Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; September 10, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Juan Arturo Mendoza-Medina appealed his convictions for conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute over fifty kilograms of marijuana. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, determining that errors in the jury charge regarding deliberate indifference were harmless and that hearsay evidence admission did not constitute plain error. Although the trial court erred by allowing a government agent's opinion testimony, this was ruled as non-reversible error given the case's circumstances, with a caution to trial judges against excessive use of such "expert" testimony, which risks becoming akin to evidentiary profiles.
Mendoza-Medina was indicted on January 8, 2002, for two counts related to marijuana distribution. His first trial resulted in a mistrial due to one juror's uncertainty, leading to a retrial. In the second trial, Senior Border Patrol Agent Mario Rebolledo testified that his drug detection dog alerted to Mendoza-Medina’s tractor-trailer at a checkpoint, leading to a secondary inspection and the discovery of marijuana in boxes within the trailer. After his arrest, Mendoza-Medina was read his rights, waived them, and initially denied involvement in the substance found.
Later, DEA agents interviewed Mendoza-Medina, during which his children were present in the processing room, occasionally interrupting. He expressed concern for his children’s welfare, leading to a statement indicating a willingness to take the blame and cooperate with the authorities, claiming he would tell them "anything [they] wanted to hear."
Mendoza-Medina reported to agents that his employer, Julian Ramirez, recruited him to smuggle marijuana alongside a legitimate load of women's jeans being transported to New York. The marijuana was to be dropped off in Dallas, with plans to meet at the Pilot Station Truck Stop. For this task, Ramirez promised Mendoza-Medina $3,000, and he claimed it was his first experience with drug smuggling, keeping it hidden from his wife. Agents later confirmed his wife's ignorance of the operation.
Upon investigating, agents found phone communications between Mendoza-Medina and Ramirez and discovered a bill of lading indicating that Ramirez had picked up the trailer on December 20, shortly before Mendoza-Medina's involvement began. They noted Ramirez's prior drug trafficking conviction. The trailer, which was locked and sealed, had been loaded with jeans on December 20. A shipping company employee testified that the trailer had been tampered with post-seizure, suggesting possible illegal access without damaging the seal.
At trial, DEA Special Agent Keith Warzecha testified as an expert, estimating the marijuana's value at $77,600 in Laredo and $135,000 in Dallas. He discussed typical drug trafficking methods, including how traffickers often target financially desperate individuals for smuggling, initially giving them smaller loads before escalating to larger shipments. The court acknowledged that traffickers sometimes conceal drugs from drivers without their knowledge.
Warzecha also revealed Ramirez's extensive history of narcotics trafficking, including a significant 1993 conviction and a cash seizure in 2001 amounting to $368,000, which he believed was drug-related. Despite Ramirez's claims regarding the money's origin, no evidence linked Mendoza-Medina to the cash, and Warzecha suggested that Ramirez was not truthful about the circumstances surrounding it.
Mendoza-Medina's wife testified that on December 20, she learned he would transport goods late at night and suggested taking their two four-year-olds with him while leaving their other children with her sister. They picked up a tractor-trailer at a gas station, with Ramirez using their van. At the Laredo North Station, agents separated her and the children from Mendoza-Medina. She heard agents yelling at him, prompting the girls to call for their father. An agent threatened her, stating that if they did not take responsibility, the children would be taken away by the state. Mendoza-Medina subsequently agreed to take responsibility for the drugs to prevent this. His wife noted that agents did not mention Child Protective Services but implied the children would be taken away. During cross-examination, she acknowledged that she had not previously stated the agent threatened to take her children and that she could see the interrogation but did not hear Mendoza-Medina agree to haul drugs.
The jury convicted Mendoza-Medina, and he received concurrent fifty-one month prison terms followed by three years of supervised release. He appealed, contesting the admission of Special Agent Warzecha's expert testimony, claiming it improperly suggested he was aware of the drugs in the truck. Mendoza-Medina cited Warzecha’s statements regarding drug transport dynamics, including drug amounts and the involvement of family members in masking trafficking. He alleged that this testimony was improperly used as substantive evidence in prosecution arguments.
The Government defended Warzecha's testimony as permissible background information that did not directly link Mendoza-Medina's actions to drug courier profiles or imply knowledge of the drugs. They maintained that the jury was adequately instructed to accept or reject the expert opinions, and any potential error was harmless given other evidence of guilt. The excerpt references the case of United States v. Williams, noting that drug courier profiles are prejudicial and inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt, and may violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) when used to establish a defendant's knowledge of transporting drugs.
In United States v. Gutierrez-Farias and United States v. Ramirez-Velasquez, the court determined that the admission of similar expert testimony constituted an abuse of discretion. In Gutierrez-Farias, a DEA agent's testimony regarding the typical knowledge of drug couriers suggested that the defendant, Gutierrez, must have known about the drugs in his vehicle, despite the agent not explicitly stating this. The court found that this implied opinion crossed the line between explaining the facts and opining on the ultimate legal issue, leading to the conclusion that it was inadmissible.
In Ramirez-Velasquez, similar issues arose when the prosecutor sought to elicit an opinion from the agent on whether drivers know what they carry. Although the agent's rephrased testimony did not directly assert that drivers are aware of the drugs, it still implied such knowledge, leading the court to determine that its admission was a plain error. The testimony also included generalizations about the trustworthiness of couriers, which the prosecutor improperly used as substantive evidence to argue that Mendoza-Medina was aware of the drugs.
Despite these errors, the court found the evidence against Mendoza-Medina, including a confession and substantial financial evidence linking him to drug trafficking, to be strong enough that the errors in admitting the expert testimony were deemed harmless.
Mendoza-Medina contends that the district court erred by admitting Agent Warzecha's testimony regarding Ramirez's statements made during his October 2001 arrest, claiming these were hearsay or prior bad acts inadmissible under Rules 801(d)(2)(E) and 404(b). Warzecha testified that Ramirez had a prior conviction for marijuana trafficking and that agents seized $368,000 from him, which Warzecha believed was drug-related. Despite Mendoza-Medina's objections, Warzecha recounted Ramirez's post-arrest statement, where Ramirez claimed Mendoza-Medina accompanied him on a freight trip and asserted he discovered the cash without Mendoza-Medina's knowledge. Warzecha indicated the trip was not logged but noted that Mendoza-Medina and Ramirez had been driving together earlier in October. Additionally, Warzecha implied that Ramirez was deceptive about the cash's discovery.
Mendoza-Medina argues the Government failed to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy and that Ramirez's statement was made to further that conspiracy, which necessitates proving four elements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The court may admit evidence while allowing for subsequent establishment of a foundation by the prosecution. The statement's content alone is insufficient to establish a conspiracy; however, other evidence, including Ramirez's past conviction, the cash seizure, and Mendoza-Medina's acknowledgment of participating in a drug transport, collectively suggest a conspiracy existed between him and Ramirez during the time of the statements made by Ramirez.
Ramirez's statements were made in furtherance of a conspiracy, specifically to hide the source of $368,000, justifying their admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence under Rule 404(b), as it was relevant to Mendoza-Medina's knowledge of the drugs found in his truck, particularly since Ramirez had asked him to transport those drugs and was later found with the cash. Mendoza-Medina's objection to Warzecha's testimony about Ramirez's statements is examined for plain error because he did not raise this objection at trial. Even if Warzecha's account might constitute double hearsay, the court found no substantial error affecting the fairness of the proceedings, as similar testimony could have been obtained from another agent. Mendoza-Medina also challenged the court's deliberate ignorance instruction, asserting it was inappropriate. The review standard for jury instructions requires that the overall charge be a correct and clear statement of applicable laws supported by evidence. The deliberate ignorance instruction is scrutinized due to the risk it poses of convicting a defendant without establishing actual knowledge of illegal activity, potentially lowering the standard to mere negligence.
A two-pronged test is established for a deliberate ignorance instruction, requiring evidence that (1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of illegal conduct, and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning about it. Conscious action is essential; mere negligence or ignorance does not suffice. In this case, the district court erroneously provided a deliberate ignorance instruction despite no request from either party, arguing that the evidence met the criteria outlined in United States v. Wells. However, the court mischaracterized the second prong, mistaking denial of knowledge for purposeful avoidance. The Government claimed evidence of actual knowledge existed due to Mendoza-Medina's admission related to transporting contraband and the circumstances of a cash seizure. Moreover, Mendoza-Medina's testimony and his wife's statements were cited as indicative of a deliberate attempt to avoid knowledge. Ultimately, the conclusion reached is that the district court erred by giving the instruction, as the evidence only indicated that Mendoza-Medina either had actual knowledge or none at all, not deliberate ignorance.
Mendoza-Medina's admission of knowingly carrying drugs, combined with the inference of prior experience during a trip with Ramirez, establishes actual knowledge. Unlike cases where nervousness suggests only possible awareness, his admission implies either actual knowledge or potential coercion. The Government's additional evidence, such as the truck not being picked up at the loading dock, fails to support a conclusion of subjective awareness of illegal activity. Furthermore, the timing of the truck pickup does not indicate a deliberate effort to avoid knowledge of the drugs, as innocent explanations exist. His claims of surprise upon arrest do not indicate guilt but rather suggest a lack of awareness or feigned innocence. The Government's reliance on United States v. Boutte, asserting that lack of evidence for a deliberate ignorance instruction renders it harmless error, is challenged. The court emphasizes that such instructions can confuse juries and should be rarely given. However, substantial evidence of Mendoza-Medina's actual knowledge, including his confession and corroborating evidence from the Ohio trip, ultimately categorizes the deliberate ignorance instruction as harmless error. Despite errors in admitting certain testimony and in giving the deliberate ignorance instruction, the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, leading to the affirmation of the conviction.
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits expert witnesses from offering opinions on a defendant's mental state or condition as it pertains to elements of the crime or defenses in criminal cases, reserving such determinations for the trier of fact. Relevant case law, including United States v. Ramirez-Velasquez and United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, supports this interpretation. Additionally, statements made by a coconspirator during the conspiracy are not considered hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Rule 404(b) allows for the admission of evidence regarding other crimes or acts to establish motives, intent, or identity, provided it does not unfairly prejudice the defendant. Further case precedents emphasize the need for the government to demonstrate a conspiracy independent of any statements made. Issues surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony, particularly from law enforcement, raise concerns about circumventing hearsay rules. The district court's referencing of United States v. Wells was noted as an incorrect citation in relation to United States v. Scott.
