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White v. Robinson Lumber Co.
Citations: 929 So. 2d 231; 2006 La. App. LEXIS 1229; 2006 WL 1382097Docket: No. 2005-CA-0923
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 28, 2006; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Linda and Roland White, Sr. appeal a judgment from the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration (OWC) that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Robinson Lumber Company, Inc. and its insurer, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation. Roland White, Jr. had previously sustained a torn rotator cuff injury in December 2002, for which he received workers’ compensation benefits. In May 2004, White and the defendants reached a settlement of $30,000, which was approved by the OWC. White passed away on May 22, 2004, reportedly due to pain medication complications. Subsequently, his parents filed a claim for workers’ compensation death benefits on July 23, 2004, asserting entitlement under La. R.S. 23:1231. The defendants contended that the prior settlement precluded the parents’ claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed the claim with prejudice. The appellate court examined the settlement language, which included a waiver of all future claims against the employer and insurer, confirming that Roland White, Jr.’s settlement effectively released the defendants from any further liability, including claims for death benefits. The court affirmed the OWC’s judgment, concluding that the parents' claim was indeed derivative of their son's prior claim and thus barred by the settlement. The Order of Approval, signed by the trial court on May 17, 2004, stipulates that upon payment of $30,000, the Employer and Insurer are permanently relieved from all past, present, and future medical and rehabilitative expenses, workers’ compensation benefits, and claims arising from any incidents prior to the agreement, including those related to chiropractic treatment by Dr. Brandtmeier. The legal issue at hand is novel within the circuit, with no guidance from the Supreme Court, though the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal have addressed similar matters. In the case of Condoll v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., the injured worker settled his claim for $25,000, releasing the employer from further liability. Following the worker's death, his wife sought death benefits, claiming the death was due to the occupational disease. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the appeal focused on whether the settlement affected the spouse's claim for death benefits under La. R.S. 23:1061. The appellate court emphasized that the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not allow a dependent spouse to be part of a pre-death settlement. It clarified that while both the injured worker and dependents have rights stemming from the same cause of action (the compensable injury), these rights are distinct. The dependents can only pursue compensation upon the worker’s death, and benefits for the dependents are contingent upon the establishment of a compensable injury to the employee. Compensation for dependents following an employee's death is not new compensation for death but a continuation of prior injury compensation, as established by LSA-R.S. 23:1236. This statute stipulates that dependent compensation starts from the date of the last payment made to the deceased employee. If an employee has settled their compensation claim, releasing the employer from further liability, dependents cannot recover death benefits, adhering to the principle against double recovery in the state's Workmen’s Compensation law. In the Price v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that dependents are entitled to continue receiving the compensation that was being paid to the injured employee at their death, rather than seeking new benefits. Once the employee's claim is settled, the dependent's right to continued benefits is extinguished, unless the settlement can be overturned due to fraud, misrepresentation, or procedural failures. The defendants argue that Roland White, Jr. settled all claims related to his injury, including those stemming from chiropractic treatment, and the settlement clearly relieved them from future compensation obligations. Conversely, the plaintiffs cite Bouy v. Teche Electric Cooperative, Inc., where the court ruled that a settlement did not extinguish a dependent's right to claim death benefits. In that case, the dependent’s claim arose from the employee's death rather than the initial injury, indicating that the right of action under La.R.S. 23:1231 remains intact upon the employee's death, despite the prior settlement. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that an employee can compromise their rights, including those of their dependents, for death benefits since the dependent's claims are derivative of the employee's rights. The legal analysis addresses the distinction between a deceased employee's claims and the rights of dependents to claim death benefits. It notes that earlier cases viewed death benefits as dependent on the employee's claims, while recent rulings from the supreme court clarify that wrongful death claims are independent and arise directly in favor of the beneficiaries. This raises questions about the continued relevance of prior Fifth Circuit decisions. The supreme court has determined that for a settlement agreement to encompass claims for death benefits, the intent must be clearly indicated in the agreement. In the current case, Mr. Bouy’s settlement only pertains to injuries sustained to his legs, without reference to complications arising from medical treatment, such as Hepatitis C, which he contracted unbeknownst to the parties during the settlement. Consequently, the agreement does not suggest that his injuries would lead to death, indicating that Mrs. Bouy's right to pursue death benefits remains intact. The ruling also references the case of Brown v. Drillers, Inc., where the court reaffirmed that a surviving spouse cannot compromise wrongful death claims before the death of the tort victim, emphasizing that personal injury and wrongful death actions are legally distinct despite stemming from the same tortious act. The conclusion reverses the grant of an exception of no right of action and remands for further proceedings, highlighting the need for clarity in settlement agreements regarding the inclusion or exclusion of wrongful death claims. The beneficiaries’ wrongful death action arises automatically upon the death of the tort victim and is designed to compensate a designated group for losses resulting from the wrongful killing. This action accounts for damages incurred by beneficiaries from the moment of the victim’s death, covering both economic and emotional losses. Importantly, the tort victim cannot compromise or affect the beneficiaries’ wrongful death action because it is an independent claim that exists separately from any personal injury claims of the victim. Louisiana law establishes that a victim’s settlement with a defendant does not preclude beneficiaries from pursuing a wrongful death claim against the same defendant for the same issues. The court emphasizes that the wrongful death action is not derivative of the victim's injuries but is a distinct cause of action that compensates beneficiaries for their individual losses following the death. The nature of the wrongful death action, as discussed in relevant Louisiana cases, reveals that it is relational, involving both the actor causing the death and the deceased victim. While wrongful death and survival actions may arise from the same tort, they serve different purposes and are initiated at different times, with survival actions depending on the victim having a viable claim at the time of death. Overall, the distinction between these actions is crucial in understanding the rights of beneficiaries following a wrongful death. The derivative claim arises only when another party is injured, serving as a secondary layer of liability to the primary victim. A wrongful death claim compensates beneficiaries for their own distinct injuries, separate from the victim’s injuries, which are addressed through a derivative survival action. Thus, wrongful death is not a derivative cause of action, and arguments suggesting otherwise are unmeritorious. The appeal concerns whether a workers' compensation death benefits claim is derivative. Following precedents from the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit, it is determined that such a claim is indeed derivative, as it does not exist independently of a job-related injury and subsequent death while receiving workers' compensation. The dependent's entitlement to benefits is a continuation of compensation for the injury, not a new claim for death. Additionally, a settlement agreement by Roland White, Jr. waived all claims under Louisiana's workers' compensation statutes related to prior injuries, including the death benefits claim asserted by his parents. This waiver encompasses claims arising from his injuries sustained in a December 2002 accident. Consequently, regardless of the circumstances of his death, the claim for death benefits has been waived. The judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration is affirmed. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 23:1231 outlines benefits for dependents of employees who die from job-related injuries, specifying lump-sum payments to surviving parents if no legal dependents exist.