Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; February 14, 2006; Florida; State Appellate Court
Ricardo Dominguez appeals a re-sentencing order after his initial sentence for aggravated assault on a police officer was deemed vindictive. The original sentence was 17 years as a habitual felony offender (HFO), followed by 5 years of probation. Upon appeal, the court found the 17-year split sentence vindictive and remanded for re-sentencing by a different judge. On remand, the State requested a maximum sentence of 30 years, leading to a new sentence of 20 years as an HFO, which was later vacated by the successor judge due to lack of new facts or circumstances. Instead of conducting a new hearing, the successor judge reimposed the original 17-year sentence, prompting Dominguez to appeal again.
The State conceded that a new sentencing hearing was necessary, and the court agreed, reversing the order and remanding for a new hearing where the defendant must be present and represented. Dominguez requested re-sentencing before a different judge, citing the prior ruling of vindictiveness. The defense argued that the successor judge should not reimpose the 17-year sentence without new justifying facts, a point supported by the principle established in Wilson v. State. However, the court noted that while the defense's argument has merit, it is limited by Wilson’s clarification that resentencing should restore the defendant to the position they would have occupied if the original plea discussions had not occurred, thus requiring a de novo sentencing hearing without deference to previous proceedings.
The defendant, while on probation, committed a new crime, leading to a probation revocation hearing where the predecessor judge revoked probation and imposed a sentence. During this hearing, the judge offered a plea bargain of 4.41 years concurrent with the probation violation sentence, which the defendant rejected in favor of a trial. Following the trial, the predecessor judge imposed a seventeen-year split sentence, deemed vindictive by the court. The predecessor judge indicated two different appropriate sentences for the same conduct: 4.41 years after the revocation hearing and seventeen years post-trial, despite no new facts arising during the trial. The Supreme Court mandated that the successor judge will not defer to the previous sentences or plea negotiations, requiring an independent sentencing judgment. As a result, the current sentencing order is reversed, and a new sentencing hearing is ordered before a different judge.
