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Bertrand v. Moore
Citations: 953 So. 2d 202; 6 La.App. 3 Cir. 545; 2007 La. App. LEXIS 485; 2007 WL 837101Docket: No. 06-545
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 21, 2007; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Agreement with the majority is expressed regarding the summary judgment favoring Constructors and Cleco on the intentional tort issue. However, there is dissent concerning the reversal of the summary judgment that determined the Eagle policy does not offer coverage or a duty to defend. The Eagle policy, effective from January 1, 1999, to January 1, 2000, specifies that coverage applies to bodily injury by accident or disease, with an emphasis on the requirement that the last exposure to conditions causing such injury must occur within the policy period. The Louisiana Supreme Court's precedent clarifies that the duty to defend under insurance agreements is broader than the duty to provide coverage. A court must assess the plaintiffs' allegations to determine if they unambiguously exclude coverage. Unless there is clear exclusion of all claims, the duty to defend is triggered if there is even a possibility of liability under the contract. Upon reviewing the plaintiffs’ petitions, it was found that they allege exposure to hazardous material after the expiration of the Eagle policy. The petitions indicate that exposure to potentially harmful asbestos occurred after January 1, 2000, which is outside of the policy's coverage period. Therefore, the allegations lead to an unambiguous exclusion from coverage, negating any corresponding duty to defend. The dissent also addresses Constructors' argument regarding potential factual disputes about the policy’s coverage, stating that the policy language clearly excludes coverage based on the timing of the alleged exposure. The conclusion is that the trial court correctly granted Eagle’s motion for summary judgment, and the dissent would affirm this ruling.