Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; October 2, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Stephen D. Akridge appeals his convictions for possessing and distributing crack cocaine, conspiring to possess crack cocaine, and possessing firearms in connection with drug trafficking, as well as possessing a firearm as a felon. Akridge argues that the district court erred by not suppressing the pre-trial statements and testimony of co-conspirators Kevin Ellison and Tiffany Stewart, claiming they were obtained as a result of an illegal search. The Government counters that the testimony was admissible under the "inevitable discovery" or "attenuation" exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
The case background includes a January 25, 1999 search of Ellison's residence that uncovered marijuana and firearms, leading to a federal investigation. On May 2, 2000, police conducted a "knock and talk" at Akridge's residence, shared with Ellison and Stewart, following an anonymous tip about drug sales. The search resulted in the discovery of marijuana, cocaine, and firearms. An officer suggested a blame-shifting strategy among the residents, leading to Stewart's arrest while Akridge and Ellison remained.
Subsequently, on June 19, 2000, ATF interviewed all three, during which they admitted involvement in drug trafficking, although Akridge denies admitting to firearms possession. They were arrested the next day, and Stewart later entered a plea agreement in January 2001, admitting to aiding in drug trafficking. The court ultimately affirmed the district court's decision to deny Akridge's motion to suppress.
On January 22, 2001, the district court granted Akridge's motion to suppress evidence from a May 2000 search of his apartment and his June 2000 statement. Subsequently, Akridge sought to expand this suppression order to include all previous and future testimony from co-defendants Ellison and Stewart, claiming their testimony stemmed from the illegal search. The court held a hearing on this motion on April 30, 2001, relying on prior factual findings and new affidavits, ultimately denying Akridge's motion. Akridge proceeded to trial on May 7, 2001, where Ellison and Stewart testified for the prosecution, alongside Akridge’s neighbor, aunt, and a tape of an incriminating phone call from jail.
Ellison, who had lived with Akridge for about fifteen years, testified about their involvement in drug sales and Akridge's firearm possession. Stewart, Ellison’s girlfriend, corroborated drug distribution activities and Akridge's use of firearms. The jury convicted Akridge on multiple counts, including conspiracy and possession of drugs and firearms. A pre-sentence report included statements from Ellison and Stewart, which Akridge contested. The district court sentenced him to a total of 660 months in prison. Akridge filed an appeal on September 21, 2001, arguing for the suppression of Ellison's and Stewart's testimony based on the exclusionary rule. The standard of review for the appeal involves a mixed standard, reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, favoring the Government's evidence.
The exclusionary rule prevents the admission of evidence obtained through unconstitutional means, including both tangible evidence and verbal statements, as established in Wong Sun v. United States. This rule encompasses not only primary evidence from illegal searches but also derivative evidence, known as "fruit of the poisonous tree," from subsequent discoveries linked to the original illegality, as clarified in cases like Segura v. United States and Murray v. United States. Evidence can be excluded if it is a direct result of an unconstitutional search; however, it may be admissible if the connection to the illegal conduct is sufficiently attenuated. The exclusionary rule serves as a judicial remedy and is applied in contexts where its objectives are most effectively met. Key exceptions to the rule include the "independent source" doctrine, which allows evidence to be admitted if obtained from a legal source unrelated to the illegal search, and the "inevitable discovery" doctrine, which permits admission of evidence that would have been discovered lawfully regardless of the initial unlawful search.
The Supreme Court has established standards for the suppression of live witness testimony, notably through the "attenuation doctrine," as seen in cases like *United States v. Ceccolini* and its subsequent applications in various circuits. According to *Ceccolini*, witness testimony can be admitted even if their identities were revealed during an unconstitutional search, provided that a closer connection between the illegality and the testimony exists. In the current case, the district court ruled that the exclusionary rule did not mandate the exclusion of testimonies from co-defendants Ellison and Stewart, despite Akridge's claim that their identities were found due to an illegal search.
Akridge's motion to suppress their testimony argued that the illegal search directly led to the discovery of the witnesses and their incriminating statements. However, the district court found two main reasons to deny this motion: first, Ellison was already under federal investigation for drug-related offenses, suggesting that his and Stewart’s testimony would have been inevitably discovered; second, the court applied the *Ceccolini* factors, concluding that the balance of circumstances favored the inclusion of their testimonies. The court noted that, given Ellison's ongoing investigation, law enforcement likely already knew of Akridge's connections to Ellison, and thus, the costs of exclusion outweighed the potential deterrent effects. While some factors favored exclusion, especially regarding Stewart's prior anonymity, the majority favored inclusion, leading to the denial of Akridge's motion to extend the prior suppression ruling.
The district court's ruling was affirmed based on the Ceccolini analysis, which deemed it applicable over the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court found that the factors from Ceccolini weighed against excluding testimony from witnesses Stewart and Ellison. The Supreme Court's discussion in Wong Sun established that the exclusionary rule does not differentiate between physical and verbal evidence, while Ceccolini clarified that the exclusionary rule does not automatically prevent testimony based on illegal searches, but rather depends on the degree of attenuation between the illegal act and the testimony.
Key considerations from Ceccolini include: (1) whether the testimony was given freely, (2) the extent to which the illegal search influenced the testimony, (3) the time elapsed between the search and the witness's testimony, and (4) the nature of the officials' misconduct. Additional factors may also include the witness's willingness to testify, intervening circumstances, and the relationship between the witness and the defendant prior to the search.
In this case, Akridge argued on appeal that the illegal search was integral to discovering Stewart and the relationships involved, positing that even if identities were known, it was uncertain whether Ellison and Stewart would have testified against him without the illegal search.
Akridge contests the legality of evidence obtained following a police search on May 2, 2000, asserting that the identities and testimonies of co-residents Stewart and Ellison should be suppressed due to the search's illegality. Akridge emphasizes that unlike Ellison, Stewart was not known to investigators prior to the search, and living with Ellison does not imply that her testimony would have been discovered without the illegal search. The timeline reveals that when police arrived at the apartment, Akridge voluntarily identified himself and the others as occupants, initiating a search consent based on misleading claims by the officers regarding a drug investigation. The court concludes that Akridge’s identity and relationship with Stewart and Ellison were known to the police prior to any illegality, thus negating the impact of the exclusionary rule on their identities. Akridge also argues that subsequent statements made by Ellison and Stewart during interviews and trial are tainted by the illegal search, claiming a causal link between the search and their testimony. He contends that the government cannot prove that the incriminating information would have been inevitably discovered without the illegal search.
The key factors influencing the court's decision include the degree of free will exercised by Ellison and Stewart, and the temporal distance between the May search, the June questioning, and their plea agreements and trial testimony. The court assessed the purpose and severity of the police misconduct, noting that the May 2 search aimed to find evidence of drug trafficking, not specifically the witness testimony in question. The Supreme Court's precedent indicates that a stronger link between illegal actions and live-witness testimony is necessary for suppression.
It was determined that the threat of prosecution influenced Ellison's and Stewart's willingness to cooperate during questioning and enter plea agreements. Despite the government's claim that the evidence from the May search was not mentioned during questioning, the context of their co-defendant status and ongoing prosecution was significant. Ultimately, the court found that the temporal distance and the exercise of free will by Ellison and Stewart supported denying Akridge's suppression motion.
During the June 19 interview, Akridge, Stewart, and Ellison cooperated with police after initially denying Stewart's presence. They were handcuffed for transport but not during questioning, where they admitted to drug-related offenses. Ellison later stated that his decision to plead guilty was motivated by the risk of enhanced sentencing due to prior criminal charges, as well as a desire to set a better example for his son. He acknowledged the need to disclose his co-defendants' involvement in illegal activities but chose to fully cooperate, testifying both favorably for Akridge at the suppression hearing and against him at trial.
Ellison was facing prosecution as a career offender, and although his direct relationship with Akridge was not disclosed until May 2000, he voluntarily participated in questioning by the Government. Several months later, in October, Ellison entered a plea agreement that required his cooperation in future investigations and included his trial testimony against Akridge. The findings indicate that Ellison's cooperation and testimony were the result of his free will, stemming from thoughtful consideration and a desire to be cooperative, despite Akridge’s argument that Ellison faced a coercive choice due to impending prosecutions.
The analysis emphasizes that the exclusionary rule does not apply to live witness testimony, as disqualifying knowledgeable witnesses obstructs the pursuit of truth. The conclusion is supported by several factors: the Government's prior knowledge of Ellison's criminal background, the time lapse between the illegal search and questioning, Ellison's willingness to testify, and the impact of his upcoming prosecution and potential career offender enhancement. The connection between the illegal search and Ellison's testimony was deemed sufficiently attenuated.
Regarding Stewart, Akridge contends that she would have lacked motivation to testify against him if her relationship had been discovered, arguing that her decision to plead guilty and cooperate was not an exercise of free will, given that evidence against her could have been suppressed.
Stewart voluntarily returned for questioning and entered a guilty plea on January 5, 2001, following a magistrate's recommendation to suppress evidence related to a May 2000 search. Despite the possibility of suppressing the firearms seized, Stewart chose to cooperate instead. This decision indicated that her motivation was not solely to avoid prosecution, as she could have awaited a suppression ruling before pleading guilty.
Regarding statements made on June 19, unlike Akridge and Ellison, Stewart had been previously in custody but was not continuously detained until her statements were made. She was released after her initial arrest in May and was questioned voluntarily six weeks later. Citing Wong Sun, the court found that the connection between the illegal search and Stewart’s statements was sufficiently attenuated, eliminating the taint of illegality.
The ruling emphasized that the exclusionary rule should not be applied as a blanket prohibition; it should only exclude evidence if it serves the appropriate deterrent effect. The court rejected a strict causal relationship rule regarding evidence obtained following illegal actions. It concluded that the statements and testimony of both Ellison and Stewart were obtained through means sufficiently distinct from the illegal search, thus purging any primary taint. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
The Honorable David A. Katz, presiding judge, concluded that the consent obtained by police officers for a search was coerced, leading to the exclusion of both the physical evidence seized in May 2000 and Akridge's confession from June 19. Testimonies from Akridge's aunt and neighbor indicated they purchased drugs from him. Akridge's phone conversation criticized Ellison's cooperation with authorities, revealing his concerns about disclosures made by Ellison. The court referenced an unpublished case, United States v. Millis, which upheld the admissibility of witness testimony despite initial illegalities, emphasizing that the co-defendant's independent cooperation mitigated potential taint. The dissenting opinion was challenged for neglecting the timeline; Akridge had informed officers of his roommates before the unlawful entry, suggesting that police knowledge of their association was not solely derived from the illegal act. The court clarified that mere illegality does not justify exclusion under Ceccolini, as the discovery of connections among the individuals involved was supported by both evidence from the search and subsequent statements. Additionally, Ellison and Stewart's plea agreements included cooperation clauses, with the government acknowledging Stewart's obligation to testify against Akridge.
The time elapsed between the trial and the initial contact with witnesses Stewart and Ellison is deemed non-critical, as both were bound by their plea agreements to assist in the Government's investigation and prosecution. Despite an eight-month gap between the May 2000 search and Stewart's plea, and a five-month gap for Ellison, their obligations to testify at Akridge's trial were established upon their plea agreement entry. The case references Ceccolini, highlighting that the analysis might differ if the police search aimed to find potential witnesses. It is noted that law enforcement interviewed Ellison and Stewart, who were initially handcuffed but not arrested, and that they waived their rights before providing statements. The dissent argues against the possibility of the witnesses testifying voluntarily due to the benefits of their plea agreements. However, it is countered that such a view would unjustly prevent co-defendant witnesses from testifying if their identities were initially revealed through an unlawful search. The text emphasizes that post-Ceccolini, courts have upheld the admissibility of testimony from co-defendants under various circumstances, rejecting the notion that only “good citizen” witnesses are allowed to testify without a connection to the search.
Testimony obtained through a grant of immunity is deemed admissible, as established in United States v. Stevens, where a coconspirator testified under a plea bargain and was allowed to challenge the legality of wiretaps. The witness's decision to testify was influenced by a desire to change his lifestyle. Both Ellison and Akridge were already known drug dealers, with Ellison under investigation before a 1999 search. The dissent references United States v. Ienco, arguing that other circuits have rejected the majority's stance; however, the circumstances in Ienco were unique, involving prolonged custody without proper Miranda rights. In contrast, the witnesses in the current case voluntarily submitted to questioning after waiving rights and months after the initial illegal search. Dissent also cites United States v. Padilla, which is distinguishable due to the immediate link between drug discovery and questioning, unlike in the present situation where the identities of the defendants were known prior to the illegal search. On May 2, 2000, police conducted an unconstitutional search of Akridge’s apartment, seizing drugs and firearms. Following their arrest on June 20, 2000, Stewart entered a plea agreement a week later, while Akridge and Ellison sought to suppress the evidence. Ellison later waived the suppression issue in his October 2000 plea agreement. Eventually, the district court ruled to suppress the evidence from the unconstitutional search on January 22, 2001.
The prosecution utilized the testimonies of Ellison and Stewart to indirectly establish physical evidence against Akridge, leading to his conviction. The majority opinion found the testimonies admissible despite their derivation from an illegal search, asserting they were sufficiently "attenuated" from the unlawful act, referencing the United States v. Ceccolini case. In Ceccolini, an illegal seizure occurred when Officer Biro discovered incriminating evidence at a flower shop, which led to a witness, Hennessey, providing testimony against the defendant Ceccolini. The Supreme Court ruled Hennessey’s testimony admissible, focusing on five factors that demonstrated attenuation, notably that her decision to speak with police was not influenced by the illegal search. Other considerations included the absence of the gambling slips in her questioning, the significant time lapse between the illegal search and her testimony, prior knowledge of her connection to Ceccolini, and the lack of any intent by Biro to find incriminating evidence through the illegal search. This framework for evaluating attenuation is critical in determining the admissibility of evidence in similar contexts.
The application of the Ceccolini factors in this case leads to the conclusion that the testimonial evidence must be suppressed. The critical factor is the issue of free will, where the majority argues that Ellison's and Stewart's testimonies were voluntary, a claim the dissenting opinion disputes. Ellison and Stewart were apprehended with significant quantities of drugs and firearms, facing life sentences under their initial indictments. The government offered a plea bargain: testify against Akridge for a reduced sentence or challenge the suppression issue and risk a harsher penalty. They chose to testify, resulting in significantly lighter sentences, indicating they were indeed coerced or induced by the government's actions.
The dissent highlights the irony in the affidavits from Ellison and Stewart, which assert their decision to testify was voluntary and driven by a desire to change their lives. However, these affidavits were likely signed under the threat of losing their plea deals. Even if there was a genuine desire to tell the truth, it was clearly influenced by the circumstances surrounding the illegal search. The dissent emphasizes that while their plea bargaining was a choice, it does not equate to true voluntariness as defined by Ceccolini, which distinguishes between witnesses who testify freely and those who do so under governmental pressure. In contrast to the civic-minded witness in Ceccolini, Ellison and Stewart were under significant threat of severe penalties, clearly indicating their testimonies were not freely given.
Defendants Stewart and Ellison's actions cannot be deemed "free" in light of the Supreme Court's established meaning of the term, particularly given the context of their testimonies, which were extracted under circumstances lacking true voluntary consent. The argument against the majority's position is supported by the attenuation doctrine, which is rendered inapplicable here due to several critical differences from the Ceccolini case. Unlike Ceccolini, where the identity and connection of the involved parties were known prior to an illegal search, the police lacked prior knowledge of Stewart and the relationship between Ellison and Akridge until after the unconstitutional search. Moreover, unlike the investigators in Ceccolini, who did not mention the illegal search in subsequent interviews, Officer Cordell Malone acknowledged discussing the earlier unlawful search with Ellison and Stewart. Additionally, the unconstitutional search here was explicitly conducted to gather evidence against the defendants, contrasting with Ceccolini, where the search was incidental. Consequently, all factors from Ceccolini suggest that the testimonies of Ellison and Stewart should be suppressed, revealing a significant miscarriage of justice where the government has benefited from its own constitutional violations. The dissent emphasizes the undue leniency shown to Stewart and Ellison in their plea deals compared to Akridge, highlighting the disparity in sentencing despite similar involvement in the alleged crimes.
Police discovered firearms and marijuana in Ellison's residence over a year prior, but subsequent illegal searches led to multiple charges against him. The illegal search significantly influenced both Ellison and Stewart's decision to enter a plea agreement with the government. The distinction between merely knowing the identities of individuals and being able to prosecute them is highlighted as crucial. The majority opinion's assertion that this case sets a per se rule is challenged, as it overlooks the specific circumstances where the illegality directly impacted the witnesses' choices. Previous cases, such as United States v. Ienco and United States v. Padilla, illustrate that plea agreements made under duress from illegal searches do not reflect free will. In these precedents, courts found that the pressure to testify against co-defendants was a result of illegal actions by law enforcement, thereby questioning the voluntariness of the testimony. The majority's attempt to distinguish these cases by timing does not hold, as there is no precedent where testimonies obtained under similar pressures have been deemed sufficiently attenuated from the illegality. The quick compliance of Stewart and Ellison with prosecutorial demands suggests a lack of free choice rather than a demonstration of free will. Legal commentary supports the notion that findings of attenuation are unlikely when witness pressure stems from prior Fourth Amendment violations.
