Marian Sears, Claimant-Appellant v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Citations: 349 F.3d 1326; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23634; 2003 WL 22722905Docket: 03-7005

Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; November 19, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Marian Sears appeals the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which upheld the Board of Veterans' Appeals' (BVA) ruling that the effective date for service-connection benefits on a reopened claim is the date the veteran requests the reopening, rather than the date of the original application. The court affirmed this interpretation of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) regulation, which stipulates that the effective date for benefits following the submission of new and material evidence is based on the date of the new claim or when entitlement arose, whichever is later. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7105(c) and § 5108, a claim denied by the DVA cannot be reopened unless new and material evidence is presented. In the specific case, Virgil Lawton, who initially had his claim for post-traumatic stress disorder denied in 1990, successfully reopened the claim in 1995, leading to an award in 1997 with an effective date set at the time of his reopening request. The court's decision confirms that the DVA regulation appropriately defines the effective date as the reopening date, emphasizing that a reopened claim is treated as a new claim.

The BVA denied an earlier effective date for the appellant's service connection claim, determining that the earliest effective date could only be the date the application to reopen was received, as stipulated by 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) and related regulations. The Veterans Court upheld this decision in August 2002, emphasizing that the law does not support interpreting section 5110(a) to mean the effective date could refer to the original claim instead of the reopening application. The court affirmed that a reopened claim is distinct from the original claim and is treated as a new claim for effective date purposes under 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(q)(1)(ii).

On appeal, the appellant contends that the DVA regulation contradicts sections 5108 and 5110 of Title 38 and should be deemed invalid. The appellant argues that even if the language of sections 5108 and 5110 does not invalidate the regulation on its own, it remains inconsistent with the pro-claimant policy inherent in Title 38. The court possesses jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) and (c) to evaluate the validity of agency regulations. The Supreme Court's Chevron framework is referenced, stating that if Congress has clearly expressed its intent on an issue, that intent must be honored. If congressional intent is ambiguous, the court assesses whether the agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. The appellant claims the DVA regulation conflicts with sections 5108 and 5110, arguing that these sections indicate reopened claims should not be treated as new claims but as previously existing claims that have been revived.

The appellee acknowledges that sections 5108 and 5110 are clear in their language but disputes their meaning, asserting that section 5110 distinguishes three claim types—original, reopened after final adjudication, and for increase—each with unique application dates. The appellee contends that original and reopened claims are separate under section 5110(a), each having distinct application dates. Conversely, the parties do not agree on a singular interpretation of these sections, indicating that the language allows for multiple interpretations, prompting a review of the legislative history to ascertain congressional intent.

Prior to 1962, the effective date for reopened claims was based on the reopening request date, as specified by two statutes: 38 U.S.C. § 3010, which set the effective date as the application receipt date, and 38 U.S.C. § 3004, which characterized reopened claims as new claims. In 1962, Congress repealed § 3004 and amended § 3010, now section 5110, omitting the language that classified reopened claims as having new claim attributes. The appellee argues this omission was unnecessary due to the clear categorization of claims in section 5110.

The appellant counters this by referencing a Senate Report from the 1962 amendments, which states that the effective date for all claims would be based on the date of application receipt, suggesting a change in the treatment of reopened claims compared to the prior law. This language may imply that Congress intended to treat reopened claims differently from new claims, indicating a potential shift in legal interpretation. However, both the statute's language and the legislative history remain open to various interpretations, with the removal of the 'attributes of a new claim' phrase potentially indicating a change in intent or simply being viewed as redundant in the context of the defined claim types in section 5110(a).

Counsel for the appellant acknowledges the lack of clear congressional intent in the legislative history of sections 5110(a) and 5108. The longstanding DVA regulation, which has not been overridden by Congress despite numerous legislative actions on veterans' benefits, suggests that if the regulation were inconsistent with the intended statutory scheme, Congress would have intervened. Since Congress has remained silent on this matter, it is challenging to assert that the DVA regulation contradicts congressional intent. In ambiguous cases where statutory language and history provide no clear guidance, regulations issued by the implementing department receive Chevron deference, indicating that the DVA's regulation is valid provided it is reasonable and aligns with statutory frameworks.

The DVA regulation allows for benefits to date back to the original claim's filing in situations where the claim was denied due to governmental error, as well as in cases of reopening based on new and material evidence like missing service medical records. Section 3.400(q)(1)(ii) applies to instances where new evidence arises from the veteran's or their representative's neglect or advancements in science. The differentiation made by section 3.400 between government errors and situations outside government control is deemed reasonable. While the regulation may not yield the best outcome in every case, it is designed to function reasonably rather than perfectly, often benefiting veterans, especially when the original denial was due to government oversight.

Amendments to statutes or regulations favoring veterans based on new medical knowledge are the prerogative of the Secretary or Congress, not the court. The court's review is confined to the legality of the Secretary's regulation, and it does not assess the wisdom of policies, which should be addressed by the appropriate governmental bodies. 

The appellant contends that Chevron deference should not apply in veterans' cases, asserting that any ambiguity in benefit statutes must be resolved in favor of veterans due to a pro-claimant policy. However, the court disagrees, emphasizing that while it recognizes the pro-claimant intent, it cannot disregard the clear meaning of statutory provisions. The DVA regulation in question aligns with the benefits scheme and provides adequate relief to veterans, even if it occasionally does not yield a pro-claimant result. The court notes that it has never invalidated a regulation entitled to Chevron deference based on a lack of pro-claimant outcomes.

The court affirms that when a statute is ambiguous and the agency has issued a reasonable regulation to address this ambiguity, that regulation must be upheld. The standard for validity is reasonableness, which the DVA regulation meets. Consequently, it concludes that sections 5108 and 5110 of Title 38 do not specify the earliest effective date for service connection upon reopening a claim, and the regulation's application in Mr. Lawton's case is sustained. The denial of an earlier effective date for his benefits is thus affirmed. Judge Clevenger concurs, agreeing with the court's conclusion regarding the effective date for compensation awards based on reopened claims.

The plain meaning of section 5110(a) indicates that the term 'therefor' refers to 'award,' establishing that the effective date of an award based on a reopened claim cannot precede the date of the application for that award. Furthermore, the statute specifies that for original claims or claims for increased benefits, the effective date similarly cannot be earlier than the application date. The phrase 'application therefor' unequivocally pertains to an application for a specific award, not a claim itself. The classification of a reopened claim as either 'new' or a reassessment of the original claim by the Secretary does not affect the interpretation of section 5110(a). Ultimately, the statute presents no ambiguity regarding the effective dates of various awards, which are governed by its plain meaning.