United States v. Juan Carlos Huerta-Moran, Also Known as Francisco Lozano
Docket: 02-1724
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; November 25, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves Juan Carlos Huerta-Moran, who appealed a sentencing decision related to his illegal reentry into the United States after deportation. The appeal focused on whether the "sentence imposed" for a prior drug trafficking conviction, specifically under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b), includes both time served before and after the revocation of probation. The guidelines stipulate enhancements based on prior sentences: a prior sentence of 13 months or less results in a 12-level enhancement, while a sentence greater than 13 months results in a 16-level enhancement. The Court concluded that a post-revocation prison sentence exceeding 13 months qualifies for the 16-level enhancement, leading to the affirmation of Huerta-Moran's 65-month sentence.
In 1993, Huerta-Moran was convicted of criminal sale of marijuana in California and initially sentenced to 150 days in prison and three years of probation. After violating probation in 1994 and serving 182 days, he was deported. Upon re-entering the U.S. illegally in 1995, his probation was revoked, and he received a two-year sentence. Following another deportation, he was convicted of attempted assault in New York in 2000 and later transferred to federal custody. He pled guilty to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) without a plea agreement and received a Pimentel letter outlining the government's position on sentencing, which included a base offense level of 8, a 16-level enhancement for the prior felony, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an offense level of 21 and a sentencing range of 57 to 71 months.
At sentencing, the district court confirmed the calculations in the pre-sentence report (PSR) that matched the Pimentel letter and denied Huerta-Moran's request for a downward departure, imposing a 65-month imprisonment sentence along with three years of supervised release. The appeal addressed the application of the amended § 2L1.2 guidelines, which introduced a more nuanced enhancement scheme for predicate felonies.
The amended § 2L1.2 stipulates a 16-level enhancement for drug trafficking felonies with a sentence over 13 months, while a 12-level enhancement applies for sentences of 13 months or less. The term "sentence imposed" is clarified in Application Note 1(A)(iv) to refer only to the non-probated portion of a sentence. On appeal, Huerta-Moran contends that his prior state conviction, classified as an "aggravated felony" and "drug trafficking offense," warrants a 12-level enhancement due to a claimed "sentence imposed" of 150 days. He argues that time served for probation revocation should not be included in this calculation. In contrast, the government asserts that all time served for the drug trafficking offense should be aggregated to determine the length of the "sentence imposed." The appellate issue revolves around whether Huerta-Moran's two-year sentence from probation revocation should be included in this calculation. Previous rulings from three circuits have established that the "sentence imposed" encompasses all prison time served, including additional sentences for probation violations. These rulings suggest that sentences must be aggregated to assess eligibility for the 16-level enhancement. However, the current inquiry is limited to whether a probation revocation sentence exceeding 13 months can be counted as part of the "sentence imposed" for the drug trafficking offense, with Huerta-Moran arguing that § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) pertains only to the original drug trafficking sentence, not subsequent probation violations.
Huerta-Moran argues that "sentence imposed" refers solely to the original sentence, excluding any probated portion. He interprets Application Note 1(A)(iv) to mean that only the non-probated segment should be considered, claiming his sentence was effectively 150 days due to three years being probated, which he contends should not count under § 2L1.2(b). However, the court finds this argument unpersuasive, as the key question is whether he was convicted of a drug trafficking offense with a sentence exceeding 13 months. The court determines that Huerta-Moran's sentence, imposed after probation revocation, clearly exceeded 13 months. Under circuit law, any penalties from probation violations are linked to the underlying conviction, thus qualifying as a sentence for a drug trafficking offense. Huerta-Moran challenges this principle, suggesting it should not apply when distinguishing between original and probated sentences for enhancement purposes. He points to the November 2001 amendment to § 2L1.2(b), which aimed to reduce disproportionate penalties, arguing that including revocation sentences in the enhancement contradicts the Commission's goal of proportionate sentencing. Nonetheless, the court concludes that even if multiple sentences were aggregated, Huerta-Moran’s case stands out because his revocation sentence itself exceeded 13 months, indicating the seriousness of the original crime. The court emphasizes that the revocation sentence reflects the gravity of the underlying offense, unless California law suggests otherwise regarding the sentencing for probation violations.
California law aligns with the Second Circuit regarding probation revocation, where a revocation sentence is imposed solely for the original conviction, not the conduct leading to revocation. The California appellate court in *People v. Blunt* clarified that the severity of the revocation conduct does not affect the length of the term; rather, it is determined by the original offense and sentence. The most significant outcome for a probationer upon revocation is the execution of the original conviction's judgment. Therefore, arguments regarding the ambiguity of "sentence imposed" and the application of the rule of lenity do not succeed, as the term is clear and follows established legal precedents.
The key principle established is that a probation revocation sentence exceeding 13 months qualifies as a "sentence imposed" for a "drug trafficking offense" under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) if the original sentence was for a drug trafficking offense. Huerta-Moran's second probation revocation sentence, which was longer than 13 months, justifies the 16-level enhancement imposed. The district court's judgment is affirmed, confirming that the length of Huerta-Moran's last sentence is the decisive factor in this case. The document also notes uncertainties in the record regarding the exact nature of Huerta-Moran's previous sentences, but the outcome remains unchanged regardless of these details. Additionally, a recent amendment from the Sentencing Commission clarifies that the length of imprisonment includes terms from probation or parole revocations.
Amendment 7 to the Sentencing Guidelines, submitted to Congress on May 1, 2003, is characterized as a clarification consistent with existing case law, effective November 1, 2003. The court notes that whether the amendment merely clarifies or substantively changes the law is a matter for judicial determination. In cases involving defendants Ruiz-Gea, Compian-Torres, and Moreno-Cisneros, the initial sentences were partially probated or suspended, raising questions about sentence characterization. However, the distinctions are deemed immaterial as all three cases agree on aggregating sentences to determine the total "sentence imposed." The court concluded that the district court correctly included the revocation sentence in the overall sentence for the drug-trafficking offense. The analysis cites that an original sentence exceeding thirteen months should not be treated more seriously than a combined sentence that includes a revocation. The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Guideline 4A1.1, which adds points for sentences over thirteen months, is contrasted with the Second Circuit's position that offense level and criminal history calculations should be treated independently, with no justification for cross-referencing the two chapters. The dissent in Moreno-Cisneros highlights difficulties with the prevailing interpretation.
Holdings from the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits conflict with the Second and Third Circuit rulings in United States v. Valdovinos-Soloache and United States v. Frias. In both cases, the defendants were sentenced to over 13 months but released on parole before completing that time. The Second and Third Circuits determined that only the initial sentence should be considered when determining the "sentence imposed" under guideline 2L1.2b, leading to a 16-level enhancement. This contrasts with the approach taken by the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, which calculate total prison time served. The excerpt notes that while parole differs from revocation of probated or suspended sentences, the conflicting rules may lead to inconsistencies. The defendant's argument that "sentence imposed" refers to the original sentence and that the Application Note pertains to initially probated sentences is dismissed, as such language is not present in the Guideline or Commentary.
