Carolyn Freeman v. Scott Busch Gene C. Hildreth John Hatfield Simpson College, Carolyn Freeman v. Scott Busch

Citations: 349 F.3d 582; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23311; 2003 WL 22697973Docket: 02-2650, 02-2734

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 17, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Carolyn Freeman attended a party hosted by Scott Busch, Gene Hildreth, and John Hatfield in Busch's dorm room at Simpson College, where she became inebriated and passed out. After allegedly being sexually assaulted, Freeman filed tort claims against the college and the individuals involved. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Simpson College and partially for Busch. A jury trial on remaining claims resulted in a verdict for Freeman, prompting her appeal concerning the summary judgments and the rejection of her punitive damages claim. Busch cross-appealed, contesting a denied mistrial motion and jury instructions. 

During the party, alcohol was provided by attendees, and Freeman became visibly intoxicated. After passing out and becoming ill, she was helped to change clothes by Busch and others, who subsequently left her alone with Busch. Busch informed a resident assistant about Freeman's condition and was advised to monitor her. Later, Busch claimed that he and Freeman engaged in consensual sex after she awoke; however, Freeman, who had no memory of the events after becoming inebriated, accused Busch of sexual assault. Additionally, Busch allowed Hatfield and Hildreth to fondle Freeman while she was unconscious. Freeman awoke the next morning confused and suspicious about the previous night’s events. The court ultimately affirmed the district court's decisions.

Freeman initiated a lawsuit against Simpson College, Busch, Hildreth, and Hatfield, alleging negligence against Busch for not calling for medical help, and against Simpson College for the actions of its employees, Busch and Huggins. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Simpson College and Busch, dismissing these claims. Freeman also claimed sexual battery against Busch, Hildreth, and Hatfield, as well as negligence related to the delivery of alcohol to a minor against Busch. Hildreth and Busch counterclaimed, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. Freeman's attempt to amend her complaint to seek punitive damages was denied by the district court. The trial proceeded on the sexual battery and alcohol-related negligence claims, leading to a jury verdict that favored Freeman, awarding her a total of $81,396.27 in damages: $66,947.64 from Busch, $14,447.63 from Hildreth, and $1.00 from Hatfield. Both Freeman and Busch filed appeals. Freeman contests the summary judgment grants and the dismissal of her punitive damages claim. Upon reviewing the summary judgment, it was determined that Simpson College could be liable for Huggins' actions only if he was acting within the scope of his duties as a resident assistant (R.A.), which is acknowledged by the college, contingent on proving Huggins' negligence. Freeman must demonstrate Huggins owed her a legal duty, breached that duty, and caused her damages, referencing specific legal doctrines from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Freeman contends that Huggins had a legal duty towards her based on Restatement 314A due to a claimed special relationship, which typically exists in dependencies such as common carrier/passenger or innkeeper/guest. However, established case law indicates that no such special relationship exists between a college and its students, as colleges are not considered insurers of student safety. Previous rulings have affirmed that the concept of in loco parentis, which suggested a custodial duty, is no longer applicable, and the responsibility of universities is primarily educational, not custodial. Freeman's request to recognize a new special relationship between a college and a student's guest is rejected due to a lack of precedent and the potential for an excessive expansion of legal duty.

Additionally, Freeman argues that Huggins assumed a duty to aid her under Restatement 324, which allows for the assumption of duty if one takes charge of another. However, this requires evidence of specific actions indicating control or custody. A relevant case, Garofalo, illustrates that merely assisting someone does not constitute "taking charge" unless there is clear evidence of control. In that case, the court ruled that the fraternity member did not take charge of the deceased student, thereby limiting the scope of assumed duty under Restatement 324.

Huggins did not assume control over Freeman's welfare despite being informed of her intoxication and condition by Busch. He instructed Busch to monitor Freeman and report back if her health declined, thus failing to demonstrate any legal duty to assist her. Consequently, Freeman's negligence claims against Simpson College, based on respondeat superior, were dismissed due to the lack of established duty under Restatement 314A or 324. 

Freeman's challenge to the district court's summary judgment in favor of Busch was also unsuccessful, as she did not present relevant arguments or evidence regarding Busch's duty to summon medical assistance during the initial proceedings. Her focus was on other claims, and she failed to provide authoritative support to counter the summary judgment, rendering her arguments on appeal unaddressable.

Furthermore, Freeman's request to amend her complaint to include punitive damages was denied. The district court determined that Freeman did not demonstrate good cause for the late amendment, which was filed ten months after the scheduling order. The court's discretion in requiring good cause was upheld since Freeman provided no justification for the delay.

On cross-appeal, Busch raised issues regarding a mistrial ruling and jury instructions. He contested the inclusion of an 'egg-shell plaintiff' instruction, which allows recovery for exacerbated pre-existing conditions. However, such an instruction requires sufficient evidence to support its submission, which was not established.

Freeman was granted a jury instruction regarding the "egg-shell plaintiff" doctrine, which stated that if the jury found she had a pre-existing condition making her more susceptible to injury, Busch would be liable for all damages she suffered, even if these damages exceeded those of a person in normal health. The district court's decision to provide this instruction was upheld, as there was sufficient evidence of Freeman's prior trauma and psychological counseling to support it. Busch's motion for mistrial due to Freeman's alleged pretrial order violation was not considered, as he failed to raise the issue in a timely manner, resulting in a waiver of his right to appeal that matter. The court affirmed the district court's rulings and granted Freeman's motion to strike Busch's late claims. Additionally, Freeman's contention regarding the exclusion of evidence related to Rohypnol was deemed unpreserved, and even if preserved, lacked merit due to the absence of evidence that it was used. Freeman's arguments attempting to establish an agency relationship and analogies to landlord-tenant or business-invitee relationships were unsupported by Iowa law. Busch's claims of evidentiary errors and insufficient evidence were also rejected without further discussion. Overall, the court affirmed the district court's thorough rulings.

A plaintiff can recover damages for a pre-existing condition if a defendant's actions have worsened that condition, as established by the "egg-shell plaintiff" rule, which dictates that a defendant is liable for a plaintiff's injuries as they find her. This instruction is only appropriate if there is sufficient evidence to support it. In this case, Freeman received such an instruction, indicating that if the jury found Freeman had a pre-existing condition that made her more susceptible to injury, Busch would be responsible for all resultant damages, even if those damages exceeded what a normal person would experience. Evidence presented at trial included Freeman's past molestation and psychological counseling, providing a factual basis for the instruction, which the district court deemed proper and did not abuse its discretion in issuing.

Busch's motion for a mistrial was denied due to Freeman's alleged violation of a pretrial order; however, this issue was not timely raised, leading to its waiver and the granting of Freeman's motion to strike. The district court's rulings were affirmed in full. Freeman also contended that the court improperly restricted her from introducing evidence regarding Rohypnol, but this issue was not preserved for appeal, and even if it had been, it lacked merit due to a lack of supporting evidence. Finally, Freeman's argument regarding the creation of an agency relationship between Huggins and Busch was unsupported by case law or the record.

The excerpt highlights that the general rule regarding the relationship between colleges and their students is not absolute. Courts have recognized exceptions, particularly distinguishing between the relationships with regular students and student-athletes. In Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, the court identified a specific relationship due to the unique context of student-athletes. In Schieszler v. Ferrum College, while a general university/student relationship was found lacking, a special relationship was established due to the college's knowledge of a student's emotional issues and threats of self-harm. Furek v. University of Delaware established a duty of care in fraternity hazing situations, and McClure v. Fairfield University reiterated that the duty to students is not absolute, referencing Restatement principles. Additionally, the excerpt addresses Busch's attempts to compare her situation to landlord-tenant and business-invitee relationships, noting that such comparisons lack support under Iowa law. Busch also raised claims of evidentiary errors and insufficient evidence for the jury's verdict, which the court rejected, affirming the district court's rulings without further discussion.