Pickett v. International Paper Co.

Citations: 924 So. 2d 492; 2006 La. App. LEXIS 518; 2006 WL 572132Docket: No. 40,313-CW

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 9, 2006; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Eaton Corporation appeals a judgment that denied its exception of prescription regarding claims filed by plaintiffs George Pickett, Thaud Kierbow, Wilbur Shoemake, Jr., and Herman James. The district court ruled that Webster Parish was a proper venue when the plaintiffs initiated their suit, thereby preventing the claims from prescribing. In August 1999, the plaintiffs filed suit in Webster Parish, alleging asbestos exposure at various job sites, including the International Paper Company and Libbey-Owens-Ford Company. Eaton, as the successor to Libbey, was added as a defendant in March 2001. After a hearing in February 2002, the court transferred the case to Morehouse Parish, noting that plaintiffs' counsel had conceded the impropriety of venue in Webster Parish.

In June 2004, Eaton filed an exception of prescription, arguing that the original filing in Webster Parish did not interrupt the prescription period because it was improper venue and Eaton was not timely served. The Morehouse district court denied this exception, asserting that Webster Parish was a proper venue at the time of filing. Eaton's appeal contends that the trial court erroneously revisited the venue issue after the stipulation made by the plaintiffs, which Eaton argues established that venue was improper. The court clarified that stipulations regarding legal conclusions are not binding and that venue is a legal question, meaning the court retains authority to interpret the law irrespective of the parties' stipulations. The ruling on venue is considered interlocutory, allowing for further review.

A district court retains the discretion to amend interlocutory rulings before final judgment if deemed erroneous, as established in VaSalle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Eaton's argument that the district court could not reconsider venue issues related to the prescription exception is without merit. Eaton claims the district court improperly concluded that venue was appropriate in Webster Parish and argues that the plaintiffs' claims have prescribed due to the petition being filed in an incorrect venue, combined with lack of timely service of process. 

Under Louisiana law, venue is determined by the location of a corporation's registered office or primary business office. An action against a domestic corporation must be brought in the parish of its registered office, while actions against foreign corporations must be filed in the parish of their primary business office or, if unlicensed, in the plaintiffs' domicile. The general rules of venue are subject to specific exceptions. 

For a plaintiff to successfully argue that venue is appropriate under Article 73, they must demonstrate that at least one defendant is properly venued according to Article 42 and that the defendants are joint or solidary obligors. In this case, the plaintiffs’ petition does not establish that Webster Parish is the registered office of any domestic corporation or the primary business location of any foreign corporation. The defendant Asten Group, Inc., identified as a foreign corporation without a designated agent for service, is claimed to be subject to service through the long-arm statute. The plaintiffs argue that venue is proper in Webster Parish since three plaintiffs are domiciled there, and if Asten is correctly venued, then Eaton, as a joint obligor, should also be properly venued. The critical issue hinges on whether the plaintiffs adequately alleged that Asten and Eaton are joint or solidary obligors.

Solidarity in legal liability requires supporting facts linking the tortfeasors. In Franz v. LeDoux, it was established that multiple tortfeasors are not necessarily jointly liable if injuries occur separately. In the current case, the plaintiffs from Webster Parish did not demonstrate that they worked at or were harmed by Eaton's actions, indicating that Eaton is not a joint obligor with Asten regarding these plaintiffs. Consequently, Webster Parish is not a proper venue for claims against Eaton. Although the plaintiffs argued that damages from asbestos exposure occurred in Webster Parish, Eaton's alleged conduct was limited to its facility in Caddo Parish, failing to establish causation for damages in Webster Parish, thus invalidating the venue claim under Article 74.

Regarding prescription, the court found that delictual actions are subject to a one-year liberative prescription starting from the date of injury. While interruption of prescription applies to joint tortfeasors, it only interrupts for defendants served within the prescriptive period if the venue is improper. Eaton was served only in March 2001, well after the prescriptive period ended on August 9, 2000, meaning the plaintiffs’ claims against Eaton have prescribed. The district court's denial of Eaton’s exception of prescription was erroneous, leading to the reversal of the judgment. The court rendered a decision sustaining Eaton's exception and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against Eaton, with costs assessed to the plaintiffs.