt confident that the presented evidence sufficed for the judge to impose a lesser sentence than death.
Ultimately, the court concluded that Wilson's counsel had conducted a thorough investigation into his background and was aware of the content the additional witnesses would provide. Their decision not to present this evidence was informed and strategic, rather than neglectful.
Interviews indicated that counsel was aware of the expected testimony from six witnesses regarding Wilson's mental health and family background, having consulted with multiple medical experts, including Dr. Geoffrey McKee, who interviewed Wilson's family. According to Strickland, a strategic choice made after thorough investigation is nearly unassailable. Wilson's counsel, Belser and Nicholson, reasonably determined that additional testimony from Wilson's father and sister would not significantly impact the sentencing court’s decision, given the extensive evidence already presented during the guilty plea hearing.
The state PCR court found that the counsel's decision fell within the range of competent assistance, leading to the conclusion that the district court erred in granting habeas corpus based on the failure to present these witnesses. Additionally, Wilson's claim regarding his medication causing a 'stony-faced' appearance was deemed a strategic choice by his counsel, who had already introduced evidence linking this appearance to Wilson's mental illness, aligning with their overarching mitigation strategy to argue against execution due to mental illness.
Wilson also contended that counsel's failure to hire a social service worker for an extended family history investigation constituted ineffective assistance, likening it to the Supreme Court case Wiggins v. Smith. However, the state PCR court found the circumstances of Wilson's case to differ significantly from Wiggins, concluding that the rejection of his ineffective assistance claim regarding this issue was not objectively unreasonable.
In Wiggins, the Supreme Court determined that Wiggins' counsel's failure to present adequate mitigation evidence constituted a violation of Strickland's standards, labeling the Maryland state court's contrary conclusion as "objectively unreasonable." The court criticized Wiggins' counsel for conducting an unreasonably narrow investigation, limited to a brief personal history and some records from a social services department. In contrast, Wilson's counsel conducted a comprehensive investigation into his family life and social history, interviewing family, teachers, and medical specialists, which informed their professional judgment not to seek additional mitigation evidence. Consequently, the state post-conviction relief (PCR) court found it reasonable for Wilson's counsel to limit their investigation scope.
The state contended that the district court improperly granted Wilson a writ of habeas corpus regarding the state trial court's refusal to allow access to a Quality Care Review Board (QCRB) report, arguing that Wilson had either failed to exhaust or abandoned this claim in state court. The district court, however, bypassed the state's procedural arguments, ruling on the merits and asserting that the state trial judge violated Wilson's Eighth Amendment rights by not considering non-statutory mitigating evidence and then improperly considering such evidence during sentencing. The district court's approach was flawed as it neglected to apply appropriate standards of review and failed to address the state's key argument regarding the procedural bar on Wilson's claims in the federal habeas petition.
The Quality Care Review Board investigated Wilson's treatment adequacy in the South Carolina mental health system after his shooting at Oakwood Elementary School. The resulting report tended to exonerate the state from responsibility for Wilson's actions. In April 1989, Wilson subpoenaed this report from the Department of Mental Health, which sought to quash the subpoena, suggesting an in-camera review by the trial court for relevance. Wilson's counsel agreed to this process. After the review, the trial court found the report irrelevant and quashed the subpoena.
In his appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Wilson initially cited the trial court's denial of access to the report but later moved to defer consideration of this issue after the court granted him access to the report. The Supreme Court accepted this motion without explanation and did not discuss the QCRB report in its opinion on Wilson's other claims.
Subsequently, Wilson attempted to raise issues related to the QCRB report in post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings. However, the state PCR court rejected his claims on both procedural and substantive grounds, asserting that claims that could have been raised during the trial or on direct appeal cannot be presented in PCR proceedings. The court indicated that Wilson should address the claim directly with the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The federal court cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner has not exhausted state remedies or has procedurally defaulted. Given the state PCR court's ruling, Wilson's claims concerning the QCRB report cannot be reviewed because he failed to exhaust his direct appeal options and may have abandoned the claim. This aligns with the procedural limitations established in Drayton v. Evatt.
Wilson is not barred from raising his claim in his federal habeas petition, provided he exhausted it in state court during direct appeal. However, he did not allow the state courts to address this claim, as he failed to object to the in-camera consideration of the QCRB report and deferred raising the QCRB claim in his direct appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court. This deprived the state courts of the opportunity to correct the alleged constitutional violation, meaning Wilson has not exhausted his claims in state court, thus precluding relief under section 2254(b).
The state contends that the district court erred in granting the writ based on Wilson’s claimed incompetence during his guilty plea. The district court did not apply the required deferential review standards and concluded that Wilson was denied due process. However, the state trial court's findings on Wilson's competency were not objectively unreasonable, indicating a further error by the district court in granting relief.
Additionally, the state PCR court found that Wilson could not present his claim in post-conviction relief because he failed to raise it on direct appeal. The state raised this procedural default issue before the district court, but it was not addressed, constituting another error. Generally, if a prisoner defaults federal claims in state court based on an independent procedural rule, federal review is barred unless he shows cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Although Wilson's procedural default could bar his claim, the state did not raise this issue on appeal. Federal jurisdiction over Wilson's substantive claim remains intact despite the default. The decision to consider the claim despite the procedural default lies within the court's discretion. In this case, the court chose to exercise its discretion to consider Wilson's claim on the merits, favoring judicial efficiency and Wilson's right to address the issue, despite concluding that his substantive claim lacks merit.
The parties did not address Wilson's procedural default in their briefs or oral arguments, leading the court to consider whether to construct arguments on the issue or order additional briefing, as seen in previous cases. However, the court chose to proceed to the merits of Wilson's claim. It found that Wilson had not demonstrated that the state trial court's competence determination was unreasonable or incorrect. The state trial court had carefully assessed Wilson's competency, yielding no evidence of mental unfitness to stand trial, which fulfilled its obligations under Supreme Court precedent.
Despite both the prosecution and defense agreeing to Wilson’s competence, the trial court opted for a competency hearing prior to the guilty plea hearing. During this hearing, the court interviewed Dr. McKee and Wilson, as well as Dr. Donald Morgan and Lieutenant Fowler, to evaluate the impact of Wilson’s medication on his capacity. The evidence overwhelmingly indicated Wilson was competent, understanding the proceedings and able to assist his attorneys. Dr. McKee confirmed Wilson's competency based on a recent evaluation, and Wilson himself affirmed his understanding of the situation. After learning that Wilson was on anti-depressants and a tranquilizer, the trial court sought further evidence regarding the medication’s effects. The next day, Dr. Morgan testified that Wilson's medication enhanced his ability to comprehend the proceedings and respond, noting Wilson appeared more alert and cooperative than previously. Based on this testimony, the trial court found Wilson competent to stand trial.
The court determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Wilson, is competent to stand trial, comprehend the proceedings, understand the charges, and assist his attorneys. This conclusion was based on the absence of contradictory evidence presented to the state trial court. Wilson's counsel expressed private concerns regarding his competence but did not convey these during the competency hearing. Specifically, counsel David Belser cited potential competency issues during a hearing on February 16, 1989, and prepared a motion for a new competency evaluation before the guilty plea hearing, which was not filed. Despite these concerns, the trial court conducted an independent evaluation, interviewing medical experts who assessed Wilson's competence on the day of their testimony. Their evaluations indicated Wilson was alert and cooperative, which the court verified through direct questioning. Thus, the court found no error in the trial court's reliance on the evaluations to establish Wilson's competence.
On appeal, Wilson argued that his death sentence constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, particularly claiming it was unconstitutional to execute someone deemed unable to conform to legal standards. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected this claim in a prior ruling. For Wilson to obtain habeas relief, it must be shown that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. The relevant legal principles for Wilson's claim were articulated in the Supreme Court case Penry v. Lynaugh, and subsequent decisions such as Lockyer v. Andrade.
A court must evaluate whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" by examining its historical context at the time of the Bill of Rights' adoption and assessing it against current societal standards of decency, relying on objective evidence. The South Carolina Supreme Court applied these principles when considering Wilson's claim, leading to the conclusion that its decision was not contrary to established federal law. The key issue was whether the court unreasonably applied the principles from Penry in Wilson's case, where he recognized legal rights but could not control his conduct. The standard for unreasonableness requires more than a belief that the court erred; it must be deemed "objectively unreasonable."
Wilson did not dispute the court's application of the first prong of the Penry test, which determined that the prohibition on executing "idiots" applies only to those utterly devoid of reason or understanding, not to individuals like Wilson, who acted out of an "irresistible impulse." His disagreement centered on the court's analysis of evolving standards of decency. The state court's evaluation relied on the number of states allowing execution for those not insane under the M'Naghten standard but who acted with an "irresistible impulse." Although three states explicitly permitted such executions, fourteen others lacked mechanisms to identify or protect these individuals, indicating limited legal avenues for defense.
The court dismissed Wilson's claim that juries rarely impose the death penalty on individuals like him, noting that his argument was based solely on data from the three states with clear laws on the matter, which did not accurately reflect the broader landscape. Ultimately, the court found no national consensus against executing individuals in Wilson's position, based on the objective evidence available.
Wilson contends in his appeal that a national consensus exists against executing individuals who cannot control their conduct, citing nineteen states where his volitional capacity would have precluded a death sentence. He argues that in seventeen of these states, a finding of "irresistible impulse" would eliminate criminal responsibility and punishment. However, the court finds this evidence insufficient to demonstrate that the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling was "objectively unreasonable." Wilson's argument relies on current state policies rather than those in 1992, and the court notes that even if states had similar policies then, the existence of nineteen states not permitting execution does not alone establish a national consensus against such penalties. The burden lies with the defendant to show a national consensus, which Wilson failed to do. Consequently, the district court's denial of his habeas relief is upheld, and the judgment granting the writ of habeas corpus is vacated, with instructions to dismiss Wilson's petition.
If the court accepts a plea of guilty but mentally ill, there will be an additional hearing without a jury to present evidence from both sides, after which the court will determine the punishment for the murder charges, which could be life imprisonment or death by electrocution. By pleading guilty but mentally ill, the defendant, Wilson, waives his right to a jury decision regarding his sentence. Counsel for Wilson expressed a belief that this plea would likely prevent the imposition of the death penalty, suggesting that the plea would have significant weight on appeal. The M'Naghten standard, applicable in South Carolina, assesses whether the defendant could distinguish right from wrong at the time of the crime. Wilson argues that the state post-conviction relief (PCR) court's reliance on previous case law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was erroneous, asserting that it misapplied the requirement to demonstrate that the insanity defense would have likely succeeded at trial. He contends that the PCR court's expectation for him to personally testify about his choice to go to trial if informed of the insanity defense contradicts Supreme Court precedent.
The state PCR court determined that Wilson's decision not to testify was one of many factors in concluding he did not demonstrate that he would have changed his plea if informed of Dr. Morgan's revised opinion. Wilson contends that the court erred in its factual finding regarding the absence of any opinion at the time of his plea indicating he lacked the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. While technically correct, Wilson argues that Dr. Morgan had expressed a desire to testify about his change of mind to Judge Moore. Despite this, the state PCR court's decision was not fundamentally flawed as it recognized Morgan's communication of his change of opinion in its opinion.
Wilson argues that the court incorrectly based its credibility assessment on Morgan's dislike for the state's psychiatric expert, Dr. Dietz. However, since the court's credibility determination is sufficiently supported by other evidence, this aspect does not require further examination.
Wilson claims that his counsel was ineffective by failing to call six potential witnesses who could have provided mitigating evidence regarding his troubled family background and unusual behavior. The witnesses include his father, sister, driving instructor, pastor, and two doctors. Wilson's father would have testified about his abusive behavior, which his sister would corroborate, while the driving instructor and pastor would describe Wilson's unusual demeanor. The state PCR court speculated that counsel might have chosen not to call certain family members to avoid introducing damaging testimony about Wilson's past violence, although this was not the reason given by counsel. Even if this speculation were considered valid, the decision not to call these witnesses could still be deemed reasonable as a strategic choice to prevent further damaging evidence from being presented. The court refrains from speculating on whether this reasoning influenced counsel's decision.
Nicholson's sworn testimony regarding the decision not to call Wilson's father and sister as witnesses is credible and supported by valid reasons. Dr. Donald Morgan testified about Wilson's abusive childhood, detailing physical and verbal abuse from his father, including threats with a gun. Dr. Geoffrey McKee provided insights from Wilson's mother and grandmother, indicating Wilson exhibited obsessive-compulsive behaviors from a young age and had a fascination with darkness, alongside significant trauma from family deaths and violent incidents in his neighborhood. Dr. Charles Baber corroborated the history of abuse in Wilson's home, noting threats from his father and bullying at school, attributing these factors as fundamental causes of Wilson's mental health issues. Dr. Diane Folingstad diagnosed Wilson with borderline and schizotypal personality disorders, reporting an increase in his paranoia and erratic behavior over time, including making threats against family members.
Wilson's defense attorneys, Belser and Nicholson, conducted extensive interviews with family members and teachers to gather a comprehensive social history for the sentencing phase. They aimed to illustrate Wilson's decline in functioning from childhood through adolescence. Despite their efforts, they faced challenges in obtaining cooperation from some teachers.
Belser and Nicholson engaged five medical experts—Doctors Donald Morgan, Geoffrey McKee, Charles Baber, Harold Morgan, and Diane Folingstad—who were knowledgeable about Wilson's mental health and family background. Dr. McKee conducted interviews with Wilson's immediate family to prepare his report. During the guilty plea hearing, McKee, Folingstad, Baber, and Donald Morgan testified that Wilson met the criteria for a "guilty but mentally ill" plea and highlighted his chaotic and abusive family upbringing. A subsequent investigation by Patricia Feigley, commissioned by Wilson's post-conviction team, corroborated the findings of Wilson's original legal counsel regarding his abusive background and mental health issues, while also uncovering evidence of mental illness and substance abuse in Wilson's extended family, suggesting a genetic predisposition. Despite the new findings, Wilson's counsel deemed their prior investigation sufficient, a judgment upheld by the state trial judge, who recognized mitigating factors concerning Wilson's mental state during the crimes. Although Wilson argues that the state has abandoned its claims on appeal, the state maintains that procedural rules prevent Wilson from raising these issues at this stage. The implications of South Carolina’s procedural law regarding the timing of claims are noted, without any definitive opinion provided.
