State v. Guice

Citations: 950 So. 2d 880; 2006 La.App. 4 Cir. 1146; 2007 La. App. LEXIS 62; 2007 WL 128248Docket: No. 2006-KA-1146

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; January 9, 2007; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

On December 16, 2004, Michael Guice, Jr. was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, with a bond set at $10,000. He pleaded not guilty and had a series of court appearances, during which he failed to appear for a motion hearing on March 10, 2005, resulting in an alias capias for his arrest. Guice appeared in court on April 18, 2005, without counsel, and the capias was recalled. A motion hearing was scheduled for May 6, 2005, where he again appeared without counsel, and a hearing to determine counsel was set for May 17, 2005. On that date, the court found no probable cause to hold him, and his trial was set for June 21, 2005. The state requested a continuance, which was denied, leading to a nolle prosequi and Guice's release.

The case was later reinstated on July 6, 2005, under a new case number. Guice was appointed defense counsel on August 11, 2005, and filed a motion to quash the bill of information, which the district court granted on August 17, 2005. The state appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court improperly granted the motion, as Guice failed to demonstrate that the delay in prosecution constituted a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial, protected under the Sixth Amendment and Louisiana Constitution, attaches upon formal indictment or arrest. The Supreme Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo outlines four factors to assess potential violations of this right: the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and any prejudice suffered by the defendant due to the delay.

The court determined that the length of the delay in a trial is a critical factor that triggers further inquiry into potential prejudice only if the delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial, which varies based on the specific circumstances of each case. The reasons for the delay are also significant, with varying weights assigned to different justifications. A defendant's assertion of their right to a speedy trial is given considerable evidentiary weight in evaluating whether their rights were infringed. The court emphasized that prejudice should be assessed in relation to the defendant's interests, which include avoiding oppressive pretrial detention, minimizing anxiety, and preventing impairment of the defense.

In *State v. Reaves*, the defendant faced multiple continuances for a misdemeanor charge over three and a half months, leading to a nolle prosequi by the state after a key witness’s absence. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash based on the denial of a speedy trial, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, which noted that the state bore responsibility for the delays despite the lack of an excessively long delay.

In *State v. DeRouen*, a fifteen-month delay was deemed not to violate the right to a speedy trial, with some continuances attributed to the state and others to external factors. The defendant was not incarcerated during this time, and the court found no significant prejudice. Previous cases indicated that delays of nineteen and twenty-two months did not constitute violations of the right to a speedy trial, particularly where the defense did not object until later and could not demonstrate prejudice. In the current case, a delay of just over eight months was noted between filing the original bill and granting the motion to quash.

The felony charge of possession with intent to distribute cocaine entails a prison sentence ranging from two to thirty years, with the first two years served without parole, probation, or suspension, and can include a fine up to $50,000. The eight-month delay in proceedings is not deemed presumptively prejudicial, as the defense requested the continuances contributing to this delay, while the state’s requests for continuances were denied. The defendant's initial motion hearing was continued at his request, and he failed to appear on a subsequent date, leading to an alias capias. Although he appeared again later without counsel, the defense was granted continuances to secure representation. The defendant did not file for a speedy trial nor claim any prejudice from the delay, maintaining his freedom on bond throughout the proceedings without evidence of lost witnesses or compromised evidence. Considering these factors, the trial court's decision to grant the motion to quash is viewed as a significant error. The ruling is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The defendant, charged alongside Kiom Y. Smith, did not assert a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, which under Louisiana law requires a trial to commence within two years of prosecution initiation. The statutory time is paused when a motion to quash is filed. In a referenced case, the court had previously found a two-and-a-half-year delay presumptively prejudicial, leading to an inquiry into other delay factors, where the defendant experienced significant prejudice due to prolonged incarceration and the loss of a crucial witness.