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United States v. Travis Bryant
Citations: 349 F.3d 1093; 2003 WL 22722832Docket: 03-1581
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; December 17, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Travis Bryant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 120 months in prison. On appeal, he challenged both his conviction and sentence. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, affirming that the government presented adequate evidence to support the conviction. Key testimonies from Gary McElroy and Johnny Wells identified Bryant as the shooter in a traffic incident, despite conflicting witness accounts. The court emphasized the jury's role in resolving such conflicts and found the evidence sufficient to establish that Bryant possessed a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, Bryant argued that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new trial due to a variance between the indictment and trial evidence. The court found no variance, as the indictment accurately reflected that Bryant, a convicted felon, knowingly possessed a firearm affecting interstate commerce. Consequently, the district court's decision not to grant a new trial was upheld. Mr. Bryant contends that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor to misstate the law during closing arguments, arguing that the jury was misled regarding the elements of the offense. Specifically, he points to the prosecutor's repeated question, "Was Travis there?" asserting that this suggested his mere presence at the scene was enough for a conviction. To succeed in his claim, Mr. Bryant must prove that the prosecutor's remarks were improper and prejudicial to his right to a fair trial. The court found that the prosecutor's statements were not improper when considered in the context of the entire trial. Mr. Bryant's defense was based on denying his presence at the scene, yet three witnesses identified him there, making the prosecutor's comments appropriate in light of the defense strategy. The court determined that any potential error in the prosecutor's remarks was harmless, considering the overall strength of the evidence against Mr. Bryant, which included eyewitness identifications that strongly implicated him as the shooter. Additionally, the district court did not take curative measures in response to the objection raised by Mr. Bryant's attorney, but it did offer to clarify the law regarding the sufficiency of mere presence for conviction. Mr. Bryant's counsel declined this offer, limiting his ability to argue that a curative instruction was necessary. Overall, the evidence against Mr. Bryant was compelling, and minor misstatements by the prosecutor did not justify a new trial. Mr. Bryant challenges the district court's jury instruction on 'possession,' arguing it, along with the prosecutor's closing argument, effectively amended the indictment from alleging sole, actual possession of a firearm to constructive possession. The district court provided Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction No. 8.02, defining actual possession as direct physical control and constructive possession as the intention to exercise dominion over a thing. Mr. Bryant's attorney objected to the timing of the instruction and its potential to confuse the jury, but did not propose an alternative instruction. On appeal, Mr. Bryant contends that the combination of the instruction and the prosecutor's rebuttal argument constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment, which is reversible error. However, the indictment did not specify the type of possession, and the government did not present evidence of constructive possession. Thus, neither the prosecutor nor the court altered the essential elements of the charged offense. While the instruction could have confused the jury, any error was deemed harmless due to the lack of evidence supporting a finding of constructive possession. Furthermore, the district court enhanced Mr. Bryant's sentence by four levels for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, citing U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5). Although state charges for related felonies were dismissed, the guidelines define a 'felony offense' broadly, including any punishable offense regardless of conviction status. The court's factual findings regarding Mr. Bryant's involvement in contemporaneous felonies were found to be sufficient to support the sentence enhancement. Ultimately, the judgment and sentence of the district court were affirmed.